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THAT JUSTICE BE SEEN 
THE AMER ICAN PROSECUT ION ’ S  USE  OF  F I LM  AT  THE  
NUREMBERG INTERNAT IONAL  M I L I TARY  TR IBUNAL  
 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation examines the use of motion-picture film by the American Prosecution 
before and during the „Trial of the Major War Criminals‟ at the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Germany, 1945-1946. My research is based on 
never before used material including newly discovered film, official papers, and 
private letters. I argue that investigating the use of film, more than any other medium, 
enables us to comprehend the American Prosecution‟s vision of justice after the 
Second World War. I focus on three crucial themes: the political, juridical and moral 
concerns of the American planners and prosecutors. 
 
Although much historical scholarship focuses on American designs to „re-educate‟ 
Germans, I show that the American planners of Nuremberg felt that the education of 
Americans was also essential. The trial was designed to draw a distinction between 
Nazi „barbarism‟ and „Western civilization‟ and presented an opportunity that 
Americans used to promote their political values at home as well as abroad. They 
used film to affirm and showcase – to millions of their fellow citizens – some of the 
values and methods of liberal democracy. 
 
The American planners and prosecutors viewed the Nazi defendants as responsible 
representatives of the German people and used the controversial doctrine of 
„conspiracy‟ to facilitate the new principle of individual accountability in international 
law. Additionally, they also proclaimed that planning and waging „aggressive‟ war 
had constituted, years before the Nazis came to power, criminal activity. Yet 
representing „conspiracy‟ and „aggression‟ with film graphically exposed the limits of 
law in dealing with unprecedented injustice. 
 
The particular form of spectacle arising from the American use of film at Nuremberg 
has remained overlooked by scholarship in a variety of relevant fields. The American 
Prosecution staged a form of morality play with film. The aim, however, was not the 
redemption of the Nazi defendants; it was, rather, only to condemn and punish them. 
The Americans confronted the defendants with images of atrocity, as well as images 
of themselves. This technique functioned as a theatrical device in which onlookers felt 
that they could examine the defendants for signs (or the absence) of remorse. This 
spectacle enabled the presentation of a particularly powerful moral case against the 
defendants and the Nazi ideology they had espoused. 
 
This dissertation, therefore, offers a new contribution to our understanding of the visual 
culture of legal procedure by using an historical case-study of transitional justice after 
the Second World War. 
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Some Notes on the Text 
 
With the hopeful aspiration of being relevant to readers on both sides of the Atlantic, I have 
chosen to use an alpha-numeric date format dd/Mmm/yyyy rather than the more typically 
British numeric dd/mm/yyyy (for example, 7/May/1946 rather than 7/5/1946). 
 
Perhaps the most commonly cited published source that I use in this dissertation is, to mention 
its full title here: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, (Nuremberg: 
International Military Tribunal, 1946-9). So widespread among historians is use of only the 
abbreviated authorship (IMT), with only volume and page referenced, (ie without reference to 
the title), that I have decided to retain this format with the exception of including a date when 
referring to the transcripts of the proceedings. 
 
Crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are often used by lawyers and 
historians to refer to all manner of accepted uses of these terms. When referring to the specific 
legally defined crimes in the London Charter of 8/Aug/1945, therefore, I have chosen to 
capitalise the wording in order to avoid any doubt or misunderstandings. „Crimes against 
humanity‟, for example, are defined with much greater breadth today than „Crimes Against 
Humanity‟ in the London Charter. 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation examines the use of motion-picture film by the American Prosecution 
before and during the „Trial of the Major War Criminals‟ at the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Germany, 1945-1946. All criminal trials possess  
political, legal, and moral dimensions that can provoke numerous questions. Some of 
these can appear, in different cases, to be more resolved than others. Who has the 
authority and right to pass judgement and inflict punishment? What are the 
appropriate laws and procedures to be applied? Do moral transgressions also 
constitute legal wrongs (and visa versa)? What is the appropriate punishment? The 
three themes of politics, law and morality are what I am concerned with in regard to 
the Nuremberg IMT. I will argue that the way in which the American Prosecution used 
film provided it with the best available means to impart political and moral lessons – 
not only to Germans, but also, in particular, to Americans. 
 
I begin, as Judith Shklar proposed, with the recognition that law is a form of 
political action.1 Due to the unprecedented historical circumstances that led to the 
proceedings of the IMT at Nuremberg, it is relatively easy to recognise the workings of 
political authority and choice-making which, usually in more subtle forms, exist in 
every instance of legal procedure (international or not). Shklar coined the term 
legalism to describe an ideology that proclaims belief in the existence of a body of 
rules within a (legal) sphere entirely isolated from political concerns. She character-
ised this ideology as a form of political choice itself. In regard to modern „war crimes 
trials‟ including the Nuremberg IMT, Gary Jonathan Bass has developed this theme 
further, characterising the legalism of liberal international lawyers as a form of 
idealism (in contrast, and in opposition to, political realism).2 Amongst a series of 
convincing propositions, Bass suggests that, in choosing to marshal the machinery of 
legal procedure in an international setting, liberal states occasionally accompany 
such legalism with an attempt to apply and proselytise domestic political norms. A 
notable example he cites is the impulse to extend, beyond the borders of the United 
                                                     
1 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), p. 143. 
2 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 5-12. 
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States of America, some of the principles enshrined within the American Constitution.3 
This impulse is quite apparent in the case of the Nuremberg IMT where the American 
Prosecution condemned Nazi leaders for – in addition to war crimes against their own 
soldiers – Crimes Against Humanity. The victims of such crimes had been deprived of 
their rights to life, liberty and property without due process of law. Bass‟ emphasis, 
therefore, is on the way in which domestic norms are exported by liberal legalists and 
applied to foreign victims as well as to the „war-criminals‟ of defeated regimes. 
Much other research has been produced in regard to the varieties of justice – not 
all in legal form – applied to past wrong-doers in societies undergoing political 
transformation. „Transitional Justice‟ has become a „field‟ of research which 
demonstrates that a legal response to injustice constitutes only one political choice of 
action of which there are numerous varieties and alternatives.4 In common with Bass‟ 
research, the focus on the ideas and practices of the agents of justice is geared 
towards consideration of their immediate and long-term effects on societies which 
have emerged form the traumatic experiences of illiberal and violent rule. In the case 
of the Nuremberg IMT, such approaches beg questions such as: from where and how 
did the ideas of Nuremberg originate and what effects did they have on German 
society? 
This dissertation is similarly concerned with the political ideas and practices of 
legalists – in this case, of the American prosecutors and planners of the Nuremberg 
IMT. But, rather than investigating the way in which they exported American ideas 
and methods for German reception, I focus on the way in which they were 
concerned with domestic, American reception. Informative research, utilizing opinion 
polls and other sources, has already been conducted on the American public‟s 
attitudes to the trial and its laws.5 My primary interest, however, is the effects such a 
concern with domestic reception had on American involvement with the Nuremberg 
IMT – the influences it had on American planners and lawyers and thus on the 
proceedings and the law itself. In Chapter 2, I investigate the attempt to persuade 
the American public of the value of legal proceedings by examining a film made by 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that was shown to millions of Americans (many 
OSS staff were, by then, working for the American Prosecution in various capacities). 
The only previous research on this film I have discovered amounts to a straightforward 
                                                     
3 Ibid., p. 22. 
4  Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Christine Bell, 'Transitional Justice, 
Interdisciplinarity and the state of the 'Field' or 'Non-Field',' The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009).  
5 William J. Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg: American Attitudes toward the Major German War-Crime 
Trials (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1970). 
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description of its content written in French.6 But by examining That Justice Be Done in 
considerably more depth and utilizing previously unused but highly relevant 
documentation (files of the OSS, released from the late 1990s), I demonstrate that, 
even before the filmmakers were assigned to working for the American Prosecution, 
they became committed to using their craft in order to persuade the American public 
that a trial, rather than a „political‟ solution (i.e. summary execution), was the 
appropriate response to Nazi injustice. Once American prosecutors became involved 
with the production of this film, the legal, political and moral lessons they strove to 
impart – not only via the film, but also via the trial itself – were influenced significantly 
by a concern with American public opinion. The legal approach was conceived and 
portrayed as the American, democratic way – in dramatic contrast to Nazi (in)justice. 
The medium of film provided American legalists with the most practical and powerful 
means in persuading their fellow citizens that democracy and legal justice – including 
the principle of due process – went hand-in-hand. 
 
Sixty-five years after the birth of international criminal law, our own era is awash 
with many legacies of the Nuremberg IMT.7 The most salient legal legacies 
rediscovered during the first post-Cold-War decade were the universalizing categories 
of crimes against humanity and genocide.8 Genocide, unlike in 1945, is now generally 
deemed by international lawyers and others to be the worst of all crimes.9 The term, 
first coined in print by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, appeared in the Nuremberg IMT 
indictment but, due to its conflation with more traditional war crimes by both 
prosecutors and judges, was seldom mentioned throughout the proceedings and not 
at all in the Tribunal‟s Judgement.10 The United Nations‟ adoption of both legal 
constructs demonstrated to some international lawyers only that the road to hell was 
paved with good conventions.11 Like their humanitarian antecedents, most notably in 
                                                     
6 Christian Delage, La Vérité par l'image: De Nuremberg au procès Milosevic (Paris: Denoël, 2006), pp. 185-
189. 
7 This point is borrowed from: Jonathon A. Bush, '"The Supreme ... Crime" and its Origins: The Lost Legislative 
History of the Crime of Aggressive War,' Columbia Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 8 (2002), p. 2325. These 
many legacies are not merely confined to international or even national arenas. The Nuremberg IMT 
has, for example, left its marks on the local politics and the physical environment of that „Haunted City‟. 
See: Neil Gregor, Haunted City: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale 
University Press, 2008). 
8 For the definition of crimes applied at the Nuremberg IMT, see Appendix II. 
9 Patricia M. Wald, 'Genocide and Crimes Against Humannity,' Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2007), p. 624. 
10 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). For the IMT 
judgement see: IMT, Vol. XXII, pp. 441-587. 
11 B.V.A. Rölling, „The Law of War and National Jurisdiction since 1945‟, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 100, No. 2, 
(1960), p. 445, cited in: Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice 
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the Hague Conventions at the start of the century, these measures of inhumanity 
seemed to function purely like Cassandra‟s prophecies of more horrors to come. 
Merely surviving on UN paper in a frozen state throughout the Cold War – despite the 
numerous instances of illegal state-sponsored mass killings12 – they were not applied in 
the form of criminal prosecutions until the onset of a New (Dis)Order at end of the 20 th 
century.13 With the institution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, the terms crimes against humanity and genocide would, for 
some murderous leaders and their underlings, come to convey, once again, 
something a little more meaningful than the mere moral posturing of diplomats that 
one sceptical UN insider of the 1960s condemned as no more than theatre, a 
(pseudo) Sacred Drama.14 Like Nuremberg, however, the ICTY was an ad hoc affair 
and it will eventually be closing its doors for good. Yet the dream of some jurists who 
witnessed Nuremberg – the idea of a permanent international criminal court – finally 
became a reality in 2002.15 
However, official American participation in current developments in international 
criminal law is considerably less than it was. In the 1940s, in addition to participating in 
the IMT, the Americans ran twelve „Subsequent‟ Trials at Nuremberg which, although 
run exclusively by themselves, made use of the same international criminal law 
enshrined in the London Charter of 1945.16 Whilst each of these trials was a more 
humble affair than the IMT, the combined effort constitutes a truly mammoth 
undertaking representing what was a considerable American commitment to, and 
faith in, the rule of international criminal law. But today, America is not one of the 
„State Parties‟ to the Treaty of Rome which defines the authority and jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague. Furthermore, the legacy of America‟s 
                                                                                                                                                           
(2nd ed.) (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 179. 
12 See, for example, Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan, (eds.), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
13 For the text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, see on the 
United Nations website: http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm (last access:24/Sep/2010). For the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last access: 
24/Sep/2010). 
14 Conor Cruise O'Brien & Feliks Topolski, The United Nations: Sacred Drama (London: Hutchinson, 1968). 
15 See, for example, Vespasian V. Pella, 'Towards an International Criminal Court,' The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1950). Pella assisted Lemkin in producing the text of the UN 
„Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide‟. 
16 The crimes outlined (but not comprehensively defined) in the London Charter were as follows: Crimes 
Against Peace, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and, as I contend in Chapter 2, Conspiracy to 
commit all of the foregoing (the Tribunal‟s interpretation of the Charter restricted the relevance of 
conspiracy to only Crimes Against Peace). See Appendix II for Article 6 of the London Charter. For a 
record of relevant documents relating to the negotiations at London, including minutes of many 
discussions between American, British, French and Soviet representatives, see: Robert H. Jackson, (ed.), 
International Conference on Military Trials, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1949). For a record 
of the „Subsequent‟ Nuremberg Trials, see: Department of the United States Army, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, October 1946 - April 1949, 15 
Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). 
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legal strategy at Nuremberg has not fared well. The crime of „aggressive war‟ was 
emphasised by the Americans at Nuremberg as the „supreme crime,‟ a proposition 
which was supported by the Tribunal in its judgement. But its inclusion in the London 
Charter was highly controversial. At the time, many jurists criticised it as a retrogres-
sive, ex post facto, application of a standard which hardly merited the name of „law‟ 
at all.17 More relevant today, for many critics, the attempt to condemn individuals for 
starting wars was, and is, viewed as moral and political business better done without 
recourse to law.18 Although „aggressive war„ is mentioned in the Rome Statute of 
1998, this document states that agreement would be required between the State 
Parties over its definition and use before the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction with this 
crime. Delegates to the first ICC Review Conference in Kampala, 2010, finally agreed 
on its definition but could not agree on the more fundamental issue of whether the 
court should be authorised to judge such cases. This failure to reach agreement 
reflects the very political nature of identifying and condemning „aggressive war‟ with 
its implicit requirement to distinguish between „just‟ and „unjust‟ wars.19 
 
The American Prosecution‟s obsession with „aggressive war‟ features throughout 
this dissertation since I argue that the prosecutors believed it addressed the political 
and moral concerns of the American public. But if we wish to identify a purely 
American influence on the use of law at Nuremberg there is no better example than 
the American planners‟ and prosecutors‟ insistence on using the legal doctrine of 
conspiracy. Research on the use of this doctrine at Nuremberg is usually concerned 
with the American Prosecution‟s (unsuccessful) attempts to convince the Tribunal to 
attach responsibility to the defendants for pre-war activity that reached back to the 
formation of the Nazi party in 1919. In this way, the Prosecution viewed and portrayed 
the creation of German concentration camps, for example, as preparatory measures 
– part of the conspiracy to wage „ruthless‟ and „aggressive‟ war (the Tribunal, 
however, maintaining that it only held jurisdiction over crimes directly connected to 
war, was only willing to consider the existence of a „concrete‟ conspiracy for 
„aggressive war‟ dating from 5/Nov/1937).20 Another use of this legal doctrine was to 
                                                     
17 Hans Kelsen, 'Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?,' The 
International Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1947), p. 164. 
18 See, for example, Baron Maurice Hankey, Political, Trials and Errors (Oxford: Pen-in-hand, 1950). 
19 Having reached agreement over a definition of the crime, the decision of whether or not to give the  
ICC the authority to hear cases of aggression has been postponed yet again. The matter will be 
revisited in 2017. See: website: Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last access:  28/Sep/2010); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th ed.) (London: Allen Lane, 2006). 
20 This was the date of a meeting in the Reich Chancellery between Hitler, and, among others, the 
defendants Goering, von Neurath and Raeder. The subject was the aims of German foreign policy 
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confer culpability onto the many thousands of Germans who would not fit into the 
dock with their leaders. In treating some of the leaders at Nuremberg as representa-
tives of particular organizations, and detailing the criminal aims and deeds of these 
organizations, the Prosecution convinced the Tribunal to declare most of them, along 
with the individual defendants, to be criminal. The plan was to enable other courts to 
convict members of these organizations relatively quickly on the basis of their 
membership alone. But this was never put into action, since „de-Nazification,‟ with its 
questionnaires and categories of political guilt, plus „re-education,‟ became the 
chosen alternatives of the Allied Control Council. 
My purpose in examining the American Prosecution‟s use of the doctrine of 
conspiracy, however, is to show that the Tribunal‟s interpretation of it left the most 
fundamental aim of the London Charter severely compromised. So taken for granted 
is the belief that individual responsibility was defined unambiguously within the 
London Charter, and that applying this principle at the trial was a straightforward 
mater, that I have discovered no investigations of what I contend to be a crucial 
inter-dependant link between individual responsibility and the use of conspiracy at 
Nuremberg.21 With an examination of Article 6 of the London Charter in Chapter 2, I 
chart just how the principle of individual responsibility became dependant on the 
American Prosecution‟s use of conspiracy, and how the Tribunal‟s differing (and 
limiting) interpretation of that doctrine subsequently rendered the application of 
individual responsibility legally flawed. The point is that the law, on its own (legalist) 
terms, and as used by the American Prosecution, did not succeed in doing much 
justice at Nuremberg. Instead of doing justice via legal means, the Americans were 
far more successful in other ways. 
 
The Nuremberg IMT has been described and defended by Mark Osiel as an 
example of a „liberal show-trial‟: „[t]o maximize their pedagogic impact,‟ he states, 
„such trials should be unabashedly designed as monumental spectacles‟. Yet he 
acknowledges that liberal-legal narratives, in their attempt to disclose the „minutiae‟ 
of their stories, may become dull – as evinced by Rebecca West‟s characterisation of 
the Nuremberg court as „a citadel of boredom‟ in the closing stages of the IMT trial .22 
                                                                                                                                                           
which could only be „settled by force‟. The minutes were recorded by Colonel Hossbach. See PS-386, 
IMT, Vol. XXV, p. 402. 
21 For one  example,  of which there are many thousands of others: Christian Tomuschat, 'The Legacy of 
Nuremberg,' Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2006). 
22 Mark Osiel,  In Defense of Liberal Show Trials - Nuremberg and Beyond  in Gue  nae  l Mettraux (ed.), 
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 704-705, 715; Mark J. 
Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick; London: Transaction, 1997); 
Rebecca West, A Train of Powder (London: Macmillan, 1955), p. 3. It is, however, worth reiterating that 
West‟s observation came towards the end of the trial – after a lengthy period of Defence presentation 
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Although stating that no universal moral consensus is possible during trials of transition 
like the IMT, Osiel does view „liberal show-trials‟ as being self-consciously designed to 
demonstrate the value of „liberal morality‟. His emphasis remains, however, on the 
liberalism: the politics of „liberal show-trials‟. But we can run with Osiel‟s observations 
on morality a little further and suggest that, in the case of the Nazi defendants, there 
was, at least, some potential for the beginnings of consensus – the acceptance of 
their accusers‟ moral values – through feelings of guilt for what they had done. Of 
course, a privately held sense of guilt was not quite enough. But a public acknowl-
edgment from the defendants, a show of guilt, would promote the legitimacy of their 
accuser‟s moral values and this is what the American Prosecution hoped to attain. 
 
The remaining chapters (4-6) together chart the fortunes of what I describe as a 
form of morality play: a drama of virtues and vices with moral lessons for Germans 
and Americans. In setting the stage for an „American Show‟ as I frame it, the 
American Prosecution received considerable assistance from the OSS, a fact that 
remained neglected until Michael Salter‟s research on that organization was 
published in 2007.23 With OSS assistance came its personnel‟s high expectations for 
drama and a desire to bring meaning to a huge war-effort. Salter‟s research is mostly 
concerned with the influence that the OSS leader, William J. Donovan, had on the 
high-level planning of the trial. Donovan hoped and believed that the trial would 
amount to „the greatest morality tale ever told‟.24 My research demonstrates that 
individuals much lower down in the organization‟s hierarchy – such as an architect, 
film-editors, and others, were equally enthusiastic about putting on a good show 
(furthermore, many of them remained at Nuremberg for the duration of the American 
Prosecution‟s case, whilst Donovan left soon after the trial began25). The American 
Chief Prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, began by meeting such expectations, impressing 
the judges, his colleagues, and press reporters with a masterful opening speech that 
dramatized the „evil‟ of Nazism and contrasted it with the virtue of „imperilled 
civilization‟.26 But, seemingly in accord with Osiel‟s observations, the minutiae of the 
Prosecution‟s subsequent attempt to build an engaging narrative of Nazi criminality 
                                                                                                                                                           
which was far more tedious than the Prosecution‟s. West‟s observation is sometimes quoted as though 
her comments apply to the entire proceedings in general – or to the beginning. See, for example, 
Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 202. 
23 Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg: Controversies 
regarding the role of the Office of Strategic Services (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). 
24 Ibid., p. 404. 
25 Ibid., pp. 432-433. 
26 IMT, 21/Nov/1945, Vol. II, pp. 99-100. 
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quickly appeared to bleed Nuremberg dry of any drama whatsoever. 
 Chapter 4, however, demonstrates that the boredom was caused, to a great 
extent, by purely practical problems encountered with the novel arrangements for 
the first ever multilingual international criminal trial that took place in a room full of 
many defendants, their counsel and prosecutors. I show that the use of witnesses was, 
in contrast to the expectations of the Prosecution, an opportunity for the Defence to 
widen the scope of enquiry and slow down the pace of the trial – a problem already 
exacerbated by the slow pace of „simultaneous‟ translation which also drained the 
impact of any speech delivered in German (at least, for an English-speaking 
audience). The American Prosecution‟s emphasis on using documents – a room full of 
documents – was the favoured method of the Chief American Prosecutor in providing 
incontestable proof of the defendants‟ guilt. There can be little doubt – despite 
Donald Bloxham‟s contention that producing narratives within the legal framework of 
Nuremberg resulted in bad history – that Jackson‟s preference for documents 
bequeathed a valuable legacy to historians of the Third Reich and even to historians 
of the Holocaust.27 Some of them, like Raul Hilberg made very good use of this 
record.28 Nevertheless, the use of documents failed to provide the engaging narrative 
that the Prosecution had hoped for. 
As I show in Chapter 5, all the practical problems encountered with witnesses and 
documents were avoided with the use of film, a medium that provided the 
opportunity to deliver a controlled narrative of Nazi wrong-doing. Film was used, 
however, for more than that. Whilst most general histories mention the American use 
of film as a high point of drama in the trial, there are very few who examine its use at 
Nuremberg in any detail.29 Laurence Douglas, however, examines in some detail the 
use of Nazi Concentration Camps, the first film to be shown at Nuremberg.30 Perhaps 
his most important insight is that the filmmakers and the American prosecutors did not 
perceive the horrific images on the screen as evidence of the Holocaust – this despite 
its subsequent use by lawyers in other legal settings who did just that. As with other 
                                                     
27 Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and 
Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); IMT.  The first volume of IMT reproduces the London 
Charter, the indictment, and other „pre-trial‟ information; the transcript is reproduced in 21 volumes (2-
22); Vols. 23 and 24 provide chronological and subject indexes as well as a document index; a further 18 
volumes (25-42) reproduce Prosecution and Defence documents in their original language (usually 
German). 
28 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (3rd ed.) (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 
2003). 
29 For what are, perhaps, the two best general accounts of the IMT trial, see: Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of 
the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (London: Bloomsbury, 1993); Ann Tusa & John Tusa, The 
Nuremberg Trial (London: Macmillan, 1983). 
30 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 
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historians looking at film related to the Holocaust, as well as numerous legal scholars 
examining the use of film more generally, Douglas characterises film itself as a form of 
witnessing. But I contend that the way it was used by the American Prosecution at 
Nuremberg means it could function in a much more effective way than human 
witnesses at Nuremberg could: its use echoed a particular theatrical device, a play-
within-a-play, which facilitated a very effective form of spectacle. 
There appears to be only one historian who comes close to explaining the 
phenomenon with which I am concerned. Christian Delage states that the point of 
presenting Nazi Concentration Camps in court was to force the defendants to 
recognize the crimes for which they were responsible.31 I continue from the point at 
which he concludes: the point of using the film, I contend, was to invite observers to 
watch the defendants as they, in turn, watched the film. I apply Dagmar Barnouw‟s 
findings to this spectacle at Nuremberg: as with the way American Signal Corps 
cameramen invited their audience to inspect German civilians for signs, or the 
absence, of remorse (as they were forced to witness the horrors of the camps) so too 
did the American Prosecution invite the rest of those present within the courtroom to 
examine the defendants for signs, or the absence, of remorse.32 They did this because 
they hoped to believe that the defendants, despite proof of their „evil‟ deeds, shared 
the same moral values as themselves: that they had known what they had done was 
wrong.33 I argue that, given the impossibility of achieving any commensurate 
punishment for the defendants‟ unprecedented wrongs, this spectacle functioned as 
method in delivering a limited form of punishment. It was this that would ensure that 
justice was seen. 
 
Chapter 6 applies the themes of preceding chapters – politics, law, and morality – 
to other films shown by the American Prosecution at Nuremberg. In particular, I 
examine the use of what appears, at first sight, to be the most boring piece of film 
presented at the trial. This does, in fact, help to demonstrate that the moral spectacle 
of using film in the courtroom did not depend entirely on the gruesome nature of the 
images. What was important was the accusatory nature of the public spectacle itself. 
As I show, the use of the short film Reichsbank Loot, despite (Cold War) political and 
legal (evidentiary) problems, succeeded in appearing to evince a moral conscious-
                                                     
31 Christian Delage, 'Image as Evidence and Mediation: The Experience of the Nuremberg Trials' in Michael 
Freeman (ed.), Law and Popular Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 503. 
32 Dagmar Barnouw, Germany 1945: Views of War and Violence (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 1996). 
33 For an alternative view, see: Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 
2003).  
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ness in one of the defendants. It was, I contend, this moral form of justice – via the 
spectacle of projecting film in the courtroom – that was most successfully conducted 
by the American Prosecution at Nuremberg.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
EXPLODING THE SWASTIKA 
 
 
The issue comes to just this: whether Mr Jefferson or Mr Hitler has 
sized us up best. The answer is no longer in doubt. Not only Virgin i-
ans, but Yankees as well, and all our countrymen and lovers of fre e-
dom the world over fight today under the banner of Thomas Jefferson. 
Under it and by reason of it we will shatter to bits this new an d ugly 
authoritarianism. 
Robert H. Jackson (13/Apr/1944).1 
 
 
The first step is to acknowledge that law is  a form of political action.  
Judith Shklar (1964).
2
 
 
In the spring of 1945, on the grounds of the Zeppelin field that had served the Nazi 
Party‟s Nuremberg Rallies throughout the 1930s, L. Bennett (“Elby”) Fernberg, with his 
eyes closed, recorded on his Signal Corps movie camera the moment in which a 
gigantic metal swastika was blown to pieces with American explosives.3 He later 
recalled that he had narrowly avoided death during this incident when a piece of 
metal about 10 feet long fell close by; about a dozen other soldiers, he estimated, 
were injured by pieces of flying metal. Without realising the power of the images he 
had recorded until years later, he had managed to capture a symbolic record of 
American purpose that would be carried through – with successes, limitations, 
problems and failures – to the occupation of a defeated Germany. This scene would 
come to symbolise the destruction of Nazism in a visual form utilized by director 
Stanley Kramer in the opening sequence of his 1961 epic, Judgment at Nuremberg.4 
What its use by Kramer implied was a continuity from Allied war-time aims with the 
post-war transformative function of courtroom justice: a determination to destroy the 
political and moral traces of Nazism that had constituted an unprecedented era of 
injustice. In particular, Kramer‟s art reflected the reality of a very political drama. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Robert H. Jackson, „Thomas Jefferson, A Great American‟, speech to the Virginia State Society, 
13/04/1944, reprinted in: USA Congressional Record, 90th Congress, pp. A2047-8. 
2 Shklar, Legalism, p. 143. 
3 Lynwood Abram, The Houston Chronicle, 4/3/2007, p. B2, cited by: John Q. Barrett, „Blowing up the 
Swastika, Nuremberg, Spring 1945‟, (2007), Faculty Profile Page, St. John‟s University, last viewed 
14/02/2009,  http://www.stjohns.edu/media/3/b218e321c9b54732afc1d33bb53a888a.pdf  
4 The fictional film was based loosely on the third „subsequent‟ Nuremberg Trial devoted to prosecuting 
members of the judiciary who had presided over the administration of Nazi „justice‟. Stanley Kramer 
(Dir.), Judgment at Nuremberg, (U.S.A.: M.G.M., 1961). 
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It is not the politics of domestic Party ideologies that this chapter is concerned with, 
for, as we shall see, a certain American Democrat could agree with a certain 
American Republican (who, in turn, could tolerate Marxists) that a trial was the best 
way to deal with the Nazi leaders at the end of the war. Rather, I am concerned here 
with the politics of patriotism or what might be termed the comparative politics of 
international law. Donald Bloxham has provided insights into how certain legal 
thinking that shaped the trial (particularly the idea of „conspiracy‟) affected the 
subsequent historiography of the Holocaust by – amongst other things – rendering a 
particularly intentionalist interpretation of the Third Reich. But the extent of his critique 
of the legal process „doesn‟t entirely convince‟.5 What is missing from his account is 
any detailed analysis of how the laws applied at Nuremberg were shaped in great 
measure by American concerns over the domestic (American) reception of the IMT 
trial. What this chapter will demonstrate, through examining the production of a film 
aimed at the American public, is that these political concerns were central to the 
way in which American planners and prosecutors designed and conducted it. The 
„primacy of foreign politics‟, so often cited as a guide to explaining the history of 
domestic German politics, helps to explain the American approach to international 
law too. Nuremberg was a piece of foreign policy which its designers felt would help 
to define the character of American democracy – at home and abroad. It would, 
however, require domestic consent which could not be manufactured but, instead, 
required persuasion. The use of film, as we shall see, provided the American planners 
and prosecutors with the best means to advocate their vision of justice to the 
American people. 
                                                     
5 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial; Lawrence Douglas, 'Review: Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the 
Formation of Holocaust History and Memory,' Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2004), p. 
137. (Emphasis added). Douglas rightly points out that the mistakes of historians are just that – not merely 
the mistakes of the law or of lawyers. 
 
F I G U R E  1 ,  A / B .   Poetic Justice in visual form: „Elby‟ Fernberg‟s U.S. Signal Corps footage of an 
exploding swastika at Nuremberg. 
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2.1. Politics By Other Means 
Perceiving injustice itself involves political choices: at the most fundamental level, 
where some see injustice, others choose to class the same phenomena as 
misfortune.6 Yet even when, as among the Allies after the Second World War, there 
was little doubt that a multitude of grave injustices had taken place, no universal 
consensus existed in the prioritization of cases for condemnation and retribution. Nazis 
had perceived the very existence of Jews and the „problem‟ of having to destroy 
them as merely Germany‟s misfortune. Genocide was not, however, the most salient 
issue, either during or after the war, for the Allied governments who, although 
claiming to be outraged and in some position to respond, offered little more than 
condemnatory or sympathetic words. What usually counted first were the national 
victims that states represented.7 
During the war, representatives of émigré governments from European nations that 
were occupied by Germany, along with British and American professors and 
governmental representatives, convened and instituted in Britain a variety of 
commissions and assemblies in order to plan methods of retribution.8 The most well 
known and official of these was the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) 
which, although sidelined by the British and American governments (and snubbed 
from the outset by the Soviets) made significant progress in conceiving juridical 
responses to German behaviour.9 Rather than merely concerning itself with criminal 
investigations, which several members of the commission deemed to be inadequate, 
such progress went beyond the remit that the British and American governments had 
been willing to tolerate. This included, for example, the creation of a committee to 
discuss matters of law, such as the proposal by Dr. Bohuslav Ečer, the Czech 
representative, to prosecute leading Nazis for the crime of „aggressive war‟.10 Central 
to the retributive response that would eventually materialise at Nuremberg were 
particular interpretations of Nazi injustice which, in the end, were those of particular 
                                                     
6 Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1990). 
7 For this reason, as Hannah Arendt observed, the trial of Adolf Eichmann was viewed by the Prosecution at 
Jerusalem as an opportunity to rectify the lack of emphasis on Jewish victims at Nuremberg. See: 
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Rev. and enl. ed.) (New York; 
London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 6-7. 
8 See for example, mention of the International Commission on Penal Reconstruction and Development 
and the London International Assembly in Bush, '"The Supreme ... Crime" and its Origins,' pp. 2341-2342. 
9 See Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
10 Ibid., pp. 93, 97. 
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nation-states: those represented by the „Big Three‟ at Yalta, plus France.11 For other 
nations (many of whom had been represented in the UNWCC), such as Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, and groups, such as the American Jewish Conference and the World 
Jewish Congress, there was encouragement to mark official support for the Tribunal or 
expressions of sympathy, but little chance for direct involvement in courtroom 
proceedings. 
What was new and significant in the early days of May 1945, alongside imminent 
victory in Europe, was that the United States had finally instituted a civilian-led ad hoc 
office devoted to the creation of an international court and the prosecution of the 
leaders of Nazi Germany. It was the plan initiated in the War Department by Colonel 
Murray Bernays in the autumn of 1944 that would, more than any other, affect the 
manner in which „Nuremberg‟ was run.12 But by the spring, the project was no longer 
a military one. The Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of 
Axis Criminality (OCC) was answerable only to the President, and only one civilian 
individual was to be held directly accountable. 
That man was Robert Houghwout13 Jackson, the 54-year-old Supreme Court 
Justice, who was not only deemed to be the best representative for the ideals of 
democratic justice, but also happened to be a living embodiment of the American 
Dream. Brought up on the farmlands of upstate New York, he belonged to the last 
generation of lawyers who could be admitted to the Bar without a university degree. 
From within a community characterised by social and political conservatism, he was 
influenced by the independent streak in his father, a freemason who never went to 
church and always voted Democrat. Once Robert completed his apprenticeship at 
his cousin‟s law firm in Jamestown, he busied himself with building a practice of his 
own and gaining a reputation as the successful advocate of local business in its fight 
against big outsiders. In 1934, he moved to Washington to work in the Treasury 
Department. He progressed to the position of Assistant Attorney General in the Tax 
Division of the Department of Justice and, subsequently, in the Antitrust Division. He 
had become an advocate for Roosevelt‟s New Deal, for the American citizen against 
the undemocratic „conspiracies‟ of corporate tax evasion, monopolization and 
corruption.14 After only a brief spell as Solicitor General he was appointed, in 1940, as 
                                                     
11 France was offered a place on the tribunal due to the fact of its being part of the occupation. David 
Reynolds suggests that the French, due to British insistence at Yalta, secured a greater involvement than 
Stalin would otherwise have intended. See: David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the 
Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 123. 
12 Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (London: Deutsch, 1981), pp. 48-74. 
13 Pronounced “How-utt” as one contemporary pointed out: anonymous, „Biographical Sketch‟, June, 
1941, LoC/RHJP, 189/5. 
14 He was a loyal servant of President Roosevelt and wrote a biography of him which was published 
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Attorney General. Only a year after that did he became an Associate Justice on the 
bench of the Supreme Court. Whilst retaining this position at the end of the war, 
President Truman chose him to be „America‟s Advocate‟ in order to prosecute the 
case against the „Major War Criminals‟ of a defeated Nazi Germany, a project that 
he would later remember as the most important experience of his life.15  
 
 
2.2. Operation Justice 
On the 2nd May 1945, President Harry S. Truman gave Jackson authority to undertake 
„Operation Justice‟ in the form of Executive Order number 9547: 
[1] Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson is hereby designated to act as the Repre-
sentative of the United States and as its Chief of Counsel in preparing and prose-
cuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against [...] the leaders of the Euro-
pean Axis Powers [...] 
 
[2] [He] is authorized to select and recommend to the President or to the head of 
any executive department, independent establishment, or [...] agency necessary 
personnel to assist in the performance of his duties [...]. The head of [any such 
organization] is hereby authorized to assist [Jackson] and to employ such person-
nel and make such expenditures, [...] as [Jackson] may deem necessary to 
accomplish [...] this order, and may make available, assign, or detail for duty with 
[Jackson] such members of the armed forces and other personnel as may be 
requested [...]. 
 
[3] [He] is authorized to cooperate with [...] any foreign government to the extent 
deemed necessary by him [...]16 
This extraordinary order represented a designation of responsibilities and authority that 
had traditionally resided elsewhere. The Office of the Judge Advocate General 
(JAG), the traditional administrative office of military justice, might otherwise have 
assumed the responsibility for applying the programme outlined in Point 1.17 Point 2 
                                                                                                                                                           
posthumously:  Robert Houghwout Jackson & John Q. Barrett, That Man: An Insider's Portrait of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
15 The first and, currently, only biographical monograph covering Jackson‟s entire life is: Eugene C. 
Gerhart, America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson (Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). For a concise and 
relatively recent account of his role at Nuremberg, see: John Q. Barrett, 'The Nuremberg Roles of Justice 
Robert H. Jackson,' Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2007). Barrett‟s book-
length account of Jackson‟s role at Nuremberg is forthcoming. Jackson, together with Harlan B. Phillips, 
edited the substantial text of his reminiscences in an unpublished oral biographical history held in the 
Library of Congress: LoC/RHJP/258-9. It was revised by Jackson himself and returned to Phillips in 1954, 
just one week before the Justice‟s death. See also chapters 8 & 9 in Jeffrey D. Hockett, New Deal 
Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996). 
16 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 21. 
17 A War Crimes Office dedicated to the investigation and accumulation of evidence for post-war trials 
was, in fact, set up in JAG by direction from the Secretary of War on 25/09/1944: Thos T. Handy, 
„Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General ... Punishment of War Criminals‟, 30/11/1944, NARA/RG-
226/148/76. The remit, however, resembled the traditional military tribunal in its direction to „Collect from 
every available source all evidence of cruelties and atrocities ... against members of our armed forces 
or other Americans...‟. 
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gave unprecedented independence and powers to a civilian to negotiate with, and 
take control of, any military personnel in the European Theatre of Operation (ETO), a 
physical and legal zone of military occupation. The last paragraph represented 
plenipotentiary powers that usually rested only with the State Department. But his 
authority stretched even further: in addition to being a prosecutor and a negotiator, 
he would also, effectively, become a legislator of international criminal law. That such 
powers were relatively quickly assigned to a single individual in the form of a single 
side of hastily-worded typescript, suggests that not only did the President have 
considerable confidence in the abilities and reliability of Jackson, but also that the 
circumstances were quite novel. 
What was most new, and in direct contrast to the aftermath of the First World War, 
was the American determination, explicitly expressed, to bring legal justice to the 
highest leaders of Germany. That Nazi leaders would be brought to trial had been 
assumed by some already in their interpretation of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, 
signed by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. The declaration was, however, mostly 
concerned with the trial and punishment of direct perpetrators of atrocities in 
particular places – for which there would be little doubt of the validity of legal 
jurisdiction. Only the final paragraph addressed the issue of the „Major‟ criminals: 
„[This] declaration is without prejudice to the case of major criminals, whose offenses 
have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint 
decision of the Governments of the Allies.‟18 It was quite possible to interpret this - as 
most in the British Foreign Office did – to mean that „punishment‟ meant summary 
execution, as Lord Simon advised Prime Minister Churchill who took on board Simon‟s 
proposal before discussing the matter with President Roosevelt in Quebec.19 It was not 
until towards the very end of the war that the American and British governments 
resolved on bringing the highest-placed Nazi leaders to justice through legal means.20 
A few days after Jackson had been given the authority of his new office, it had 
become clear to him that, although plenty of discussion had taken place on both 
sides of the Atlantic in regard to theories of international criminality and courts, far less 
hard evidence of the type that he deemed necessary – connecting high leaders to 
decision-making involving war-making and atrocities – had actually been gathered 
by any agency. The UNWCC, he had been advised, had garnered much of its 
„evidence‟ from little more than newspaper-reports and intelligence that, in many 
cases, had been forwarded from American military sources. Those sources themselves 
                                                     
18 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 12. 
19 Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, p. 80. 
20 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp. 190-246.  
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had proved to be far less fruitful than Jackson had understood at the time he 
accepted his new role.21 
 
 
2.3. The Office of Strategic Services 
There was, however, one American organisation that was ideally suited to assisting 
Jackson: the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This young (but soon to be disbanded) 
organisation had considered in some depth the issue of collecting „war crimes‟ 
evidence from almost the moment of its inception in the summer of 1942.22 By default, 
the OSS had become the principal US agency in considering post-war legal justice 
because the issue had been given little direction from Roosevelt until the last months 
of the war: with such a dearth of policy, few departments or agencies were willing to 
address the issue that would flare into a „war on the Potomac‟ during those last 
months of the European war.23 As a result, the OSS was, by the end of the war, most 
suited (and willing) to assist in the Nuremberg project to such a degree of significance 
that has only recently been appreciated and explained by Michael Salter.24 That its 
operatives had engaged in espionage and „special operations‟ alongside resistance 
and underground fighters throughout Europe meant that it was uniquely suited to 
locating sources of incriminating evidence. Yet it had also succeeded in tapping the 
talents of America‟s brightest civilians at home: intellectuals and academics of the 
Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), including several anti-Nazi émigrés from Europe 
who spent much of the war busying themselves writing secret reports that amounted 
to first drafts of Nazi-Germany history, international criminal jurisprudence, and much 
else besides. They included such luminaries as Gordon Craig, Felix Gilbert, Sheldon 
Glueck, H. Stuart Hughes, Otto Kirchheimer, Raphael Lemkin, Herbert Marcuse, Franz 
Neumann, Hajo Holborn, Carl Schorske and many others, several of whom would 
contribute in various ways to the proceedings of the IMT at Nuremberg.25 
The OSS was headed by William J. Donovan, a decorated general from the 
previous war and a highly successful civilian attorney whose law-practice operated 
                                                     
21 RHJ, Diary, 7/May/45, LoC/RHJP/95/‟Diary‟. 
22 The OSS was created through a reorganisation of intelligence gathering that concluded in the summer 
of 1942. See: Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A (London: Deutsch, 
1983), p. 141. 
23 The quotation is part of the title of the first chapter in: Smith, The Road to Nuremberg. It describes the 
bitter inter-departmental struggles to decide a post-war war-crimes policy. 
24 Salter, Nazi War Crimes. Chapter 8. 
25 Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942-1945 
(Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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from No. 2, Wall Street.26 Unlike Jackson, he was a Catholic and supporter of the 
Republican Party but he was willing to tolerate the presence of Marxists or left-leaning 
individuals within his organizations so long as they were devoted to defeating the 
Nazis.27 Almost as soon as the OSS had been created, Donovan addressed the issue 
of gathering war crimes evidence by declaring the need to procure statements from 
(ex-) prisoners of war.28 In the autumn of 1942, the organisation identified the need to 
begin the process of constructing a list of individual Nazi war criminals.29 One powerful 
motive for the early production of such a list was to ensure that OSS double-agents 
would not be treated as war criminals if captured by Allied troops. A year later a list of 
high-ranking Nazi individuals was produced including some who would appear as 
defendants in the IMT at Nuremberg (the list would be further revised during the 
war).30 
Although, throughout the war, Donovan himself maintained the view that a legal 
response towards the very highest-placed Nazi individuals was highly problematic, the 
R&A Branch of OSS, headed by William L. Langer, had nonetheless devised a method 
for determining individual responsibility that would avoid merely arbitrary selection of 
defendants in any trial that might eventually take place. It was as early as June 1943, 
that R&A report 3113 outlined proposals for a legal response to „Principal Nazi 
Organizations Involved in War Crimes‟.31 Together with a handful of other war-time 
OSS papers related to war-crimes, it would, before August 1945, end up in the hands 
of Robert Jackson.32 
Aiming to „establish the juridical responsibility of such organizations and institutions 
as the Nazi Party, the Reich government, and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) for the 
commission of crimes‟, the report suggested an approach that would later lend itself 
to the useful application of the legal construct of „conspiracy‟, suggesting that: 
                                                     
26 R. Harris Smith, O.S.S.: The Secret History of America's first Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley; London: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 15. For a biography of Donovan which makes no mention of 
Nuremberg, see: Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York, N.Y.: Times Books, 
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27 Smith, O.S.S., p. 29. 
28 Salter, Nazi War Crimes, p. 309. 
29 Ibid., p. 310. 
30 Ibid., pp. 311-312. 
31 OSS, R&A 3113, 5/Jun/1943, Donovan Papers, Vol. 19. 
32 J.B. Donovan, „OSS Documents and Memoranda‟, 2/Aug/1945, NARA/RG-238, 51/18. This memorandum 
lists 38 OSS documents that had been given to Jackson by 2/Aug/1945. It is likely that some would have 
been given in early May 1945. 
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The group approach (as opposed to the consideration of isolated persons) is 
based on the assumption that the indictment of these organizations ... may 
expedite the prosecution of war criminals and help to prove that Nazi war crimes 
are not purely individual acts committed in violation of existing laws but are the 
manifestations of an overall plan which relied, integrally or implicitly, on specific 
organizations as instruments essential or incidental to the execution of its pur-
pose.33 
Although ostensibly concerned principally with organizational responsibility 
(something that would become highly significant in IMT and subsequent trials after the 
war), such an approach, most significantly, was to be used as „a proper basis for the 
selection of the individual defendants.‟34 As Bradley Smith pointed out, the plan to try 
organisations as criminal entities has often been treated as though it were an 
afterthought rather than the heart of the American Prosecution‟s thinking. As Smith 
put it, „The individual defendants were merely the performers through whom the main 
drama was played out.‟35 If, first, organizations could be identified as being 
responsible for what were essentially characterised as institutional crimes, then, rather 
like a class-action in American municipal law, the most representative leaders of such 
organisations could be indicted for crimes of a „common plan or enterprise‟ relating 
to any particular charge.36 The modern novelty (in international law) of individual 
criminal responsibility, not only for war crimes, but planning and waging a war of 
„aggression‟, exists in this document. The four charges defined in the report were as 
follows: 
I. Plot for World Domination 
II. Launching of Illegal Wars, Aggression, and Violation of International 
Treaties 
III. Violation of International Rules of Warfare 
IV. Domestic Crimes 
This report also listed comprehensively all appropriate forms of evidence that it 
suggested should be gathered, including official German documents, the testimony 
of witnesses, and German-made films. 
Although this concise report outlined a theory of prosecution and a method for 
collecting evidence related to an expanded definition of „war crimes‟, this subject 
was not the principal concern of the R&A branch or the OSS as a whole. The 
fundamental purpose of R&A was to produce research (not only based on 
clandestine intelligence) that would be useful for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
military more generally in the fight to win the war. By extension, it also worked towards 
                                                     
33 OSS, R&A 3113, p. 1. (Emphasis added). 
34 Ibid., p.3. 
35 Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 64. 
36 The term „common enterprise‟ is still synonymous with „conspiracy‟ in Anglo-Saxon law and appears in 
various places (from p. 4) within R&A 3113 (op. cit.). 
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ensuring that the Allies would win the peace and produced several influential reports 
detailing the issues that would result from the eventual military occupation of 
Germany. Amongst several „Civil Affairs‟ guides printed by the war department, R&A 
produced such papers as „Dissolution of the Nazi Party and its Affiliated Organiza-
tions‟, „Policy toward revival of old parties and establishment of new parties in 
Germany‟, „Police and Public Safety in Germany‟ and „German Principles of 
Administration and Civil Service in Germany‟.37 Thus, the proposals to indict and try 
Nazi leaders sat within a wider scheme of political transition that was being 
considered within the OSS during the war. These reports were not only to be read by 
prominent officials in preparation for military government. Some of them were also to 
be distilled in a more accessible form for a wider audience of civilian and military 
personnel that would be involved in the occupation of Germany. For this audience, 
however, the ideal medium was the „orientation‟ film which could be produced in-
house: by the Field Photographic Branch (FPB) of the OSS. 
 
 
2.4. The Field Photographic Branch 
As its name implied, the FPB had been created to capture still and moving images of 
strategic importance for overt and covert military operations. It also produced 
training films for OSS and military personnel. Films were made not only to demonstrate 
the use of newly designed weapons or devices, but also in order to assist in the 
provision of more generalized military training. Many of these films relied upon R&A 
research. But once victory against Germany seemed assured, concerns in both the 
R&A and FPB switched to dealing with the administration of military government in a 
defeated Germany once the war would be over. The outline for one such film was 
entitled The Pattern of German Conspiracy and was written in the final days of the 
European war.38 Although the film itself was never made, the written outline highlights 
the thread of consistency between FPB thinking before and after the OSS came to 
Jackson‟s aid in preparing for the prosecution of the „major war criminals‟. 
Designed to be shown to „all military personnel concerned with the administration 
of military government in Germany, as well as for interested State Department and 
Congressional groups‟, this outline was informed by readings of a variety of R&A 
                                                     
37 O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, British Library Microfilm holdings/ OPL 
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38 Budd Schulberg, „The Pattern of German Conspiracy: A Cinematic Supplement to the Guide for Civil 
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reports as well as Sigrid Schulz‟s Germany Will Try It Again, Louis Nizer‟s What to do with 
Germany, and „numerous writings by Lord Vansittart, Dorothy Thompson, Brookings 
Institute, etc‟.39 It was subtitled „A Cinematic Supplement to the Guides for Civil 
Affairs‟ and began by suggesting that, although the war was almost won militarily, the 
Allies would still need to win the peace: 
After five years of struggle, suffering and tireless devotion to the cause of freedom, 
the peace-loving nations have overcome the most ambitious conqueror the world 
has ever known. As this prospectus is being written, mighty armies converge on 
Berlin from the east and from the west. For war-weary millions throughout the 
world, the conflict seems almost at an end. But is it? 40 
The rhetorical question was soon followed by another which asked „What to do with 
Germany?‟41 Rather than providing any single straightforward answer, the outline was 
designed to highlight likely problems that would be encountered during the military 
occupation and control of Germany. But rather than dealing only with the near-
future, it was mostly concerned with the past – and, more precisely, the lessons that 
history might teach. As an accompanying memo put it, it was intended to be:  
a visual survey of the German pattern of anti-democratic and militarist activity, 
with special attention to the 1918-1923 period, focusing the minds of the audience 
on the mistakes and misconceptions of the Allied Commission during the previous 
occupation, and on the methods of deception and evasion which have become 
traditional with German nationalist groups.42 
Thus the film was intended to serve as a warning from history to the future American 
civil and military administrators of an occupied Germany. Starting with the story of the 
Treaty of Versailles, delivered by „the well-intentioned‟ Wilson, the decline of the 
Weimar Republic was narrated in dramatic form. A scenario – invented rather than 
gleaned from any text or footage – pictured a demobilized German lieutenant 
questioning his war-hero, General Ludendorff, who advised him to bide his time and 
view the instigation of republican democracy as only a temporary imposition. This was 
followed by „Free Corps‟ and „Schwarz Reichswehr‟ sequences detailing the methods 
of Germany‟s illegal and clandestine remilitarisation. 
A sequence entitled „War Criminals‟ set out a list of German crimes including 
„International Acts in defiance of treaties and international law‟ and „Torture of 
civilians, execution of hostages and systematic terrorism‟. Yet in order to highlight the 
dangers of compromising on the public demand for justice the narration explained 
that these „crimes listed above are not taken from a list of those committed by the 
                                                     
39 Anon., „Memo on German Military Government Film‟, NARA/RG-226/148/73/1050. 
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41 Ibid. 
42 Anon., „Memo on German Military Government Film‟, NARA/RG-226/148/73/1050. 
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missionaries of Kultur between 1939 and 1945. They are vintage 1914-1918. They are 
part of the list of 32 crimes against International Law drawn up by the Allies‟ Special 
Commission in 1919.‟43 There subsequently followed the sorry tale of the abandon-
ment of international criminal justice after the First World War: how an Allied Special 
Tribunal had failed to try the Kaiser due to the gift of refuge provided by Holland 
„whose very independence was owed to the strength of Allied arms‟; how an Allied 
High Tribunal had been set up to try German officers, soldiers and civilians but had 
been thwarted by Allied acquiescence in the establishment of an alternative, 
German, Tribunal that merely acted as a sounding-board for the myth-making of an 
undefeated Germany and the legend of the „stab-in-the-back‟. 
The drama in this outline, which would reappear in subsequent film-scripts, derived 
not only from the emphasis of the injustice of atrocities but also from the guilty going 
free whilst, as the narration put it, „Dame Justice tapped her feet impatiently‟.44 Of the 
„tens of thousands‟ of Germans that might have been indicted after the First World 
War, „the list was cut to 1500‟ and then to 896. The 896 „somehow or other dwindled to 
14‟ and the number kept reducing until the „farce and tragedy‟ of Leipzig (German -
run war crimes trials) resulted in only a handful of convictions accompanied by 
inappropriately light sentences.45 This history lesson was designed to emphasise the 
crucial importance of a concerted effort to impose justice once the occupation of 
Germany was underway. 
This outline was written by Hollywood scriptwriter Budd Schulberg, author of the 
novel What Makes Sammy Run and, later, the creator of the screenplay On the 
Waterfront.46 Some weeks after completing The Pattern of German Conspiracy,  
Schulberg and the FPB were directed to working on „War Crimes‟ for Robert Jackson‟s 
office, an enterprise that became far more involved than the assistance that had 
already been given to the Judge Advocate General‟s War Crimes Office. As John W. 
English, the executive officer of FPB in Washington, explained to a colleague on the 
14th May: 
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...OSS has entered the war crimes situation. Mr. Justice Jackson [...] has requested 
the assistance of the organization. It is consequently necessary for us to decide on 
making every contribution we can. We should be prepared to work in a coordinat-
ing capacity in getting out photographic evidence on war crimes. It is more than 
likely that we should make a picture on the subject and we should plan on giving 
coverage to the big War Crimes trials...47 
Schulberg‟s early work on the War Crimes programme was to develop an outline for a 
documentary on the preparation for the international trial (Nuremberg was not yet 
chosen as the venue). There was, at this point, little official (written) discussion or 
reasoning behind the need for such a film, yet the subtitle to Crime and Punishment 
was „An Outline of a Picture on War Crimes for the American Public‟ and it developed 
further some of the themes already existing in The Pattern of German Conspiracy, the 
most prevalent being the injustice of war crimes suspects having evaded justice after 
the First World War.48 After an introductory sequence portraying the aggressive nature 
of statements from public speeches of leading Nazis (Hitler, Göbbels and Göring), this 
outline also offered a history-lesson beginning with the time of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Again, but in bolder relief, the dwindling numbers of suspects who were to face 
justice was brought home, this time, with the proposed use of graphics: 
NARRATION: 
Of the thousands of Germans accused of war crimes ... fifteen hundred were 
selected for the “first” trials. 
ANIMATION: 
No. accused on an “initial” list – 1500. 
NARATION: 
This list was “abridged” to 896. 
ANIMATION: 
No. accused on the “abridged” list – 896. 
[...] 
The number finally convicted was 6. 
ANIMATION: 
No. actually convicted – 6. 
NARRATION: 
The longest sentence was four years. It was never served. 
What happened?49 
In a new development, Schulberg made more explicit in the narration of this outline 
the legal failings of the period after the First World War, implying that this time the 
„mistakes and misconceptions of the Allied Commission during the previous 
occupation‟ must not be repeated. Such „mistakes‟ included adherence to the 
traditions of immunity for heads-of-state as well as acknowledgement of the defence 
of „superior orders‟: 
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By definition a war crime could not be committed by “heads of state”. In practice, 
Generals and high government officials were also exempted. On the other hand, 
a war crime could not be committed by a German soldier since he acted on 
orders from a superior who acted on orders from a superior who acted on orders 
from ... 
FADE OUT 
After scenes of cheering Germans supporting their Nazi leaders, the narration asked 
„What were they heiling?‟ and proceeded to answer this with an exposition of Nazi 
crimes against „religions, racial minorit[ies] and political opposition‟. These examples 
of crimes were from before the outbreak of the Second World War: the imprisonment 
of Niemöller and other prominent clergymen, and the internment of political 
opponents of the regime at places like Dachau. The next sequence that did seek to 
expose Nazi injustice during the war itself sought to represent the injuries caused to 
innocent Allied civilians: the „vengeance‟ aerial bombing of „undefended cities‟ using 
stock shots of devastation in Rotterdam, Canterbury and Coventry and, after images 
of V1 and V2 rocket-bombs in flight, scenes of the resulting damage caused including 
women and children being carried away from the wreckage. After „a “reprisal” 
speech‟ by Himmler, images of Oradour-sur-Glane were proposed to be shown. 
After considerable coverage on the subject of slave labour, the outline included a 
sequence entitled „Concentration Camps‟ which first proposed to picture emaciated 
prisoners, but no images of the dead. The method applied was to highlight and 
confront a pattern of denial emanating from all levels of German command about 
knowledge or responsibility for the camps. Starting with a German private who „may 
say he did not like his job but had no choice since he was acting under orders‟ this 
sequence progressed, via a SS commander charged with guarding Buchenwald, to 
the top command where Göring continued the mantras of denial: 
Finally we reach the level of Goering, who says, (NY Times, May 11, 1945) that he 
had no knowledge of atrocities or concentration camps: “I was never so close to 
Hitler as to have him express himself on the subject to me.” OVER this statement, 
we see a SHOT OF HITLER AND GOERING conferring together, as intimate and 
friendly a shot as is available. 
Goering‟s voice (in translation) continues: “I believe the atrocities and concen-
tration camps are merely propaganda.” 
Over Göring‟s final words, „merely propaganda‟, was to appear „some of the 
shocking evidence of mass murder‟ at Buchenwald, Belsen, Majdanek and Auschwitz, 
accompanied by figures of death superimposed onto the screen. The list of camps 
and figures of the dead made no distinction between those designed as prisoner 
camps and those designed purely for extermination. In fact, the figures that had been 
estimated for Majdanek, Auschwitz and Treblinka (1,500,000, 1,765,000 and 1,000,000) 
had not yet been calculated for the other examples (Buchenwald, Belsen and 
Dachau) which each had only a question-mark for the figures to be worked out later. 
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This sequence reinforced the identification of the double-edged injustice of immunity 
for heads of state combined with the age-old defence of „superior orders‟ – an 
injustice that traditionally saw the guilty go free. But this time, the guilty – heads of 
state and  those who followed their orders – would have to be punished. This raised 
the question of just what crimes particular individuals could be held accountable for. 
The most significant point was Schulberg‟s acknowledgement of the novelty of Nazi 
crime and the requirement for a new way to describe it: 
Narrator: There was no word to describe these crimes, which could only be 
committed in an age where evil is armed with science. Homicide is the wilful killing 
of a man. This is genicide,[sic] the wilful killing of [a] people.50 
As a reflection of its novelty, the spelling (by an experienced and talented script-
writer) of the typescript word „genicide‟ [sic] stood corrected only in pencil (the letter 
„a‟ was also only later inserted in pencil in order to signify a „people‟ in the singular). 
The decision to supplement the description of this new crime with quotations from 
Marshal Von Rundstedt was inspired by a reading of Raphael Lemkin‟s Free World 
article of April 1945, „Genocide – A Modern Crime‟, in which the originator of the term 
began his piece by quoting the Marshal as saying: 
One of the great mistakes of 1918 was to spare the civil life of the enemy coun-
tries, for it is necessary for the Germans to be always at least double the number of 
the people of the contiguous countries. We are therefore obliged to destroy at 
least a third of their inhabitants...‟51 
This quotation was not only sourced by Schulberg for use in the film outline; Jackson 
also had possession of the Lemkin article whilst in Nuremberg before the trial started.52 
The use of this quotation in the film-outline was coupled with an interview with von 
Rundstedt in which the marshal admitted responsibility only for military strategy – and 
not for the treatment of civilians. But if there was any doubt that a policy of 
depopulation did not come from the very top of the Nazi leadership, Hitler himself was 
quoted as saying: 
We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation...the removal of entire 
racial units... If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war 
without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I 
have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin!53 
These words were taken from Hermann Rauschning‟s Hitler Speaks.54 Although, without 
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context, it would be easy to presently read this narrative as relating to Hitler‟s 
intentions towards Jews, this text was sourced from a passage that purported to 
convey Hitler‟s views on the dangers of „the Slav races‟.55 The use of Rauschning‟s 
testimony here served to demonstrate that Hitler‟s pre-war intent was genocidal and 
that – most significantly from an audience‟s point of view – he had expressed this 
intent explicitly (but only in private).56 Given that, not until the 1980s, „professional‟ 
historians subsequently expressed serious doubts regarding the reliability of Hitler 
Speaks, it is only possible to say with hindsight that the use of such material in this film-
outline was a mistake.57 It was not an effort, through the use of black propaganda, to 
mislead. 
There are two more significant aspects to Crime and Punishment that signify the 
attempt to convince the American public that the right approach to post-war justice 
was underway. First, although insignificant when compared to the perpetration of 
genocide against Jews and other Europeans, the „mistreatment‟ of American 
prisoners of war comprised an entire sequence itself. Brief interviews with convales-
cent American soldiers were proposed in which they would tell of „starvation, 
beatings, lack of sanitation and medical care, torture and murder marches and other 
crimes against the Geneva Conventions‟. At this point, one might have expected 
some explicit reference and considerable time devoted to the massacre of American 
troops by members of the 1st SS panzer division at Malmedy, Belgium, in December 
1944. Yet since the month after this war crime, such was the level of American public 
awareness and outrage at these murders of dozens of troops that it had become 
quite unnecessary to inform the American public of this once again.58 
Instead of dwelling on what was understood by the public to be the single most 
infamous crime against their fellow Americans, the following part of this sequence 
rather served to illustrate the breadth of German injustice against Americans – and to 
connect such injustice directly to the Nazi leadership. Thus after an order by Hitler to 
execute parachute troops; after Göbbel‟s encouragement to lynch downed 
American fliers; after further examples of „incitements‟ by leading Nazis „to unlawful 
acts‟, the viewers of the film would see „a quick flash of the results of these policies – 
the group of American paratroopers shot [...], the machine-gunning of American 
survivors of torpedoes ships, hanging of American fliers, and death of starved 
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American prisoners.‟ This was followed by a proposed stream of quotations from 
German soldiers exhibiting – like their predecessors after the First World War (depicted 
at an earlier stage in the outline) – the continual denial of responsibility and the 
defence of „superior orders‟. 
Next, as though to make the point that, by learning from the mistakes of history, 
America must not be doomed to repeat the failures of the past, that failure was 
dramatized by showing, once again, the statistics of legal failure: from an original 
number of 1,500 suspects, the total diminished down to only 6 that were actually 
convicted with a combined sentence of only one-and-a-half years. 
The following and final sequence proposed a direct address to the camera by 
Jackson, even suggesting the text that he would speak. To be overlaid with images of 
UNWCC staff pouring over voluminous documentary evidence, it made clear the 
historical significance of the moment: 
Jackson: “...It is our task to see that Germany does not again win from the Allies‟ 
forgetfulness of her crimes. This has been a war for international justice and against 
[...] Nazi [...] militarist philosophies. Our successful prosecution of the men and 
organizations most responsible for the crimes that have been depicted will prove 
our war aims before the civilized world: To sustain and revive the dignity of man.”  
(Over this part of Mr. Jackson‟s address, we see a panorama of the most shock-
ing crimes, Buchenwald, Lidice, Coventry, etc.) 
As Mr. Jackson concludes, THE CAMERA returns to him again, looking direct into 
the faces of the audience: 
“The war will not have been fully won unless the conscience of the world – in-
cluding the conscience of Germany [...] – understands that wrong must be 
righted, crime must be punished, international law restored, strengthened, main-
tained and enforced so that the people of the world may live in security and 
peace.” 
FADE OUT 
THE END 
What this text made evident was the openly espoused, self-conscious proposition that 
the postwar international justice to be spearheaded by Jackson‟s office would serve 
the political aims of the war. It would bring meaning to that war as an effort by 
Americans to „revive the dignity of man‟.59 Unlike the „mockery‟ represented by the 
bold statistics of justice delayed and denied after the First World War, a concerted 
effort to bring leading Nazis to book would awaken the German conscience and, in 
doing so, open the way to a more settled peace. 
In early June, Jackson examined the outline of Crime and Punishment as it existed 
thus far - in purely textual form - and, whilst acknowledging his non-expertise in the 
field of film-production, stated that it seemed „a very effective presentation‟.60 Yet this 
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was, perhaps, merely an attempt to preface his subsequent criticism in as polite a 
mode as possible. The problem, as he expressed it, was an ethical issue with his own 
appearance in the film: 
I think this would be a very doubtful propriety from the standpoint of professional 
ethics and might cause offense to our colleagues abroad. As you know, the British 
are particularly sensitive about lawyers trying their own cases in the newspapers 
and other vehicles of communication. There is some sensitiveness on that score in 
this country although not as much as I think there ought to be. My conclusion is 
that I ought not to depart from the role of a reasonably dispassionate prosecu-
tor.61 
Although it had been made clear in a footnote to the text of this speech that it was 
only a suggested outline and that Jackson would be free to speak his own words, it 
was, in fact, the overtly „political‟ tone of the entire text that made the Justice recoil 
from appearing in the film. The hope that, in the face of Nazi crimes, a prosecutor 
might be „dispassionate‟ only highlights some contradiction in the belief that a 
transitional legal process could remain entirely de-politicized. Jackson argued that 
the film could still achieve its goal in „educating‟ the American public without taking 
part in it himself. The belief in a solid line dividing politics and the application of law 
was tellingly conveyed in his subsequent comments: 
After all, in the political sphere President Roosevelt, Marshall Stalin and Churchill 
signed the Moscow Declaration, which would be a good climax [for the film], and 
Truman followed it through by making an appointment and a statement concern-
ing it. I think it would be well to discuss with the people who know this field other 
means of driving home the lesson without using any of the staff who would actu-
ally appear in the prosecution...62 
Jackson liked to believe that, at the moment of his appointment by Truman, politics 
ended and the sphere of law – in which he functioned – began.63 It therefore seemed 
highly unlikely that he would ever agree to appear in any film that openly avowed 
the political nature of American or international justice. Yet he would come to 
bemoan the fact that his own role required more than the collection of evidence and 
the organisation of a prosecution case. He later privately admitted (in a letter to his 
daughter) that his increasingly „hectic‟ role entailed the combined functions of 
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„diplomacy‟ and that of a „lawyer‟.64 
 
 
2.5. London Politics 
His admission came in the midst of the negotiations in London that were devoted to 
shaping the form and jurisdiction of an International Military Tribunal. After a brief 
spate of optimism on Jackson‟s part, it became apparent to him in mid July that the 
French, and to a greater extent, the Soviet delegation, would not, like the British, tend 
to adopt the role of adding only minor alterations and amendments to previously 
issued American working documents with a view only to limiting the scope of the trial 
and the number of defendants.65 The Soviets were far more rigorous in their criticisms 
of American suggestions – particularly when it came to the proposals for trying 
individuals on a charge of „conspiracy‟ as well as indicting organizations.66 This seems 
to have been driven by genuine concerns relating to differences in Continental and 
Anglo-American jurisprudence and procedures rather than any concerted effort to 
scupper the negotiations.67 Yet despite the difficulties, both the Soviet and American 
delegations, in keeping with their perceived respective traditions, envisaged utilitarian 
purposes in persevering with a multinational tribunal. For the Soviets, involvement in 
this multinational trial provided the ideal platform for justifying the punishment of the 
enemies of Communism. The most prominent of those individual enemies were not in 
Soviet custody and without collaborating with the Americans, they would have been 
left only with a couple of less-prominent Nazis with which to stage their spectacle. 
Furthermore, although there was considerable debate on how to deal with Nazi 
organizations, the Soviets could agree with the Americans on certain fundamental 
aims that the British chief negotiator, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, quoted from the Yalta 
Declaration: 
“It is our intense inflexible purpose to bring all war criminals to just and swift pun-
ishment ..." – and these are the important words – "to wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi 
laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and military influences from 
public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people”.68 
Yet Soviet revolutionary interpretations of the functions and purposes of law 
caused difficulties in the negotiations. As a result, the all-too „political‟ nature of inter-
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national postwar justice became quickly apparent to the Anglo-Americans in the 
early days of the negotiations when one of the Russian negotiators, General 
Nikitchenko, outlined the general Soviet attitude: 
The first [explanation of our position] is with regard to the character of the trial. We 
are not dealing here with the usual type of case where it is a question of robbery, 
or murder, or petty offenses [...but] with the chief war criminals [...] whose convic-
tion has been already announced by both the Moscow and [Yalta] declarations 
by the heads of governments, and those declarations both declare [the intention] 
to carry out immediately just punishment for the offenses which have been 
committed. 69 
Soviet purpose was thus chiefly concerned with punishment: not only through 
executions of „war-criminals‟ but also through the very public spectacle of their swift 
condemnation. Despite the self-image of a revolutionary society at the forefront of 
modernity, this did, in fact, reflect an approach more consistent with pre-
Enlightenment „justice‟.70 It was the case that all the Allied delegates to the 
conference deemed the Nazi leaders to be guilty and that they deserved stern 
punishment – the leaders were continually referred to as „criminals‟ rather than 
„suspects‟. The Soviet view, however, explicitly declared law and justice to be entirely 
political matters. The Anglo-American legalist position, on the other hand, held that 
the very process of publicly demonstrating proof of criminal guilt through the use of 
evidence stood outside politics and would serve a wider purpose than (only) 
retribution. Yet they would find themselves in partnership with a delegation that felt 
comfortable with the idea that the international trial could only be a show-trial and 
that any pretence otherwise would be to deny reality and lead to unnecessary delay. 
As Nikitchenko continued: 
[T]he Soviet Delegation considers that there is no necessity in trials of this sort to 
accept the principle that the judge is a completely disinterested party with no 
previous knowledge of the case. [...] the judge, before he takes his seat in court, 
already knows what has been quoted in the press [...] there is, therefore, no 
necessity to create a sort of fiction that the judge is a disinterested person who has 
no legal knowledge of what has happened before.71 
Nikitchenko‟s view of the „fiction‟ of a disinterested judge was consistent with the 
immediate Soviet condemnation, in the early years of the revolution, of the principle 
of judicial objectivity: an aspiration dismissed as „bourgeois falsification‟.72 Yet for at 
least some of the American, British and French lawyers present such an ideal reflected 
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a deeply-held and sincere faith in the mythical metaphors of the Goddess of Justice 
who not only held a sword and set of measuring scales, but wore a blindfold too.73 
Such differences in ideology remained irreconcilable. As Jackson put it: „We are 
making slow progress with the Russians. Their life and tradition and experience are so 
different that even after translation of language it is hard to understand each other.‟74 
Nikitchenko would demonstrate, practically, his belief that an impartial judge could 
only be a fiction to be swept aside: he would, unlike Jackson who would appear as a 
prosecutor, come to sit on the bench as a judge at Nuremberg.75 
Jackson‟s concerns with the Soviet approach had been further compounded by a 
viewing of a Russian film on the subject of the Kharkov trial.76 Held after the recapture 
of the Ukrainian town in December 1943, this Military Tribunal managed to convict 
and condemn to hanging all four defendants (three Germans and a Russian 
„collaborator‟) in a matter of days. Wide press coverage in Russia and access for 
Western reporters was facilitated with the aim of displaying the first Allied example of 
a legal process against German nationals accused of perpetrating atrocities.77 To the 
Soviets, it represented the very first example of the determination to have war-
criminals „brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the 
peoples they [had] outraged‟ as outlined in the text of the Moscow Declaration.78 Yet 
Jackson‟s understatement that the Kharkov film was a „very interesting exposition of 
the Russian method of proving a case by the defendants themselves‟ suggested 
distaste (at the very least) for the Soviet practice of questioning defendants before 
they answered with dubiously lengthy and forthright confessions of guilt.79 What was 
of paramount importance to Jackson was the transparent exposition of fair and open 
procedure so that not only the contemporary world, but also future generations, 
would, because of such very methods, believe that the guilt of the defendants, as 
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well as the moral duty to condemn them, was beyond question. This concern with 
„posterity‟ – in both the construction of an incontestable documentation of the Nazi 
past, and the construction of an international legal apparatus that might affect the 
behaviour of future state-leaders – is one aspect to their approach that distinguished 
American legalists in contrast to the Soviet emphasis on the political utility of 
immediate punishment – so much so that some American staff, more concerned 
about the immediate importance of re-educating the German public, would 
occasionally find frustrating.80 
 
 
2.6. Democratic Justice 
Jackson chose to characterise the essential differences between Soviet and 
American methods as being a matter of legal procedure rather than any significant 
disagreement over issues of substantive law. Due process and the open contestation 
of events and responsibility – as would be achieved through the Anglo-Saxon method 
of adversarial procedure – was, to Jackson, the democratic way. He justified his 
unwillingness to concede what he deemed to be this essential aspect to American 
legal tradition by invoking the need to consider American public opinion.81 And, as 
has often been neglected in accounts of the major trial, this legalist approach had a 
considerable democratic mandate from the United States Congress.82 In contrast to 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union, there was – before the negotiations in London – 
widespread bipartisan demand from America‟s democratic representatives for a 
legal process to deal with the top Axis leadership. Although calls for „commensurate 
punishment‟ of such leaders had been made in the House as early as 1943, it was in 
late March, 1945 that Congressman Emmanuel Celler sat before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs in an attempt to have submitted a joint resolution 
directing the President to „appoint a Commission to cooperate with the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, or any other agency [...] of the United Nations in the 
preparation of definite plans for the punishment of war criminals of the Axis 
countries‟.83 The recent recall of Herbert C. Pell from his role as American representa-
tive to the UNWCC could be easily perceived as an American retreat from 
international cooperation in the trial and punishment of „war criminals‟.84 This renewed 
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Congressional activity was, in part, a reaction to this withdrawal. However, with the 
potential to force the government into negotiations with a great number of Allied 
representatives – over the potentially complex issues regarding the design of laws and 
procedures – it appears that this resolution went further than the State Department 
was willing to tolerate. It was not the commitment to a legal process per se that was 
objectionable, but the spectre of becoming bogged-down in interminable, fruitless 
negotiations, or being forced to cooperate with Allied institutions on the latter‟s terms. 
Instead, it appears that the Foreign Affairs Committee was persuaded into favouring 
a concurrent resolution, put forward instead by Congressman Cecil R. King, that 
would merely serve to advise the executive of the desires of Congress.85 In this way, 
the House could make the principles and priorities of forthcoming justice clear without 
committing the executive to cooperating with Allies to an extent that might force it to 
abandon such very principles or practices in the process. Although less powerful than 
the original joint resolution proposed, it equated more closely to the American 
approach that would materialise at the London Conference and at Nuremberg: 
That it is the sense of the Congress that it should be the policy of the Government 
and its agencies and representatives ...To determine no one exempt from trial or 
punishment by virtue of his status as head of state, or as an official of any state, or 
as an industrialist or civilian, or by virtue of the fact that the acts involved were the 
acts of state or were performed under the compulsion of superior orders.86 
Although the resolution garnered unanimous support from both houses in Congress, 
various criticisms and suggestions were directed towards ensuring greater 
transparency and accountability – including the demand that a permanent record of 
Nazi perpetration of atrocities be made.87 Although this did not become part of the 
resolution for technical reasons, it also reflected a crucial aspect to the IMT trial that 
would take place at Nuremberg. (This suggestion was also made to Jackson by 
Sheldon Glueck – who had kept abreast of Congressional workings – during the 
London Conference negotiations88). 
Just as the American democratic mandate for trial and punishment of Germany‟s 
individual leaders was clear, a self-consciously „democratic‟ method in the theory of 
prosecution was also discernible. The process – already described above – of first 
deciding upon organizational responsibility for crimes before choosing representative 
individual defendants was itself a mark of an inherently „democratic‟ sensibility: in 
short, it evinced an adherence to the principle of representational responsibility and 
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accountability.89 As Jackson put it in reply to the Soviet view expressed at the London 
Conference, „We think of this as rather more than trying certain persons for some 
specific offences‟.90 „Merely as individuals,‟ Jackson would later state in his opening 
speech of the trial, „their fate is of little consequence to the world‟.91 Their individual 
punishment – though deserved if fairly proven guilty – was secondary to the 
condemnation of the „social forces‟ that they represented now that they had merely 
become but „living symbols‟ of the numerous injustices that had been perpetrated 
under their direction.92  
 
 
2.7. That Justice be Seen by Americans 
As the trial would represent the democratic alternative to both Nazi and Soviet 
methods, it was important to present it as such – in order to demonstrate to the 
American people that it would be distinct from „political‟ or „victor‟s‟ justice. 
Democratic justice, however, in maintaining an element of fairness to the defendants. 
and observing certain rules of procedure that might entail considerable time, would 
always be subject to a particular problem that Nazi and Soviet methods circum-
vented: being fair to the defendants might very well turn out to be a very laborious 
and time-consuming affair. Jackson publicly acknowledged this problem at the close 
of the London Charter negotiations, but attempted to brush aside such concerns with 
what, in hindsight, appears to be considerable optimism regarding the likely duration 
of the trial: 
This will be a dreary business and there is no use trying to dodge that fact [...] But I 
do not think the world will be poorer even if it takes a month or so, more or less, to 
try these men who now are prisoners and whose capacity for harm has now been 
overcome...93 
Such a potentially „dreary business‟ would require justification and propagation. The 
trial needed to be presented as a process in keeping with American ideals – 
democracy and the rule of law. The slow pace, huge effort and considerable 
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expense entailed in planning and running a trial based on democratic principles 
would need to be justified to American citizens and taxpayers as the price worth 
paying in order to maintain such ideals. Why did they need to be persuaded? 
Jackson was well aware that the American public was in no mood for a „fair trial‟ for 
Nazi leaders. He had been confronted, for example, by a sceptical government 
official in Washington, with the fact that a Gallup poll reported widespread desire for 
harsh treatment of Germans (generally) without the trouble of legal proceedings.94 
Another poll, from May 1945 had found that 67% of American respondents, when 
given the choice between a trial and other ways to treat Hermann Goering, preferred 
to simply have him killed (only 4% preferred to have him tried first).95 Despite Jackson‟s 
retort that he held no stock in Gallup polls, it was obvious that – if he took democracy 
as seriously as he proclaimed – he would need to consider such views and attempt to 
persuade the American public that a trial such as he proposed represented the best, 
most American, democratic, and „civilized‟ alternative to unleashing a vengeful 
hand. 
Although the press was a useful medium of dissemination about the forthcoming 
trial – and, to this end, press releases were occasionally issued throughout the summer 
of 1945 – editorial control was always left, by definition, to the editors of newspapers. 
The ideal medium, therefore, was film: where editorial control would be total, and the 
reach of dissemination would be greater. It would also allow for some drama to 
detract from the potentially „dreary business‟ of legal procedure. Most importantly, it 
would provide the opportunity to persuade viewers that something more than 
„victor‟s justice‟ was both desirable and possible.  
Already before the final session of the London conference in early August, 
therefore, an American film about the forthcoming trial – made by the OSS FPB and 
subject to approval by Jackson before release – was shown to him and some of his 
accompanying staff on 30th July in the London office of the OSS.96 The Crime and 
Punishment film script that Budd Schulberg had written now lay abandoned and the 
considerably shorter alternative was now entitled That Justice Be Done.97 It was 
directed by Lt. E. Ray Kellogg, the former Special Photographic Effects Chief of 20 th 
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Century-Fox, who had been working for the OSS FPB throughout the war.98 As Gordon 
Dean – also a member of the OSS and the American Prosecution‟s Public Relations 
officer – had put it in his instructions to Schulberg (now also responsible for writing the 
new script):  
...the general public will still be somewhat confused as to who is doing what, and 
screaming for speed in the trial of the major war criminals – their attention being 
focused on the majors such as Goering. 
Consequently, I think that our most important message and the theme of the 
picture should be “Something IS Being Done About War Criminals”.99 
Thus the new film was to be more concerned with the present rather than with the 
failures to bring justice in the past (after the First World War, as the emphasis had been 
in Crime and Punishment). For Dean, there was no longer even any need to convey 
the depths of Nazi injustice to the American people who, he felt, were already 
„screaming‟ for retribution. Not only would the prosecution of major war criminals – 
that still lay ahead – need to be explained. The film provided an opportunity to 
portray the coming major trial as the most significant process within a broader project 
of postwar justice that was already underway. 
However, after the preview, Jackson, in a tone of resignation, noted in his personal 
diary that the film was „terrible‟.100 He gave no further (written) explanation at that 
time. It is not possible to reconstruct entirely the exact content of the film when he 
saw this early version. Yet what is certain is that it underwent considerable revision 
and re-editing before being viewed in public and could not have been released 
without his approval.101 In fact the comments he later made about the progress of the 
film – in a more detailed and constructive manner – suggest that his earlier 
despondency had been acted upon in the editing room. In early September, he saw 
the latest edit in the Washington office of the OSS and noted in his diary: 
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After conferring with the [unnamed]others who saw the film, I made four criticisms 
of it: First, a section showing me mounting the gang plank of a plane should be 
omitted; second, a reference to hanging with a gruesome picture of a hanging 
should be omitted; third, it should be brought up to date to include the signing of 
the Agreement for international trials; and fourth, it should be brought up to date 
by showing the Nuremberg set-up. I was called later by Lt. [E. R.] Kellogg who said 
that these changes were all desirable and would improve the dramatic quality of 
the picture.102 
Jackson‟s more positive reaction suggests that he did not object to any attempt to 
make the film dramatic. The two suggestions for negative amendments – i.e. that 
scenes should be cut – suggested that what he deemed to be important was 
maintaining some level of human „dignity‟ or decency in the picture (by removing 
what he thought of as an unnecessarily gruesome picture of a hanging) and fairness 
by eliminating any unnecessary appearance of himself, in order to maintain as much 
of a „dispassionate‟ image of a prosecutor as possible.103 His authority to affect not 
only the content but also the timing of the film‟s release is confirmed by the letter he 
wrote two days later to the Chief of the Office of War Information: 
I have recently reviewed the one-reel picture [...] „That Justice Be Done‟. It is my 
opinion that [it] can do much to bring about public understanding of what we are 
attempting to do [...] and that a reasonably early release date is necessary if the 
picture is to be timely. 
[...] I would therefore appreciate it if you would advise [the film‟s director] Lt. [E.] 
Ray Kellogg, of O.S.S., [of] the available release dates in order that he may, in my 
absence, make one or two minor changes that I have suggested and get the 
picture into the theatres.104 
The final version of the film was distributed by the War Activities Committee, the club 
of distributors and theatre-owners within the „motion picture industry‟ working in 
cooperation with the Office of War Information throughout the United States. As a 
result, it was screened nationally in approximately 16,000 theatres and seen by millions 
of Americans from October 1945.105 The theme that remained consistent from the 
earliest scripts to the final version that we can still view today is the dramatic contrast 
in political conceptions of justice. It suggested a relatively simple dilemma that might 
be approximated as a straightforward choice between speedy (Nazi-style) „summary 
justice‟ which might satisfy impatience and outrage; or the democratic, „dispassion-
ate‟ procedures entailing an involved process of legal accounting that represented a 
more „civilized‟ method of justice. As [E.] Ray Kellogg, the chief of FPB, had put it: 
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[...] The purpose of this film is to orient the public to a clearer understanding of the 
role of the United States in the forthcoming trials of major war criminals. It will 
emphasize the responsibility of the Office of the US Chief of Counsel for the 
prosecution of Axis criminality. In this picture an effort will be made to show the 
people the great amount of work necessary in the preparation of these trials.106 
The film would therefore serve to justify the protracted effort (and delay) in bringing 
justice to the major war criminals. Whilst making every effort to demonstrate that 
much activity was already underway (in particular, with lower ranking Nazis), the slow 
pace of justice was framed as a necessary price to pay for a „democratic‟ rather 
than summary (or a Nazi form of) justice. 
In the opening sequence of That Justice Be Done, Jackson‟s favourite Founding 
Father was quoted alongside shots of the recently completed memorial devoted to 
him in Washington, D. C.: “I, Thomas Jefferson, have sworn upon the altar of God 
eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man”.107  
 
And then, with hardly more dramatic – and political – contrast possible, there 
screeched a voice from the Nuremberg of 1934 – from within the huge Luitpoldhalle 
replete with seas of uniforms and swastikas. Despite appearances, Hitler‟s original 
words (in German) were quite mundane.108 Yet the English translation, affecting 
stereotypically harsh Teutonic intonations and overdubbed some seconds into the 
speech, were those of Rauschning‟s Hitler Speaks.109 This was the same quotation 
(slightly amended) that had been used in the film-script for the abandoned Crime 
and Punishment: „If I, Adolf Hitler, can send the flower of the German nation into the 
hell of war without the smallest pity for spilling precious German blood, then surely I 
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have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin.‟110 
However, in contrast to the limited implications of using this quotation in Crime and 
Punishment, now the (American) viewer would perceive that such genocidal 
intentions had been made explicit by Hitler before a huge audience in the 
Luitpoldhalle, and before the nation through the medium of film (these words had, 
however, been purported by Rauschning to have been uttered in private). 
As has already been pointed out, using Rauschning‟s (now discredited) text did not 
constitute any intention to mislead viewers (in fact the filmmakers – along with others – 
had been misled by Rauschning themselves). The consequence of applying recently 
found film-footage to fit a pre-written script, however, was to convey, with little room 
for doubt, the collective guilt of an entire nation – dating from 1934. To the 
subsequent “Sieg Heil”s, after Hitler had spoken, came shot after shot of Nazi salutes 
and approval: from women at the back of the hall, from members of the chastened 
SA, and from the Fuehrer himself. And as the cries of German adulation and 
conformity continued, there suddenly appeared on the screen images of horrific 
prophecies fulfilled: of atrocities against civilians, so clearly innocent, and so clearly 
murdered.111 The display of atrocity imagery in That Justice Be Done was highly 
effective yet relatively brief.112 Combined with continual cries of adulation and 
conformity from within the Luitpoldhalle, the use of such imagery suggested a 
widespread support from the Nazi movement, not only for Hitler‟s genocidal intentions 
before the war, but also for the actual atrocities that had been perpetrated. 
The first post-war shots of living Germans were those of civilian women being 
forced to view piled corpses of murdered inmates of „liberated‟ concentration 
camps. Such scenes had originally been deemed suitable to open the film.113 
Combined with the ongoing recurrence of “Sieg Heil”s from the Luitpoldhalle, they 
made explicit the American accusation of collective German (not just Nazi) 
responsibility – at the very least of what Karl Jaspers would soon dub the „political‟ 
guilt of his fellow Germans.114 
                                                     
110 See p. 26 and Ibid. 
111 There was, for example, a shot of a murdered child. 
112 Atrocity footage appeared for a total of approximately 40 seconds during the first three minutes of this 
ten-minute „one-reeler‟. 
113 The first script, Nazis on Trial (see note 97), begins: „1. The most horrifying shot available of corpses with 
Germans reacting‟. NARA/RG-226/90/12/124. 
114 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, (trans. E. B. Ashton) (New York: Dial Press, 1947). 
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Yet to attempt a clear distinction between political and moral guilt was more likely to 
emerge from a German, rather than American, liberal thinker more interested in 
salvaging some of the nation‟s cultural past in looking ahead to political and moral 
regeneration.115 For the occupiers, intent – at least in 1945 – on a comprehensive 
political, moral and cultural overhaul of Germany, any distinction between moral and 
political responsibilities was far less clear. But the political implications of these images 
were clear enough: the scenes of atrocity were the results of Nazi rule that the 
German people had supported or, at least, tolerated.116 
Briefly focusing on Germans also had some practical use for the OSS film makers, 
who discerned a particular problem with too much use of atrocity pictures by 
themselves. Too many atrocity images, it was feared, might serve to damage the 
effort to convince the American population that the appropriate response in dealing 
with „war criminals‟ was the establishment of an International Tribunal.117 So emotive 
were these images, that they had the power to incite hatred, anger and frustration – 
derived from an overwhelming sense of injustice. Too many of them might evoke a 
desire for vengeance. As Gordon Dean had expressed it in mid June: „People are 
now pretty well convinced that the atrocities took place and that they were 
wholesale and the only effect of showing [more atrocity] film at this point is to make 
them mad that something isn‟t being done about it.‟118 Thus, as the point of That 
Justice Be Done was to convince its audience that the right approach was being 
taken in the interest of Americans, two fundamental issues needed to be addressed in 
                                                     
115 For a critique of Jasper‟s „excessively broad understanding of guilt‟, see: Raphael Gross, 'Relegating 
Nazism to the Past: Expressions of German Guilt in 1945 and Beyond,' German History, Vol. 25, No. 2 
(2007), pp. 232-238. 
116 For the moral dimension to recording and showing such forced confrontation we shall return to this 
phenomenon in Chapter 5. 
117 Gordon Dean to RHJ, 14/Jun/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/„Gordon Dean‟. 
118 Ibid. 
 
F I G U R E  3  A / B .  The German witnessing of atrocity in That Justice Be Done: Allied cameramen search 
for remorse in the faces of German women - but find only horror. 
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the film: that justice was being done for American victims and that the use of law was 
a better alternative to pure vengeance. 
A telling change in regard to the first priority was that, instead of the new crime of 
genocide, as Schulberg had identified it in Crime and Punishment (see page 25), Nazi 
crimes were now simplified and made more relevant to an American audience: 
This is murder, deliberate murder. Defying every written and unwritten law of man. 
Not only premeditated but carried out by official decree. 
American soldiers shot in the back while wearing American uniforms in open 
defiance of established rules of warfare.119 
It is not possible to discover whether this change was made on Schulberg‟s own 
initiative or whether (as seems more likely) he was directed to drop the use of the 
word „genocide‟ by his superiors in the FPB or by Jackson himself. What is certain is 
that such a change (from that of „genocide‟ in Crime and Punishment to simply 
„murder‟ in That Justice Be Done) reflected the conflation of War Crimes with Crimes 
Against Humanity that would occur in the London negotiations and at Nuremberg 
itself, where the only mention of the word in the indictment would appear within the 
charge of War Crimes (rather than, as we might expect today, Crimes Against 
Humanity).120 It also reflected perspectives of injustice that, whilst claiming the 
legitimacy of a universal morality and natural law („every unwritten law of man‟), 
were nevertheless based upon the more particular interests of a particular Allied 
nation-state.121 
 
Combined with the images on screen, including a shot of Hitler‟s „Commando 
Order‟ (see Figure 4), the perpetration of „deliberate murder...carried out by official 
decree‟ implied to an American audience that the relevant subjects of such officially 
sanctioned murder was, in particular, the killing of Americans.122 In fact, most victims 
                                                     
119 Kellogg (Dir.), That Justice Be Done. 
120 „Genocide‟ had appeared in a working (American) document at the outset of the London 
negotiations, only to disappear from subsequent drafts of the London Charter, so that although the term 
reappeared in the indictment, it was used infrequently throughout the trial. 
121 For the conflation of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity see Douglas, Memory of Judgment. 
122 For copies of the „Commando Order‟, see PS-498 in: NCA, Vol. III, p. 416 (in English); IMT, Vol. XXVI, p. 
 
F I G U R E  4  A / B / C .   Using film to show documents – a copy of Hitler‟s „Commando Order‟ fades 
from German to English, and then a pan across the page highlights the phrase „...killed to the last 
man‟ (See note 122). 
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of this order were British and Canadian soldiers.123 Yet, for the American public, the 
most relevant Nazi crimes were those perpetrated against individual Americans (this 
would mostly fall under the traditional rubric of war-crimes) as well as the „crime‟ of 
dragging the U.S. into a second European war (the new crime of „aggressive war‟). 
The crime of genocide, the crime against the universal category of humanity (but 
actually most particularly directed against the Jews), was of little value in persuading 
an American public to support engagement in an international Military Tribunal. 
Hence, crimes against non-Americans – including „German Jews‟ – were rationalized 
as instances of an overall, totalitarian war against „opposition‟ to Nazism and 
conflated with the suffering of American soldiers: 
For if the Nazis were to carry through their master plan they had to wipe out every 
trace of opposition: religious opposition, political opposition, the opposition of 
peace-loving nations. And when our troops pried open the doors of the human 
slaughter houses we found Poles, Frenchmen, Russians, German Jews, Spanish 
anti-fascists ... and some Americans.124 
What followed this narration was a brief excerpt from an interview with an American 
Lieutenant, Jack H. Taylor, during which he explained the many ways that his fellow 
prisoners – including two American soldiers – had been murdered in and around 
Mauthausen concentration camp.125 As an OSS operative, fighting behind enemy 
lines in the Balkans, Taylor had been captured by the Nazis and labelled (literally, with 
a red triangle) as a political prisoner – rather than as a regular combatant and 
prisoner of war.126 Whilst such a distinction did not justify atrocious treatment of any 
prisoners, these circumstances happened to reinforce the perceptions of the film-
makers that „opposition‟ to Nazism by Americans and, for example, by „German 
Jews‟, were in some way comparable. As pointed out above, little distinction, other 
than numbers of those murdered, was understood to exist between the extermination 
camps of the east and those discovered by the Allies in the west. This reinforced the 
recurring disinclination to distinguish between victims of genocide and victims of 
„opposition‟, i.e. of „aggressive and ruthless war‟.  This, by implication, tended to imply 
to the audience of That Justice Be Done that Nazi responses to such „opposition‟ were 
meted out to all and any opponents in a uniform manner (which might include 
Americans). 
With the case made that Americans were as deserving of justice as anyone, it 
                                                                                                                                                           
101 (in German). 
123 Taylor, Anatomy, p. 254. 
124 Kellogg (Dir.), That Justice Be Done. 
125 Salter, Nazi War Crimes, pp. 267-269. For further discussion of the use of Jack H. Taylor‟s interview within 
the film Nazi Concentration Camps, see below, Chapter 5, pp.169-171; Douglas, Memory of Judgment, 
pp. 33-35. 
126 For more about Taylor, see below pp. 129-131. 
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remained for the film to explain just why the best response was a legal one. “How can 
we rectify these crimes?” asked the narrator before expounding upon the dilemma: 
We may arrest the sadist in charge of Buchenwald, but we cannot torture him to 
death – as he tortured his victims. We may indict the scientist who developed the 
gas chamber but we cannot strangle him to death slowly as his gasses strangled 
thousands of others.127 
Thus summary justice would not be enough. But the question of how (or whether) to 
confront some of the greatest injustices of the war would continue to raise doubts in 
the mind of Tom Clark, the U.S. Attorney-General, who took no part in the film or 
planning for the Nuremberg IMT: „These [war criminals] have perpetrated almost 
unbelievable horror on humanity. What the hell can I do with them?‟ he wondered.
128
 
The identity and professional position of this mystified doubter, as much as the 
question itself, is revealing: in light of the inadequacy of punishment, the very nature 
of any justice to be done was, eminently, an unprecedented political dilemma. What 
is even more revealing, however, is that Clark was referring to the leaders of Japan, 
not Germany. The Nuremberg IMT, which was under way when he made these 
comments, did not appear to provide him with any answers. But he did not have the 
same faith in international law that Robert Jackson possessed. If the response to such 
injustice were to involve anything more than swift vengeance, it would require a leap 
of faith and some imagination that reached beyond the traditional confines of 
international law. Jackson and the other American planners of Nuremberg hoped to 
convince the American public that the required legal innovations would only 
enhance the value of their own faith in the rule of international law.129 But it would 
also be necessary to portray such innovations to be in keeping with traditional, 
democratic, and American values. 
The way forward, according to the film, was simply to be found in the “historic” 
Moscow Declaration of 1943 with which “law-abiding” nations - the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union – had agreed that those responsible would „be 
judged by the people they have outraged‟ so that – in the words of the Declaration, 
now repeated by the narrator – “justice may be done”.130 As we have seen, in fact, 
no mention of any legal justice was mentioned at the Moscow Conference in regard 
to the „major war criminals‟ – only punishment was mentioned. Yet here, the film 
                                                     
127 Kellogg (Dir.), That Justice Be Done. 
128 Cited in: Robert Donihi, „War Crimes‟, St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 66, (1992), p. 765. The brackets (and the 
words „war criminals‟) are Donihi‟s, not Clark‟s or mine. 
129 As Jackson had said in a speech on International Law to the American Society of International Law in 
April 1945, „I am happy to join you in a timely and resolute confession of faith‟. Robert H. Jackson, 'The 
Rule of Law among Nations,' American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 31, No. 6 (1945), p. 290. 
130 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 12. 
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implied, a practical American and international legal response to Nazi injustice had its 
origins in 1943. Once again – as with the opening scenes of Jefferson and Hitler – the 
contrast between Nazi „justice‟ and the American way was made explicit when the 
narrator asked, „What kind of justice do we mean? Do we mean the kind of justice of 
Dr. Hans Frank, Nazi Minister of Justice, who said, “[...] Anything which benefits our 
nation is just.”‟ 
 
Alongside the appearance of more Founding Fathers, followed by American troops 
engaged in battle, and an example of orderly American legal proceedings (see 
Figure 5), the narrator continued: 
Or do we mean the democratic concept of justice our nation fought to establish, 
fought to develop and is fighting to preserve: public trial, equality before the law, 
the right of defendants to prepare their own defence, a trial so orderly, so thor-
ough, so free from passion, that no would-be martyrs would ever be able to point 
to themselves as victims of enemy lynch-law; [...] that is the kind of justice we are 
establishing.131 
The politics of justice, therefore, was portrayed as a straightforward choice between 
„lynch-law‟ and truly legal proceedings – the Nazi way of totalitarian violence or the 
American, democratic way entailing due process. It would be difficult for American 
viewers to advocate the former. Instead, they would be informed by the film of the 
appropriate methods of the latter. But they would have to wait. The narrator 
explained that translating American concepts of justice into the „unprecedented 
machinery of international law‟ was not something that could be achieved 
„overnight‟. 
This was followed, however, by the attempt to demonstrate that something was 
already being achieved. Thus General Weir, the Director of the War Crimes Office of 
the Judge Advocate General, could look straight into the camera and confidently 
assure the American public that: 
                                                     
131 Kellogg (Dir.), That Justice Be Done. (Emphasis added). 
 
F I G U R E  5  A / B / C .   What Kind of Justice? The narrator contrasts Nazi „justice‟, as expounded by 
Justice Minister Hans Frank, with „the democratic concept of justice [that America] fought to establish‟, 
showing a statue of Abraham Lincoln, and an example of orderly American legal procedure. 
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In France under General Betts, and in Italy under General Richmond, trials are 
underway. As fast as we can identify, hunt down, and apprehend those guilty of 
war atrocities against American prisoners of war, we are bringing them to trial and 
holding them accountable for their acts.132 
 
But what of the „Major War Criminals‟? These were men whose crimes were so all-
embracing, according to the narrator, that President Truman had appointed a 
suitably qualified Chief Prosecutor named Robert H, Jackson: a Supreme Court Judge 
and former Attorney General. He was to be assisted, told the narrator, by William J. 
Donovan and „a staff that calls upon some of America‟s outstanding legal talent who 
will join forces with the most eminent jurists of Great Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union‟. Thus, appointing the most talented people available was already a step 
towards rendering some justice for Americans. This staff, continued the narrator,  
will not content themselves with hanging a tyrant by his heels, but with laying bare 
the ugly core of his evil designs. [...] They will not content themselves with convict-
ing a criminal on a single count [...] but will seek conviction on conviction in order 
to put teeth into the international laws that condemn those crimes. 
[The Nazi leaders would undergo a] public trial that should serve as an unprece-
dented warning to those who would plunge the United Nations into another 
criminal war in defiance of the laws and treaties of peaceful nations who have 
joined together to outlaw man‟s greatest inhumanity to man: the crime of War.133 
The tyrant that appeared on screen was Mussolini (but instead of the filmmakers‟ 
original intention to show him after being lynched, he could be seen in his more 
fortunate days speaking from a balcony). However the Italians might mete out justice 
(the film implied) American, democratic justice would involve the investigation of 
truth, of „laying bare‟ the evils of Nazism. This would involve multiple investigations of 
each Major War Criminal so that producing a record of such crimes would itself 
                                                     
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
 
F I G U R E  6  A / B .   General Weir and OSS graphics assure the American public that something is 
being done about war criminals. Not only is the „International Tribunal‟ being prepared, but already 
there are being conducted „National Traitor Trials‟, „Local Minor Trials‟, and „U.S. Military Trials‟. 
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constitute a form of justice. It would also serve the more utilitarian purpose of 
deterring war. It is easy to overlook the fact that the Nuremberg IMT began only three 
months after America had ceased being at war. That Justice Be Done was released 
to the American public only two months after the Japanese surrender which had 
materialised only after high rates of American casualties. America itself had dropped 
two bombs that foretold of the potential for even more destructive wars to come. The 
prospect of a precedent to hold individual leaders accountable for starting wars, 
therefore, appeared to be the most relevant legal innovation that the American 
Prosecution could cite in convincing Americans of the value of a trial. 
To reinforce this point Jackson, despite his initial disdain for the idea, would make 
an appearance in the film himself.134 Perhaps what had originally made him so 
reluctant was that the filmmakers‟ sense of political drama was quite self-consciously 
present throughout. What perhaps made it palatable for him, however, is that the 
politics propagated in the film was framed as a matter of methods rather than a 
choice of ideology: between democratic justice (not liberalism, despite its implicit 
ubiquity throughout) and lawlessness. Given there can be little doubt that he had 
considerable control over the film‟s content, it is possible to infer that he became 
convinced, to some extent, of the value of his own appearance. Not only would this 
confer more obviously the authority of an official imprimatur to the film, but in doing 
so, he probably believed that the sincerity of his words would make some dramatic 
and persuasive impact on his viewers. 
 
                                                     
134 There also remains a very brief cut (less than one second) of Jackson on the „gang plank‟ of a plane. It 
is so brief that we can only speculate as to whether or not this is the very scene that Jackson proposed 
should be cut, and, if so, whether it was shortened as a compromise. 
 
F I G U R E  7 .   Justice Robert H. Jackson makes the case 
for legal proceedings to the American people in That 
Justice Be Done. 
47 
 
 
Thus, an excerpt from what appeared to be an originally longer piece-to-camera by 
Jackson materialized towards the end of the film: „I am convinced that we have an 
opportunity to bring to a just judgement to those who have thought it safe to wage 
aggressive and ruthless war.‟135 This summarized the interpretive thrust of the entire 
American case: first and foremost, a conspiracy to wage an „aggressive‟ war was 
cast as the supreme international crime which had, in turn, led inevitably to other 
„ruthless‟ transgressions, including the perpetration of atrocities. As despicable as 
those transgressions were, Jackson interpreted them as merely by-products of this 
conspiracy – the quashing of opposition – rather than ends in themselves. It was the 
conspiracy for aggression after all – and not the perpetration of atrocities – that had 
resulted in bringing America into the war and now evoked it as a plaintiff in the realm 
of law. His concern with American domestic opinion could only serve to further 
encourage his preference for making the crime of conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war the centrepiece of the American case against the Nazi leaders. It was this crime 
against America - rather than War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity perpetrated on 
European soil - that had affected every single American in some way and would, 
therefore, be most relevant to a large domestic audience. 
It also reflected his utilitarian philosophy of international law as something more 
than punishment or retribution alone. The law, he felt, had to be marshalled in order 
to keep the peace in a future overshadowed by the potential for unimaginable 
destruction.136 It was this, he believed, that everyone – including Americans – needed 
to understand. The following remark, however, would be cut from the final edit of the 
film: „The measure of our success will of course depend upon the support we have 
from the people of the United States.‟137 Perhaps, felt Jackson, such comments 
appeared, too explicitly, to betray the very purpose of the film: to persuade the 
American public that Nuremberg – the process of law – was a necessity. What 
Jackson could not bring himself to admit was that Nuremberg itself was a political 
necessity (in his case, derived from his desire for a world of perpetual peace). So too 
was the propagation of its value. The attempt to persuade appears to have been 
successful. As William J. Bosch found from research based on numerous American 
opinion polls, American „popular opinion greeted with satisfaction the legal methods 
chosen‟.138 
                                                     
135 It is clear that a) the scene is cut as Jackson is about to continue speaking and b) the involved process 
of setting up for an interview would not have involved the recording of only a single sentence. 
136 These opinions can be gleaned from a speech that Jackson made to the American Society of 
International Law in Washington D.C. on 13th April 1945: Jackson, 'The Rule of Law among Nations.' 
137 Schulberg, „That Justice Be Done‟, („1st script‟), NARA/RG-226/148/72/1087, p. 16. 
138 Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 91. 
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The film closed just as it had begun, with the long shadow of Lady Justice falling 
upon a bleak wall atop with barbed wire. From one raised hand she held a set of 
measuring scales, in the other, pointing to the ground, a sword. Whether or not she 
wore a blindfold, however, was impossible to discern.139 The ambiguity in this image 
reflects the contradiction with Robert Jackson‟s legalist outlook and the very political 
reality of inventing laws and instituting an ad hoc Tribunal devoted to confronting an 
unprecedented era of injustice. Although Jackson wished to believe that law existed 
as a sphere of knowledge and practice beyond political concerns, we have seen 
that he began, at least privately (and only partially), to acknowledge that he was 
also engaged in a political process. The London Conference was a matter of 
international „diplomacy‟. And during those negotiations, Jackson and his American 
colleagues advocated the adoption of particular laws and methods that were based 
on liberal and democratic principles. Furthermore, throughout the negotiations in 
London, Jackson remained mindful of domestic American popular opinion. The 
advocacy of holding Nazi leaders accountable for the conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war closely reflected a particularly American perspective – what might 
also be termed the (American) „national interest‟. Finally, Jackson and his colleagues 
also engaged in attempting to shape American popular opinion: screening That 
Justice Be Done was an exercise in political persuasion. 
                                                     
139 See note 73 on p. 26. 
 
F I G U R E  8 .   Lady Justice: her shadow appears at the beginning and end 
of That Justice Be Done. 
  
CHAPTER 3 
THE FOG OF RETRIBUTION  
 
 
The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; 
and that is precisely what constitutes their monstrousness.  
Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (17/Aug/1946).1 
 
 
No, we do not have that conception of conspiracy. We would 
have to make new law. 
Professor André Gros, (19/Jul/1945).2 
 
Before any informed assessment can be made of the American case against the 
defendants at the IMT – by examining (in subsequent chapters) Prosecution speeches, 
witnesses, documents and films – it is first necessary to chart the evolution and 
application of the legal framework which affected the selection and use of evidence 
at Nuremberg. As already noted in chapter 2, the concern to do justice in keeping 
with American public opinion led to foregrounding „aggressive war‟ as a crime 
deemed graver than War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity. Yet this crime (framed 
as Crimes Against Peace in the London Charter3) was not an American invention.4 It 
had happened to be a favoured idea of at least one senior Soviet jurist even before 
the onset of the Second World War.5 Furthermore, as we have already seen, during 
that war, the Czech delegate of the UNWCC suggested that, once the fighting was 
over, the Nazis should be indicted for waging aggressive war.6 
What was entirely American, however, was the introduction of „conspiracy‟ at 
Nuremberg. The evolution and application of this legal doctrine must be appreciated 
to contextualize the use of all evidence offered by the American Prosecution. There 
was some poetic justice in accusing Nazis – consummate conspiracy-theorists 
themselves – of this crime. But the meaning of „conspiracy‟ as it appeared during the 
IMT trial caused considerable confusion and misunderstanding at the time, and has 
continued to do so ever since. As with „aggression‟, neither its meaning nor purpose 
was defined in the London Charter. General usage of the term has tended to suggest 
visions of secret plots and machinations, the hatching of evil, meticulously thought-out 
                                                     
1 Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner, (eds.), Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, 1926-1969 (trans., 
Robert & Rita Kimber, 1992), (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), p. 54. 
2 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 296. 
3 See Appendix II. 
4 For a purely American (and thus incomplete) story, see: Bush, '"The Supreme ... Crime" and its Origins.' 
5 For Soviet ideas on „aggression‟ dating back to 1937, and their influence on the London Charter of 
8/Aug/1945, see: Francine Hirsch, 'The Soviets at Nuremberg: Propaganda, and the making of the 
Postwar Order,' American Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (2008), pp. 705-710. 
6 See above, p. 13. 
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plans. Although popular interpretations of the word has significance to the wider 
historiographical context of the trial, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the use 
of this doctrine within the context of the birth of modern international criminal law. By 
its very nature, this new field of law finally addressed the issue of individual leadership-
responsibility for the actions of subordinates or others. As this chapter will make clear, 
it is no coincidence that the first international trial that held individuals criminally 
responsible was also the first to make use of the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy, 
although presented as a form of crime was, at the Nuremberg IMT, also used as a 
method for attaching responsibility to individuals in the dock. Thus, any problems in 
convincing the Tribunal to accept this doctrine would reflect upon the American 
Prosecutions‟ logic of rendering individual culpability in international law. 
Gleaned from Anglo-American domestic criminal (common) law, the basic 
definition of conspiracy was (and remains) „an agreement between two or more 
persons to do something unlawful by lawful means, or something lawful by unlawful 
means, or [it seems, rather superfluously,] something unlawful by unlawful means‟.7 
Thus, the agreement or consent to assist in illegal means or ends, rather than any 
active engagement in any particular activity, was enough to render culpability (for 
what amounts to a thought-crime). Doubts immediately arose in the French 
delegation as to the legitimacy of this doctrine and why the Americans so doggedly 
insisted on its use. As to its purpose and effects – in particular, regarding the matter of 
individual criminal responsibility – it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of at 
least four differing perspectives on „conspiracy‟ in relation to the IMT trial. In 
examining these perspectives, I will address the straightforward question that is most 
relevant to my general thesis: how well did American law perform at Nuremberg? 
 
 
3.1. The Bernays Plan 
The first significant view is what has sometimes been referred to as „the Bernays Plan‟ 
and reflects the original intentions of Colonel Murray Bernays who worked in the War 
Department and, on 24th October 1944, presented his ideas to Henry Stimson, the 
Secretary of War.8 Stimson, in turn, did much with it to persuade President Roosevelt to 
ensure that a trial of „Major War Criminals‟ (rather than „summary justice‟ or a purely 
                                                     
7 Justin Miller, Criminal Law, (1934), p. 108, cited in: Brendan F. Brown, Benjamin F. Pollack & Norah C. 
Taranto, „The Crime of Conspiracy‟, (memorandum to Joseph B. Keenan, 23/May/1946), cited in: R. 
John Pritchard, (ed.), The Tokyo major war crimes trial: the records of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East, Vol. 123-A, (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998-2004), p. 5. 
8Jackson referred to the „Bernays Plan‟ on 10/May/1945: RHJ, Diary, 10/May/1945, LoC/RHJP/95/‟Diary‟. 
Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp. 51-62. 
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„political solution‟, i.e. killings without legal proceedings of any kind) would become 
the policy of the United States.9 On 22nd January 1945, Roosevelt was advised, in a 
memorandum co-authored by Stimson, that „We are satisfied that these atrocities 
were perpetrated in pursuance of a premeditated criminal plan or enterprise which 
either contemplated or necessarily involved their commission.‟10 Little more needs to 
be reiterated here, other than the fact that, within Bernay‟s plan, conspiracy was 
conceived as the most effective method of finding the Nazi leadership responsible 
(along with the numerous members of organisations they represented) for their pre-
war victimization of the Jews (and others). In regard to „atrocities‟ no definite 
requirement for a direct link to war appeared to be deemed necessary at this stage: 
The allegation of the criminal enterprise would be so couched as to permit full 
proof of the entire Nazi plan from its inception and the means used in its further-
ance and execution, including the prewar atrocities and those committed against 
their own nationals, neutrals, and stateless persons, as well as the waging of an 
illegal war of aggression with ruthless disregard for international law and the rules 
of war.11 
The intent behind Bernay‟s original vision – to criminalise „prewar atrocities‟ – was, as 
we shall see, to be thwarted.12 
 
 
3.2. The London Charter 
Despite the mid-century resurgence of natural law that Nuremberg represents, the 
„Four Powers‟ saw fit to explicitly posit their laws – to an extent – in an agreement and 
constitution intended to outline the scope of the IMT‟s jurisdiction.13 But the London 
Charter, signed on 8th August, 1945, contained inherent ambiguities – most particularly 
in the manner in which it conflated individual leadership culpability with the Anglo-
American legal doctrine of „conspiracy‟. In contrast to what one prosecutor 
subsequently deemed to be a well-crafted document, one of its most significant 
articles is very poorly drafted.14 Although much ink has been spent reproducing and 
                                                     
9 Ibid., pp. 64-151. 
10 Henry L. Stimson Edward R. Stettinius & Francis Biddle, Memorandum for the President, 22/Jan/1945, repr. 
in: Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 5. 
11 Ibid., p. 6. (Emphasis added). 
12 Taylor, Anatomy, p. 637. 
13 See Michael Biddiss, 'The Nuremberg Trial: Two Exercises in Judgement,' Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 16, No. 3 (1981), p. 611. The Four Powers were Britain, France, the USA and the USSR; Stefan Glaser, 
„The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and New Principles of International Law‟, (1947), repr. in: 
Gue  naël Mettraux, (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 55-71. 
14 Telford Taylor, in his admirable personal memoirs of the major trial, rather generously stated that „The 
London Conferees are entitled to great credit for drawing up and reaching agreement on a document 
which was well organized, coherent, and a generally sensible basis for the anticipated trial or trials‟: 
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analysing it since its inception, it is worth re-examining Article 6 once again to throw, I 
believe, some new and problematic light on the legality of the Nuremberg IMT 
judgement in its application of the charter (for Article 6 of the charter, see Appendix 
2). This is so significant because, whatever the controversies that have existed over 
the legality of the London Charter in relation to pre-existent international law, if it can 
be demonstrated that the Tribunal itself fundamentally misapplied its (own) laws, this 
renders not only the issue of the court‟s validity in pre-existent international law less 
significant, it also diminishes the moral weight of law itself at Nuremberg as a 
significant factor in rendering justice. Ultimately (if such a problem can be 
demonstrated), only the issue of justice – through other means – remains. This is an 
altogether different, although related (non-legal) issue. Yet in order to reach this 
point, we must first consider the laws applied at Nuremberg. 
Article 6 appears to set out three substantive crimes, namely: (a) Crimes Against 
Peace, (b) War Crimes, and (c) Crimes Against Humanity. The reality, however, is a 
little more complex. Crimes Against Peace, unlike (b) and (c) also includes mention of 
„conspiracy‟ so that subsection (a) itself specifies both the act of a „war of 
aggression‟ (or a „war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assur-
ances‟15), as well as the conspiracy or common plan to act. Therefore, when 
considering only the three subsections (a-c) – in isolation from the rest of Article 6 – we 
are already presented with four discrete16 crimes, one of which includes the doctrine 
of conspiracy: 
 
 
F I G U R E  1 :  Four discrete crimes posited in sections (a) to (c) of Article 6. 
 
The first of these crimes (a-1) was directly applicable to some of the highest leaders of 
                                                                                                                                                           
Taylor, Anatomy, p. 75. 
15 There is, to complicate matters further, a difference between a „war of aggression‟ (which was not 
defined) and a war „in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances‟. For present 
purposes, however, these will be treated as a single „crime against peace‟. See: Smith, Reaching 
Judgment, p. 16. 
16 The use of the word „discrete‟ is being used in place of what lawyers might denote as „substantive‟ in 
order to avoid unnecessary discussion over whether or not crime a-2 (Conspiracy to commit Crimes 
Against Peace) constitutes a „substantive‟ crime of the charter. Much of the point of this discussion is 
that, in contrast to the opinions expressed by the tribunal itself, no distinct dividing line can be drawn 
between „substantive‟ and conspiracy charges (including a-2) that have been posited in the charter – 
at least not, as will be explained, without discounting the relevance to the defendants of the charges of 
War Crimes and, to a lesser extent, Crimes Against Humanity. Hence the word „substantive‟ is 
occasionally used in quotes throughout this text. 
 
(a-1) Crimes Against Peace 
(a-2) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(b) War Crimes 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity 
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the Nazi state. The second (a-2) would have rendered indictable those individuals 
involved in any tacit or explicit agreement to pursue Crimes Against Peace – even, in 
theory, if no war(s) had ever taken place. Although the conception of a Crime 
Against Peace (or a conspiracy to commit one) was, and remains, highly controver-
sial among legal scholars – in that critics denounced it, and continue to denounce it, 
as ex post facto law – there was little doubt that within the terms of the charter itself, it 
applied directly to the particular defendants on trial. Crimes Against Peace were 
inherently leadership crimes. To some extent, the same can be said of another 
innovation of the charter that also specified a controversial discrete crime: Crimes 
Against Humanity. Although this crime listed „murder‟ as an element more 
appropriately applicable to perpetrators directly, or perhaps only secondarily, in 
contact with their victims, it also listed „extermination‟, a noun implying some measure 
of leadership administration, direction or involvement. 
In contrast to these innovations, the laws (and charges) of War Crimes (b) were, 
and remain, the least controversial. Such crimes undoubtedly already existed in 
international law.17 Yet, more than Crimes Against Peace, an indictment of War 
Crimes would require a new formula in order to apply culpability to the particular kind 
of defendants on trial. Paragraph i (as I have labelled it in Appendix II) stated that 
„The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility‟. The matter not explicitly 
addressed in this wording, however, was which particular types of individual were to 
be held responsible in international law for the perpetration of such (war) crimes. The 
matter was also not resolved by Article 7 of the charter: 
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or respon-
sible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them 
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.18 
State leaders rarely, if at all, were involved in the direct acts of War Crimes as defined 
as a discrete crime in the charter. Significantly, many of these crimes were committed 
without any direct orders, or immediate encouragement or incitement from the 
particular defendants on trial.19 (Yet it would be ludicrous to suggest that, as leaders 
of the Nazi regime, they were not in some way – and indeed in a greater respect – 
responsible for such crimes in some particular manner since they were committed on 
a vast scale under the regime that they led). Individual instances of such transgres-
                                                     
17 As we shall see, the Tribunal  referred to the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 
1929. 
18 IMT, Vol. I, p. 12. 
19 Ian Kershaw characterised this tendency as „working towards the Fuehrer‟: Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936 - 
Hubris, pp. 527-591. 
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sions, rather, were perpetrated directly by subordinates or completely unrelated 
individuals (professionally) at particular (and usually distant) locations. Traditionally, it 
would be such subordinates and, given the (limited) development of doctrine of 
Command Responsibility before 1945, their more immediate superiors (ie military 
commanders in the field) who would find themselves arraigned for such crimes within 
military tribunals.20 But there is little doubt that the very reasoning behind the IMT trial 
was to reach even further: to those individuals who had traditionally evaded 
accountability. Such intent was expressed in the final words of the Moscow 
Declaration which promised punishment (not necessarily through legal means) for the 
Major Criminals „whose offenses [had] no particular geographical localization‟.21 The 
chief American prosecutor at the IMT trial, Robert Jackson, stressed this issue in his 
opening speech at Nuremberg: 
These defendants were men of a station and rank which does not soil its own 
hands with blood. They were men who knew how to use lesser folk as tools. We 
want to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose 
evil architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the 
violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions, of this 
terrible war.22 
In Anglo-American (domestic) criminal law, where some form of commission (or 
omission) could be attached to a defendant (analogous, for example, to an order 
given by a military commander), individual culpability for a crime could be applied 
without any need for resorting to the doctrine of conspiracy. For example, the 
following statement would have been applicable, in Anglo-American (domestic) 
jurisdictions, in 1945 and elucidates the point that one who, in the words of Jackson, 
„does not soil his own hands with blood‟, can still be found guilty of murder:  
It must be proved that D [the defendant], by his own act or unlawful omission, 
caused death. For this purpose, D, who, for example, procures E to murder D‟s 
wife, does not cause her death. D does not kill; E does. D is guilty of murder but as 
a secondary party.23 
In this example, „D‟, as „a secondary party‟, could, in Anglo-American domestic 
criminal law, be found guilty of murder as an accomplice since to „aid, abet, counsel 
or procure‟ the perpetration of a crime renders criminal liability for the act.24 If further 
parties involved in the case were, although indifferent to the fate of D‟s wife, aware 
                                                     
20 After the First World War, the Allies had initiated plans to indict such holders of high office as the son of 
the Kaiser, Count Bismarck, and Marshalls Von Hindenburg and Ludendorff but this was soon dropped in 
favour of German prosecutions of less highly placed individuals at Leipzig. See Major William H. Parks, 
'Command Responsibility for War Crimes,' Military Law Review, Vol. 62 (1973), pp. 11-13. 
21 Mettraux, (ed.), Perspectives, p. 733. 
22 IMT, 21/Nov/1945, Vol. II, pp. 104-5. 
23 This is not to be confused with the US crime of murder in the second degree. J. C. Smith & Brian Hogan, 
Criminal law (10th ed.) (Croydon: Butterworths Tolley, 2002), p. 357. (Emphasis added). 
24 This is according to the UK Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. Cited in: Ibid., p. 140. 
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of D‟s plan and in some way complicit with it (for example, by supplying a weapon), 
they also might be prosecuted as accessories to the crime. However, if they were 
aware of, and agreed upon, the definite plan (of the murder of D‟s wife) and agreed 
to assist in either its committal or any act in furtherance of its committal, then they 
might be arraigned on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder (whether or not the 
murder had taken place). Such circumstances in the case of murder tried under 
municipal law, and directed against a quite limited number of individuals, would be 
relatively simple in comparison to a murderous litany of crimes committed in the 
course of a war and under the aegis of an obviously murderous state/regime. For a 
military administrator stationed in Berlin during the 1940s, such a direct individual 
connection might still be provable, but even then, his guilt would have remained 
beyond the reaches of traditional international law that was applicable before 1945. 
The analogy to municipal law, therefore, ultimately remains insufficient because it 
does not account for the responsibility of a vast number of crimes where, neverthe-
less, no direct link might be made between an individual high leader of state 
(particularly in the case of civilian leaders) and any number of individual war crimes. 
Perhaps the best example of the type of individual to which this might apply is that 
of a banker, who might have had no direct connection to atrocities committed in war 
(or peace) but who would have assisted a criminal regime in some significant way – 
whilst in the knowledge of its murderous methods or designs. A probably exasperated 
Robert Jackson explained to the delegates drafting the London Charter: 
[I]f you take the banker as an example – for instance, Schacht, who is our prisoner 
at the moment – he is either a big war criminal or nothing. [...] Nothing except the 
common-plan or conspiracy theory will reach that type of man, and, therefore, if 
you [...] shove him out of this Tribunal, you have shoved him out of the possibility of 
being tried anywhere because you have no law to try him except under this 
agreement [and charter].25 
Jackson‟s example, Hjalmar Schacht, was a particularly apt case in stressing the 
value of the doctrine of conspiracy. Yet this statement was an inadvertent admission 
of the novelty of the law that would be required (rather than, as was later claimed by 
Jackson, merely a matter of newly applying already-existing laws).26 The banker was 
to be accused in the indictment of assisting the accession and consolidation of 
Hitler‟s power as well as promoting preparations for war.27 The main problem for the 
prosecution would be, however, that Schacht had been dismissed by Hitler before 
                                                     
25 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 254. 
26 IMT, 21/Nov/1945, Vol. III, p. 146. 
27 IMT, Vol. I, p. 74. 
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the war began.28 Thus serious doubts about the wisdom of arraigning him were 
expressed by the librarian of the (British) Foreign Office: 
Whatever the views of our American and Russian allies I should regard it as most 
inadvisable to indict Schacht [...]. He is, I believe, in many ways an unpleasant and 
unreliable character. But, in my considered view, he is not a war criminal in the 
sense of the prosecution. His defence would be so strong that, if it did not secure 
an acquittal, the authority of the Tribunal would be seriously reduced.29 
With Schacht‟s eventual acquittal, these turned out to have been prophetic words. 
„Conspiracy‟, however, appeared to provide the only answer for the American 
delegates. Without it, the problem of leadership culpability remained even in the 
(apparently more clear-cut) case of the banker that took Schacht‟s place and stood 
as head of the Reichsbank throughout the war. Before the trial commenced there 
was enough evidence to demonstrate that Walther Funk could be found directly 
responsible for „persecution‟ of the Jews before the outbreak of war.30 For example, 
his active participation in a meeting with Göring, designed to appropriate Jewish 
property as „compensation‟ after Kristallnacht was recorded in a document of 
unchallenged authenticity.31 Yet the legal problem of leadership culpability for War 
Crimes remained and there appeared to be only one answer to the Chair of 
Jurisprudence at Oxford as the trial was underway: 
How, it has been asked, can a financial or economic expert sitting in Berlin be held 
liable for the shooting of hostages in a remote Russian village? The answer is that 
under the law each of the parties, by deliberately entering into the conspiracy, 
adopts all his confederates as agents to assist him in carrying it out, and conse-
quently any act done subsequently for that purpose by any of them will be 
admissible as evidence against him, unless before the act was done he has 
withdrawn from the conspiracy. Such withdrawal may, however, be too late if the 
course of the conspiracy, which he has helped to bring into being, cannot be 
stayed.32 
Arthur L. Goodhart‟s final remarks in this section of his lecture, delivered before the 
Edinburgh University Law Faculty on 5th February 1946, suggested that he felt the 
doctrine of conspiracy was useful in finding defendants like Schacht and Funk 
culpable for criminal acts committed by others during the war (and, specifically for 
the example he cited: War Crimes). His statement merely reflected the fait accompli 
laid down by the American delegation during the London negotiations that only 
                                                     
28 Schacht was accused of the overall conspiracy (Count 1 of the indictment) as well as Crimes Against 
Peace (Count 2) but found innocent on both Counts and acquitted by the Tribunal.  
29 E. J. Passant memorandum, 15/Aug/1945, cited in: Taylor, Anatomy, p. 88. 
30 Funk was indicted on all four counts and found guilty of all except, ironically, the overall conspiracy 
count (Count 1). Such mixed results reflect the variations of interpretations of the counts (in particular, 
Count 1and the doctrine of conspiracy) and the method outlined in the charter of deriving individual 
culpability. 
31 See document PS-1816, IMT, Vol. XXVIII, p. 499; NCA, Vol. IV, p. 425. 
32 Arthur L. Goodhart, „The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials‟, (Lecture, 5/Feb/1946), repr. in: Mettraux, (ed.), 
Perspectives, p. 632. 
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through the use of the doctrine of conspiracy could the „substantive‟ crimes of the 
charter attach individual culpability to defendants like Schacht or Funk. No other law, 
Jackson had insisted, was available to reach a man like Schacht.33 
The single section of the charter expressing explicitly the fundamental linkage 
between (non-localized) „Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices‟ and 
localized (war) crimes (perpetrated by subordinates or others) – is to be found in what 
I have labelled paragraph x of Article 6 (see Appendix 2).34 That the framers of the 
charter did not label this paragraph subsection „(d)‟ suggests that it was not intended 
to constitute a discrete crime (like those of a-c). That it is the only section explicitly 
linking leaders (etc) to responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates or others, 
suggest that it applied to each and every „substantive‟ crime.35 Thus, if War Crimes 
were to hold any legal relevance to the particular defendants on trial, they could 
only do so (legally, within the confines of the charter) through the application of 
paragraph x. Since this paragraph specified that leaders (etc) would be held 
accountable for „acts performed by any persons‟ (ie subordinates) through 
participation in „the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy‟, 
leadership responsibility for War Crimes was thus – at least in a positivist legal sense – 
irrevocably conflated with the doctrine of conspiracy. This might have been avoided 
by dealing more explicitly with leadership responsibility in paragraph i. In fact, this 
approach had been attempted during the negotiations and had appeared in 
several drafts of the Charter‟s definition of „Crimes‟, including the penultimate 
American draft of 30th July 1945: „The following acts, designs, or attempts at any of 
them, shall be deemed to be crimes coming within its jurisdiction: [...]‟.36 The single 
word designs would have gone some way in holding leaders responsible for the direct 
actions of others whilst maintaining conspiracy as a potentially discrete, separate, 
charge.37 This, potentially, would have permitted the Tribunal to reject or ignore 
paragraph x as separate conspiracy clause (if it so wished), whilst still finding 
defendants responsible for the design of crimes they themselves were not directly 
implicated in. Yet it is still questionable as to whether this, or similar wording, would 
                                                     
33 See above, note 25. 
34 The reverse relationship of responsibility – subordinates being held responsible for carrying out the orders 
of their superiors – was addressed by Article 8. 
35 It should be noted that the form of indentation in the text of Article 6 also implies that paragraph x 
applied equally to all (indented) „substantive‟ crimes listed above it. However, explicit mention of 
conspiracy within Crimes Against Peace without similar mention in sections (b) and (c) has led others to 
suggest that this implied War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity were to be treated differently – i.e. 
without embracing the doctrine of conspiracy. See, for example: Smith, Reaching Judgment, p. 59. 
36 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 393. (Emphasis added). 
37 This single word constituted a significant reduction of the expression of general leadership responsibility 
that had been posited in earlier drafts at the point before „substantive‟ crimes were listed.  
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have formed a suitable basis to make clear the culpability of men like Schacht and, 
to a lesser extent, Funk. 
Alternatively, paragraph x could have addressed the issue of leadership responsi-
bility by omitting mention of conspiracy altogether, shown as follows (with the 
conspiracy phrase struck out, and the word „crimes‟ substituted for „plan‟):  
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan 
[crimes].38 
Yet still, could Schacht or Funk, as presidents of the Reichsbank, be reasonably 
found guilty of the „formulation‟ or „execution‟ of any particular War Crimes (or Crimes 
Against Humanity) perpetrated, for example, on the eastern front?39 As this seems not 
to be the case, the utility of the doctrine of conspiracy is clear. But „conspiracy‟ 
crimes might have been better placed as discretely enumerated crimes beneath 
those already listed in a-c (together with the amended paragraph x above, this 
would have clearly posited conspiracy crimes as separate, whilst expressing 
leadership culpability on its own so that it could be applied to both conspiracy and 
non-conspiracy crimes).40 
At the close of the London conference, the final draft of the charter omitted any 
separate, discrete expression of leadership responsibility in relation to War Crimes or 
Crimes Against Humanity, consigning it solely within paragraph x of Article 6 and thus 
making it entirely dependent on the judicial acceptance of the doctrine of 
conspiracy. Thus, according to the charter, leaders could be held responsible for 
either i) conspiracy to commit War Crimes and/or conspiracy to commit Crimes 
Against Humanity or otherwise ii) only the actual direct acts of, or closely related acts 
to, these crimes (which, as already noted, they were unlikely to have committed). 
Assuming the validity of conspiracy as a doctrine in international law, and realizing 
that paragraph x is the essential text in making crimes (b) and (c) relate to the 
particular defendants in any meaningful way, we are confronted with the following 
(partly ludicrous) collection of eight crimes defined by the London Charter: 
 
                                                     
38 See Appendix II. 
39 Funk was found guilty of all crimes except the overall conspiracy (Count 1). But it is arguable that his 
darkest guilt – accepting deliveries from the SS - was that of omission rather than „formulation‟ or 
„execution‟ (see Chapter 6).  
40 This had been attempted in several drafts during the London conference, but for a variety of reasons, 
such drafts could not be agreed upon by all four parties. Jackson, (ed.), Conference. 
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F I G U R E  2 :   The eight crimes posited in Article 6 of the London Charter – when crediting 
paragraph x with applicability to all „substantive‟ crimes. 
 
Although it seems certain that nobody at the negotiations in London intended to 
create the crime of „Conspiracy to commit Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against 
Peace‟ (x-2), this is, if we are to give paragraph x its due, a law that can be derived 
from article 6 of the charter. Logic however, seems to be the price that was paid at 
London in order to reach agreement. So adamant were the American delegation in 
stressing that conspiracy to wage aggressive war was the heart of the case, that they 
insisted „conspiracy‟ be mentioned explicitly within subsection (a), the „substantive‟ 
law of Crimes Against Peace – despite its applicability as further expressed in 
paragraph x.41 As Jackson put it during the London negotiations, a „war connection‟ 
(for connection, read conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace) was the only way 
to proceed in justifying the expansion of law into the traditionally immunised confines 
of state-sovereignty: 
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from time 
immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not ordinarily our 
business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its inhabitants, or any other 
country treats its inhabitants, is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some 
other government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this program 
of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an 
international concern is this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless 
we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no 
basis for dealing with atrocities. They were part of the preparation for war or for 
the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that 
makes them our concern.42 
What right, such a statement suggested, did any foreign state have to probe into the 
American treatment of its own minorities unless that treatment was cause for, or part 
of, an illegally pursued international conflict? It was only aggressive war, for Jackson, 
that constituted the supreme crime and exclusively contingent element that 
                                                     
41 That conspiracy to wage aggressive war was deemed to be the heart of Nazi criminality was reiterated 
during the presentation of the American case by Sidney S. Alderman. IMT, 23/Nov/1945, Vol. II, p. 241. 
42 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. 331. 
 
(a-1) Crimes Against Peace 
(a-2) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(b) War Crimes 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity 
(x-1) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(x-2) Conspiracy to commit Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(x-3) Conspiracy to commit War Crimes 
(x-4) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Humanity 
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permitted supremacy of international law over the otherwise (still) sacred tradition of 
state-sovereignty. This was markedly different to the French delegation‟s attitude at 
the conference: 
Professor Gros: [...] I should think that [...] our differences are more or less this: the 
Americans want to win the trial on the ground that the Nazi war was illegal, and 
the French people and other people of the occupied countries just want to show 
that the Nazis were bandits. It is not very difficult to show.43 
Jackson agreed that this was an accurate description of the difference between the 
aims of the French and Americans but viewed the unjustified starting of a war (rather 
than unjustified means in conducting it) as the supreme crime. His explanation 
admitted frankly that such differing perspectives derived from differing experiences of 
the war (i.e. French occupation versus American embroilment).44 Although there may 
be something to be said for the proposition that initiating war in an industrial age 
must, by necessity, contemplate the injustice of killing innocent civilians, Jackson‟s 
particular form of reasoning encouraged a potentially dubious interpretation of 
history – in that what we now refer to as the Holocaust might said to have been 
considered by the Nazis as merely the necessary pre-requisite, by-product, or 
„offshoot‟, of preparing and waging an aggressive war.45 An overwhelming majority of 
historians (including myself) would, today, favour the reverse interpretation: that only 
total war provided the means (or at least, environment) to carry out the Nazis‟ „Final 
Solution‟.46 Furthermore, such a view implied that future humanitarian intervention (as 
we would now call it) would be illegal without the existence of an „aggressive‟ (i.e. 
illegal) war between states.47 A war started legally would preclude humanitarian 
intervention. 
As far as negotiating the charter was concerned, the obsession with „aggressive 
war‟ served to reinforce the American insistence on the use of the doctrine of 
conspiracy: viewing aggressive war itself as a „conspiracy‟ contemplating all crimes 
associated with its fruition (War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity). But the 
duplication of „conspiracy‟ within Article 6 of the charter, dr iven by this insistence, 
would ironically serve to make it appear to be less relevant – or, indeed, irrelevant – in 
regard to the other two „substantive‟ crimes (b & c). This was an essential factor in 
shaping the judgement as we shall see. 
                                                     
43 Ibid., pp. 381-382. 
44 Ibid., pp. 383-384. 
45 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 72. 
46 See, for example, Konrad Hugo Jarausch & Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German 
Histories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 117-119. 
47 The most obvious example that highlights the flaw in this method – to a 21st century being – is that of the 
Rwandan genocide. 
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3.3. Indictment 
From most – if not all – subsequent narrative accounts of the IMT trial, one might 
assume that the conspiracy doctrine was applied only in Count 1 of the indictment. 
This is the case even with those accounts that concern themselves predominantly 
with the legal aspects of the trial.48 Figure 3 reflects what is usually described in such 
accounts: 
 
 
F I G U R E  3 :  The inaccurate reflection of crimes charged in most narrative accounts of the  
Nuremberg IMT trial. 
 
However, before specifying the charges in further detail, both counts 3 and 4 
mentioned conspiracy in the second and third paragraphs of each „statement of 
offence‟. Count 3 opened as follows: 
                                                     
48 See for example: Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law: With a Postlude on the 
Eichmann Case, (2nd ed.), (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1962) and Peter Calvocoressi, Nuremberg: the 
facts, the law and the consequences (London: Chatto & Windus, 1947). 
 
Count 1 - Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
Count 2 - Crimes Against Peace 
 
Count 3 - War Crimes 
 
Count 4 - Crimes Against Humanity 
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COUNT THREE – WAR CRIMES 
(Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (b) ) 
 
VIII. Statement of the Offense 
All the defendants49 committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 
May 1945 […] 
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and executed a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in Article 6 (b) of 
the Charter.  […] 
The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other persons 
for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 of the charter) as 
such other persons when committing the said War Crimes performed their acts in 
execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in 
the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants 
participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices.50 
The first three paragraphs of Count 4 were very similar, other than the fact that Crimes 
Against Humanity were specified as having been committed „during a period of years 
preceding 8 May 1945‟.51 Thus doubts as to the temporal scope of „conspiracy‟ were 
not resolved by any legalistic generalities within the indictment (but rather by the 
specific historical details of crimes cited beneath the opening paragraphs of each 
count – in particular, Count 4 specified the establishment of concentration camps 
and that Jews were „persecuted‟ from 193352). But what is clear from paragraphs two 
and three of both the War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity counts of the 
indictment is that the understanding of individual responsibility as being dependant 
upon the doctrine of conspiracy was expressed and entirely consistent with such an 
interpretation of paragraph x in Article 6 of the London Charter. Indeed, both these 
paragraphs reiterated the very wording of paragraph x reinforcing the dependence 
of the individual culpability of „Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices‟ in 
the „formulation or execution‟ of War Crimes/Crimes Against Humanity upon use of 
the doctrine of conspiracy. 
A more accurate reflection of the indictment than those provided in most narrative 
accounts, therefore, is shown in Figure 4, with the essential differences underlined: 
 
                                                     
49 Not all the defendants at the IMT were charged under Count 3, so this must be read as applying only to 
those who were. (Schacht, for example, was only indicted on counts 1 and 2, whereas Funk was 
indicted on all four counts). 
50 IMT, Vol. I, pp. 42-3. (Emphasis added). 
51 Ibid, p. 65. A further anomaly was evident in the use of the words „war crimes‟ where one might have 
expected „Crimes Against Humanity‟, thus conflating the two at this stage before the trial had begun. 
The specifics of Count 3 were much more comprehensive than Count 4, including mention of 
„genocide‟ which is generally understood today as the worst type of Crime Against Humanity rather 
than a War Crime. 
52 IMT, Vol I, pp. 66-7. The word „persecuted‟ is used in quotations here to as it is insufficient to describe Nazi 
victimization of Jews – a point admitted by the prosecution although it used the same word (see 
Chapter 6, p. 157). 
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F I G U R E  4 :   The indictment – including conspiracy in counts 3 and 4. 
 
The indictment, therefore, reflected the overlap of counts 1, 3, and 4 to a greater 
degree than has been noted in most (if not all) narrative accounts of the IMT trial. This 
reinforces the view which seemed obvious at the time and has been expressed in 
various accounts since: that the American case, and in particular, the evidence 
submitted, in dealing with Count 1 covered much of the ground that was to be 
covered by the French and Soviets in counts 3 and 4. If this was not admitted entirely 
by Jackson, it could be inferred from his words spoken during the trial: 
Count One of the Indictment is a conspiracy count [...] It is impossible, trying a 
conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the fact that the act, which was the 
object of the conspiracy, was performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of 
the conspiracy.53 [...] [T]he other prosecutors, if they feel their field is being tres-
passed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are exceeding, [should] raise [an] 
objection specifically; because I don't know how we can separate, particularly on 
a moment s notice, Count One [conspiracy] from the other [„substantive‟] 
Counts.54 
This statement was made in relation to the calling of witnesses that might be useful in 
the prosecution of various counts of the indictment. Yet the same principle applied to 
the use of all forms of evidence. The use of the doctrine of conspiracy – in both the 
London Charter and the indictment – served the very practical American aim of 
taking control of the bulk of the entire case against the defendants. This left the 
problem of covering similar ground to the French and Soviet prosecutors. The 
duplication in presenting cases in general, as well as specific documents, caused 
some consternation on the Bench: 
                                                     
53 This is not necessarily true in the case of Anglo-American conspiracy: the object of a conspiracy is 
treated as a separate „substantive‟ crime and need not be carried out. 
54 IMT, 30/Nov/1945, Vol. II, pp. 436-7. 
 
Count 1 - Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
Count 2 - Crimes Against Peace 
 
Count 3 - War Crimes & conspiracy to commit War Crimes 
 
Count 4 - Crimes Against Humanity & conspiracy to commit Crimes 
Against Humanity 
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6 February. This day, which is the 100th session of the Tribunal, the French counsel 
with a voice so toneless as to be without any meaning presents a completely 
useless exposé of the looting of art treasures in France. 
The work has been done completely by the Americans, and even then was a 
work of supererogation. 
[...] 
7 February. I regret to say that all matters dealt with today have been largely 
repetition of matters already discussed by the other delegations. It is difficult to 
remain patient, but the prestige of France is somehow involved. [...]55 
Linking individual responsibility for all crimes within the charter to the doctrine of 
conspiracy served to justify the overlap between the prosecutorial cases covering 
counts 1, 3 and 4. The only charge of the indictment that made no mention of 
conspiracy whatsoever was Count 2, Crimes Against Peace. This, the most 
straightforward prosecution case, became the responsibility of the British War Crimes 
Executive. 
 
 
3.4. Judgement 
In comparison to the Prosecution‟s indictment, the Tribunal‟s judgement provoked 
considerably greater comment from contemporary reporters and lawyers and, 
subsequently, from historians. This is hardly surprising since the reading of the 
judgement in court, combined with the sentencing of the defendants, constituted the 
climax of the trial as an international event – just as the defendant‟s pleas as well as 
Robert Jackson‟s celebrated speech (rather than the reading of the indictment) 
represented the most dramatic opening moments of the trial.56 Furthermore, in 
keeping with an analogy to common law in Anglo-American domestic jurisdictions, 
the judgement represented – to some, including President Truman – a legal 
„precedent‟: a view that Hans Kelsen, as the consummate 20 th century legal positivist, 
felt was worth refuting.57 Nevertheless, the view has persisted that when speaking of 
the legal legacy of „Nuremberg‟ one must not only consider the London Charter, but 
also give considerable weight to the judgement too: in this (legal) sense, there has 
been said to be two „Nurembergs‟.58 More recently it has been maintained as a 
general principle that judgements in international courts can constitute laws 
                                                     
55 H. Montgomery Hyde, Norman Birkett: the life of Lord Birkett of Ulverston (London: H. Hamilton, 1964), pp. 
505-506. During the French prosecution case on 6th February 1946, the President of the Tribunal pointed 
out that a specific document, PS-141, had already been presented by the American prosecution. See: 
IMT, 6/Feb/1945, Vol. VII, p. 55-6. 
56 See Chapter 4, p. 111. For the text of Jackson‟s opening speech, see: IMT, 21/Nov/1945, Vol. II, pp. 98-
155. 
57 Kelsen, 'Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?.' 
58 Richard Wasserstrom, 'The Relevance of Nuremberg,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1971), 
p. 28. 
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themselves.59 However, the international Tribunal at Nuremberg, whilst being no 
bastion of legal positivism, understood its own function, not as a law or precedent-
making body, but to merely render judgements and sentences upon the defendants 
within the scope of the laws posited – to the extent that they were – in the text of the 
London Charter. One need not, therefore, adhere to a strictly positivist jurisprudence 
in any assessment of the judgement, but merely seek to assess its value as measured 
by the Tribunal‟s own declared objective. Criticism, however, should be tempered by 
the fact that, as has been noted by several commentators, due to inherent 
ambiguities in the charter itself, it was possible to interpret its various parts in various 
ways. Nevertheless, it is with regard to the nexus between individual culpability and 
the doctrine of conspiracy, as expressed in the charter, that a crucial flaw in the 
judgement becomes evident. 
In contrast to the American Prosecution, Francis Biddle, the voting – as opposed to 
the advisory „alternate‟ – American judge of the Tribunal, held the doctrine of 
conspiracy in a particularly low regard and made this clear to his peers on the bench: 
I had learned to distrust conspiracy indictments, which in our country were used 
too often by the government to catch anyone however remotely connected with 
the substantive crime. [...] 
[John J.] Parker [the American „alternate‟ judge,] thought that the conspiracy had 
been proved “beyond all peradventure” – he liked such old-fashioned phrases, 
which, when he used them, sounded like the crack of a long whip, tearing all the 
other arguments to shreds. The British were upset by my stand – it was as if I had 
deserted them. The heart would be taken out, Birkett [the alternate British judge] 
believed, if we rejected conspiracy.60 
The French judges were even more distrusting of what, to them, was an alien (non-) 
legal theory. In spite of the existence of the London Charter, therefore, the validity of 
the doctrine in International Law was still something to be debated (in private) by the 
judges. Since the British were supporters in principle, and since the Soviets were 
amenable on purely pragmatic grounds – as it would assist in finding defendants like 
Fritzsche and Schacht guilty – the bench was, numerically, evenly split amongst the 
four voting judges and so compromise was required.61 
The final judgement, therefore, did not reject the doctrine but, as Jackson later put it: 
                                                     
59 Bing Bing Jia, „Judicial decisions as a source of international law and the defence of duress in murder or 
other cases arising from armed conflict‟ in Sienho Yee & Wang Tieya (eds.), International Law in the 
Post-Cold War World (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 77-95. 
60 Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 468. See also: Hyde, Norman Birkett, 
pp. 522-523. 
61 Biddle, Brief Authority, pp. 466-469. 
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[...] the language which expressed [the London] agreement seems not to have 
conveyed to the minds of the judges the intention clearly expressed by the 
framers of the charter in conference, for, while the legal concept of conspiracy 
was accepted by the Tribunal, it was given a very limited construction in the 
judgment.62 
There was good reason for Jackson to avoid any further and comprehensive criticism 
of the judgement – i.e. in pointing out the link between conspiracy and individual 
responsibility – since his instinct was to defend the Nuremberg project as a whole, 
including his own involvement in framing the charter. Too much criticism of the 
Tribunal‟s interpretation of the charter would only serve to highlight flaws in the 
charter itself. 
In conflict with the aims of the Prosecution (and the delegates to the London 
conference), the judgement expressed the opinion that, according to the London 
Charter, charges of War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity were simply not valid in 
Count 1:  
Count One [of the indictment ...] charges not only the conspiracy to commit 
aggressive war, but also to commit War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. But 
the Charter does not define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one 
to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6 of the Charter provides [in paragraph 
x]:  
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such 
plan."  
In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate crime 
to those already listed. The words are designed to establish the responsibility of 
persons participating in a common plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the 
charges in Count One that the defendants conspired to commit War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity, and will consider only the common plan to prepare, 
initiate, and wage aggressive war.63 
That the charter did not „define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one 
to commit acts of aggressive war‟ was true insofar as this statement went. But what 
the Tribunal did not admit, or chose to ignore, was that conspiracy – and the 
individual responsibility of the particular defendants on trial – was relevant to each 
and every crime in Article 6 (a-c) through the application of paragraph x. To state 
that „[t]he words [of paragraph x] are designed to establish the responsibility of 
persons participating in a common plan‟ was only half correct: they were also 
expressly devoted to invoking the culpability of the defendants – „leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices‟ – for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity that they 
                                                     
62 Jackson, (ed.), Conference, p. vii. 
63 IMT, Vol. I, p. 226; NCA, Opinion and Judgment, p. 56. Partly as a result of this interpretation, the tribunal 
could and did also hold that counts 1 and 2 were „in substance the same‟ and could be considered 
together. IMT, Vol. I, p. 224; NCA, Opinion and Judgment, p. 54. 
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would not otherwise be held accountable for. By quoting and subsequently 
commenting on paragraph x, the judgement explicitly rejected its relevance. 
The original meaning of the London Charter (reflected in Figure 2 on page 59) was 
now considerably altered by the „limited construction‟ of conspiracy as outlined in 
Figure 5:  
 
F I G U R E  5 :  The tribunal‟s interpretation of Article 6 of the London Charter: discounting the 
relevance of paragraph x and treating Crimes Against Peace and the con-
spiracy to do so as „in substance the same‟ charge. The charge of Crimes 
Against Humanity was restricted to war-time acts only.64 
 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity were now deemed irrelevant in the 
Tribunal‟s interpretation of Count 1 of the indictment. Furthermore, the Tribunal 
deemed „conspiracy‟ as irrelevant to counts 3 and 4. So confident was it that 
individual responsibility was already established in international law before 1945 that 
the Tribunal felt it need not rely on the charter (and specifically, paragraph x) to find 
the defendants culpable: 
The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition which it gives both 
of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With respect to War Crimes, however, 
[...] the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were already 
recognized as War Crimes under international law. They were covered by Articles 
46, 50, 52 and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 
the Geneva Convention of 1929. That violation of these provisions constituted 
crimes for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled to admit 
of argument.65 
The distinction not made in this observation was the difference between the 
undoubted pre-existence of these laws (and sanctions) and to whom such laws were 
applicable. It was not in the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 
1929, or even the Versailles treaty of 1919, but only in the London Charter of 1945 that 
– exclusively via the doctrine of conspiracy – such crimes were applicable to the 
particular types of defendants that now happened to be on trial (that is, military and 
                                                     
64 Note the similarity of figure 5 to figure 1, the latter of which considers the „substantive‟ crimes a-c in 
isolation from the rest of Article 6. 
65 IMT, Vol. I, p. 253. (Emphasis added). 
 
(a) Crimes Against Peace & Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(b) War Crimes 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity [only during the war] 
(x-1) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(x-2) Conspiracy to commit Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace 
(x-3) Conspiracy to commit War Crimes 
(x-4) Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Humanity 
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civilian holders of high office, besides the official Head of State).66 
The Tribunal‟s „restrictive‟ interpretation of the Charter meant that the indictment 
itself was considerably revised by the judges, as shown in Figure 6: 
 
 
F I G U R E  6 :  The Tribunal‟s revision of the indictment derived from its interpretation of the 
London Charter. 
 
As a result of dismissing the relevance of paragraph x, the Tribunal, if it is to be 
assessed with its own legalist logic – inadvertently reverted to judging the defendants 
for some crimes they simply could not have committed. In particular, it judged the 
defendants for only the direct perpetration of War Crimes which were, in fact, 
actually committed many thousands of times over by many thousands of their 
subordinates. In choosing to dismiss the applicability of conspiracy to the „substantive‟ 
definitions of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the Tribunal had forfeited a 
novel legal method of encapsulating the vast scale of injustice for which only leaders 
could be held responsible. The Tribunal had reached beyond its remit (its jurisdiction) 
in effectively re-writing the laws of the London Charter.  
It is, therefore, fair to state that the heart of the American Prosecution‟s legal case 
was compromised severely. No consensus among the American Prosecution and the 
Tribunal existed in regard to the central legal framework underpinning the entire 
American case against the defendants. Indeed, as we have seen, little consensus on 
the meaning or value of conspiracy existed within the Tribunal itself. Thus, if the trial 
                                                     
66 Articles 227-230 of the Versailles treaty concerned „penalties‟. Article 227 did extend juridical culpability 
to an ex Head of State (specifically, the ex-Kaiser) but only for the vaguely specified „supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties‟ (this would have provided precedent for 
arraigning Hitler, had he remained alive). The reason for this vagueness was partly due to American 
dissent within the „Commission for the Responsibility for the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties‟ – the body instituted at the Paris Peace Conference in order to formulate articles of the 
Versailles treaty in relation to „penalties‟. American dissent within the Commission focused on the 
rejection of extending culpability to transgressions of the „laws of humanity‟ as well as extending the 
reach of Command Responsibility to a (negative) culpability for „having abstained from preventing [...] 
illegal acts‟. The majority report rejected the idea of prosecutions for planning or waging aggressive 
war. Article 228 outlined the right of the „Allied and Associate Powers‟ to bring before military tribunals 
those accused of (direct participation in) traditional war crimes only. See: Commission of Responsibilities, 
Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law, Pamphlet No. 32), (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919). 
 
Count 1 - Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
Count 2 - Crimes Against Peace 
 
Count 3 - War Crimes & conspiracy to commit War Crimes 
 
Count 4 - Crimes Against Humanity & conspiracy to commit Crimes 
Against Humanity [only during the war] 
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were to be judged on its legal merits alone or, more specifically, on the merits of the 
Tribunal‟s interpretation of the laws of the London Charter, justice was not seen clearly 
to be done. The judges, however, were not solely responsible for this fog of legal 
retribution: the framers of the Charter and, specifically, Robert Jackson, had not 
striven sufficiently to build a consensus amongst the negotiators in London so that 
clarity might have existed from the outset.  Instead, ambiguity in law was the price to 
be paid for ensuring that political differences between the Four Powers might not 
derail the process of bringing the Nazi defendants to stand trial in an international 
court. But that the law applied in the courtroom had happened to be imperfect from 
the outset should not lead us to conclude that no justice was achieved at 
Nuremberg. Instead, it simply means that we need to look elsewhere – beyond the 
realms of law – if we wish to find the most visible manifestations of justice at 
Nuremberg. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
AN AMERICAN SHOW 
 
 
I agree with you that all this smacks of the swaggering conqueror and 
that the trials should be conducted with Spartan simplicity. But that’s 
not the way of the Americans. [...] The Russians, British and French 
actually have small parts here. Probably 80% of the trials staff is 
American. And in our youthful exuberant way we're turning Nure m-
berg into Coney Island. The trial isn’t going to be a farce, but i t’s going 
to be a damned good show, no question of that.  
Stuart Schulberg (19/Oct/1945)1 
 
 
You Americans do things on such a vast scale!  
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, (Jun/1945)2 
 
The major Nuremberg trial was more than a legal process. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, it was also a piece of theatre designed by American planners to impart 
political and moral lessons. The evidence cited in the following pages suggests that 
this production was designed for an American, as much as for a German, audience. 
There were high expectations within the American Prosecution that the trial would 
entertain that audience with a good measure of drama throughout the proceedings. 
I examine some of the important elements of this production, beginning with the 
physical arrangements in the courtroom – arrangements that included provision for 
capturing the drama on sound and film. I then assess the dramatic impact of various 
forms of „performance‟ with an examination of Robert Jackson‟s opening speech as 
well as the provision of evidence in the form of witnesses and documents. This will 
prepare the ground for examining the relative effectiveness of film in the following 
chapter. Given that legal imperfections hampered the progress of justice at the IMT, 
the central question I will address here is whether some of the theatrical aspects of 
the trial fared any better in achieving justice at Nuremberg. 
 
In a work devoted to the theme of what some academics now refer to as 
„transitional justice‟,3 Otto Kirchheimer, the renowned constitutional theorist, engaged 
in a critically qualified defence of the Nuremberg IMT trial. Considering some of its 
„anomalies‟, he posed a rhetorical question: 
                                                     
1 Stuart Schulberg to Barbara Schulberg, 19/Oct/1945. SSP. 
2 Maxwell-Fyfe addressed these words to Robert Jackson. Cited in: Taylor, Anatomy, p. 58. 
3 See Introduction, p. 3, note 4. 
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[W]hen compared with any homegrown variety of law and procedure, the [IMT] 
case will show any number of anomalies. If these anomalies are stated cumula-
tively, the proceeding might give the impression of gross irregularity, allowing the 
trial itself to be put on trial. What would remain but a kind of morality play which, 
being refuted immediately thereafter by the course of history, would have nothing 
to teach?4 
We have already discovered some of the legal anomalies in Chapter 3. Yet rather 
than being merely a „morality play‟, Kirchheimer‟s answer was that the trial 
distinguished itself favourably from other forms of „successor trials‟ due to the fact that 
the outcome – the question of guilt and punishment of each of the defendants – was 
not pre-determined but rather entailed an element of risk for the powers that had 
submitted them to juridical proceedings. Also in its favour, the attempt to do justice to 
the victims of Nazi Germany using „the language of the charnel houses‟ meant that, 
for Kirchheimer, some justice as well as politics – or rather justice via politics – figured 
at Nuremberg.5 
His „rejoinders‟ to some of the more common critiques of the trial included 
countering the accusation of „victor‟s justice‟. This dilemma was one that Robert H. 
Jackson himself framed in moral terms: 
The danger, so far as the moral judgement of the world is concerned which will 
beset these trials, is that they come to be regarded as merely political trials in 
which the victor wreaks vengeance upon the vanquished.6 
The point stressed by Kirchheimer, and several others since, is that any judicial process 
instigated after the defeat of a particular regime cannot but reflect the political 
values of the „successor[s]‟ who are engaged in replacing a vanquished legal 
authority with one deemed more legitimate.7 Despite the presence of Soviet judges 
on the bench, there is some consensus among legal and other historians that the trial 
succeeded, at least partially, as a „liberal‟ (political) endeavour.8 Although often 
viewed by liberals as an embarrassment, Soviet inclusion served to demonstrate some 
of the differences between a trial run on Stalinist grounds and one run along „liberal‟ 
lines.9 Paradoxically, the presence of the Soviets served to strengthen the trial‟s 
„liberal‟ credentials: the dissenting opinion submitted at the end of the trial by Judge 
                                                     
4 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), pp. 338-339. (Emphasis added). 
5 Ibid., pp. 339-340. 
6 RHJ, „Statement of Robert H. Jackson Representing the United States‟, 7/Aug/1945, LoC/RHJP/95/‟London 
Conference‟. 
7 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 332. See also: Teitel, Transitional Justice, pp. 11-15. For concurring 
assessments see:  Osiel, 'In Defense of Liberal Show Trials - Nuremberg and Beyond'; Geoffrey Best, 
Nuremberg and After: The Continuing History of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (Reading: 
University of Reading, 1984); Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance. 
8 For a discussion of Nuremberg framed by its American authors as a liberal and democratic project, see 
Chapter 2. 
9 For Anglo-American „embarrassment‟ with Soviet inclusion see: Hirsch, 'The Soviets at Nuremberg,' p. 701. 
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Nikitchenko bemoaned the fact that not all defendants were found guilty and that 
more of them were not sent to the gallows.10 Thus, a considerably harsher alternative 
to the justice that actually transpired was – and is – available for all to see. Soviet 
justice was seen to be outvoted by the more liberal majority on the bench (that 
acquitted three defendants and chose not to hang Rudolf Hess) so that Jackson 
could fairly claim that no defendant „was found guilty or punished because of Soviet 
participation‟.11 
The trial‟s liberal credentials, for Kirchheimer and several others, were based 
primarily upon Nuremberg‟s procedural methods – characterised as „due process‟ or, 
in layman‟s terms, „fair play‟. Thus, even if its advocates permit themselves the 
characterization of Nuremberg as a „show trial‟, it is prefaced and qualified with the 
adjective „liberal‟ to denote an adherence – based exclusively upon political 
ideology – to „due process‟ which other „show trials‟ lack.12 This over-arching political 
characterisation, whilst being entirely valid, tends to permit and encourage neglect in 
concern with Nuremberg as an effort in moral judgement and education: something 
that most advocates of liberal internationalism would admit but see as so 
fundamental that it hardly warrants further investigation. As a result, it has been 
possible for Thane Rosenbaum to state, some 60 years after the IMT trial, that the 
moral dimension of Nuremberg has been overlooked: 
Many things can be said about the Nuremberg Tribunals and their legacy as a 
force for human rights and an inspiration for international law. But what you do not 
hear much about is the way in which Nuremberg, perhaps inadvertently, repre-
sented the essential values and broad vision for moral justice.13 
What is so remarkable about this statement is that, after more than six decades and 
thousands of books and articles concerned with the IMT trial, Rosenbaum believes 
that the moral aspects of Nuremberg remain neglected. At the same time, 
Nuremberg is held by jurists to mark the point at which Natural Law thinking – which, in 
opposition to Positivism, explicitly stresses a link between law and morality – was 
revived, not only to shape Nuremberg, but also to affect American, as well as 
international, jurisprudence.14 Yet, to take one example of a jurist concerned with the 
morality of law and procedure, so „political‟ an event did Judith Shklar view the 
                                                     
10 IMT, Vol. I, pp. 324-364.  
11 RHJ cited in: Jeffrey D. Hockett, 'Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Supreme Court, and the Nuremberg Trial,' 
The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1990 (1990), p. 262. 
12 Osiel, 'In Defense of Liberal Show Trials - Nuremberg and Beyond'. 
13 Thane Rosenbaum, 'The Romance of Nuremberg and the Tease of Moral Justice,' Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 27, No. 4 (2006), p. 1732. 
14 Rodger D. Citron, 'The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, The 
Revival of Natural Law, and the Development of Legal Process Theory,' Michigan State Law Review, No. 
2 (2006). 
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Nuremberg IMT that she chose to write about it in Part II of Legalism, her influential 
(and, at the time, controversial) book divided between „Law and Morals‟ (Part I) and 
„Law and Politics‟ (Part II).15 The „politics‟ of Nuremberg has left its „moral‟ dimensions 
in the shade partly due to the fact that the contrast between Nazi and liberal ethics is 
considered to be so wide and obvious that it is hardly worthy of discussion: put simply, 
Nazism was „evil‟ and the liberal internationalism that transpired at Nuremberg was 
(and is) „good‟. Such an understanding has been represented in book-titles such as 
Nuremberg: Evil on Trial, and Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial, which, in fact, hardly deal 
with ethics at all.16 There may be little ethical objection to characterising Nazism as 
„evil‟ but such a description usually does not do much to explain the nature of, and 
reasons for, such a morally reprehensible „ism‟.17 To state that Nazism is „evil‟, 
therefore, is to state the obvious without necessarily explaining anything. 
The first priority for the American Prosecution at Nuremberg was to prove that the 
defendants had committed legal wrongs. Yet this does not preclude the idea that 
they were also involved in a process of moral judgement – whatever the merits or 
pitfalls of such judgement might be. Kirchheimer himself – concerned exclusively with 
the politics of „successor‟ trials – had made an inadvertent admission of the existence 
of such a moral aspect to the trial. All that might remain, he stated, if Nuremberg‟s 
political and legal justifications were to be dismissed, would be ‟a kind of morality 
play‟.18 The logic of this statement suggests, however, that whether or not the trial 
were defensible on political, procedural, or legal grounds, it did also function, to some 
extent, as an endeavour in moral judgement and education – despite there being 
little evidence of any explicitly declared aim to engage in such activity. We can infer 
from Kirchheimer‟s statement that he would have taken a dim view towards any trial 
that was knowingly conducted with moral judgement or lessons in mind. The lawyers 
involved in the creation of the London Charter were themselves at pains to present 
their laws as merely the encoding of (legal) custom and positive law already in 
existence – rather than any effort to bring law into line with universal moral 
principles.19 Little acknowledgment of the legitimacy of such an enterprise as the 
                                                     
15 Shklar, Legalism. Shklar‟s book is cited in Ruti G. Teitel‟s groundbreaking Transitional Justice as well as 
Gary J. Bass‟ Stay the Hand of Vengeance. It also makes an appearance in Douglas Lawrence‟s The 
Memory of Judgment. It appears in the index of each.  
16 James Owen, Nuremberg: Evil on Trial (London: Headline Review, 2006); Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: 
Infamy on Trial (London: Penguin, 1994).  
17 A notable  exception that deals in part with the Nuremberg IMT is Hannah Arendt‟s Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Rev. and enl. ed.) (New York; London: Penguin, 1992). 
18 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 339. 
19 Nevertheless, the President of the Tribunal would express his opinion, after the trial, that „Just as 
International Law should have supremacy over national law, so the law of God, the law of right and 
wrong, or of conscience, or whatever you choose to call it, should have supremacy over both‟. Cited in: 
Biddiss, 'The Nuremberg Trial,' p. 611. 
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Nuremberg IMT would have been forthcoming from contemporaneous jurists were 
any openly-declared reversion to the laws of universal conscience, morality, or God, 
expressed in the London Charter. 
For evidence of the existence of „a morality play‟, therefore, we must rather 
examine the content of speeches and the way in which evidence was presented 
during the trial itself. The idea of Nuremberg as a „morality play‟ presupposes not only 
the existence of a moralising impulse, but also an element of theatre with which to 
impart such lessons. Whether or not attempts to dramatize the trial were successful 
(occasionally they were, but the trial was often dull20), evidence of the desire to 
dramatize events in the courtroom is unmistakably present – most particularly in the 
words of the American planners and lawyers. This chapter will demonstrate that such 
a desire for drama served not only to impart political, legal and historical lessons: the 
theatre of Nuremberg set the stage for a particularly American show that would also 
serve to facilitate a moralizing impulse. 
 
 
4.1. Setting the Stage 
In the summer of 1945, some American planners already envisaged the trial as a 
piece of theatre. Gordon Dean, chosen by Robert Jackson as American Public 
Relations chief, expressed his ambitious aims in a memorandum to his superior: 
One of the primary purposes of the trial of the major war criminals is to document 
and dramatize for contemporary consumption and for history the means and 
methods employed by the leading Nazis in their plan to dominate the world and 
to wage an aggressive war. Consequently one of the most important considera-
tions in the preparation for the trial, in the choice of site, and in the conduct of the 
trial, is that of getting speedily and clearly to the people of the world the record of 
evidence which is developed there. This means that except for the controlling 
consideration that the trial must be conducted in a judicial atmosphere, with 
dignity and dispatch, first attention must be given to those agencies of public 
dissemination - the press, the radio, and the motion pictures - which will tell the 
story to the world.21 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the American planners deemed it important to 
convince the American public that the Nuremberg project was a legitimate and 
worthwhile enterprise. Once the trial was underway, Dean viewed it just as crucial, not 
only to „document‟, but also to „dramatize‟ Nazi behaviour. This would justify the huge 
effort and expense of American justice and would also justify, in moral terms, 
American involvement in European affairs, both during and after the war. Thus the 
                                                     
20 West, A Train of Powder, p. 3. 
21 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „Plan for Public Relations Organization for the Trial of the Major War Criminals‟, 
11/Aug/1945, „NARA/RG-238/51/27/‟Suggestions Re Publicity‟. 
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trial was to be set on the world stage as a grand, historical narrative – not only 
designed to educate Americans and Germans, but also to carry the moral lessons of 
aggression and its virtuous defeat to anyone able and willing to convey such a story 
through sound, picture and/or print. In this way, the production of moral drama made 
for good foreign policy: the world would be persuaded that, in contrast to Nazi evil, 
the American conception of justice was righteous. 
Mainly due to the fact that Nazis preferred American to Soviet captivity – and 
therefore did their very best to reach the west of Germany before surrendering 
themselves – the Americans were in a considerably stronger position than their Allies 
to shape the way in which Nuremberg would be run. (The British were second to the 
Americans in holding most of the „major war-criminals‟). So strong was their position, in 
fact, that Jackson occasionally threatened that the US might „go it alone‟ if 
agreement between the Four Powers could not be reached in London. As one British 
observer noted in the later stages of negotiation: 
[T]he Americans hold most of the major criminals [...] and they are very anxious 
to be free to try before the International Military Tribunal any person who they 
consider to be a major criminal, even though the other prosecutors hold the 
contrary view. 
These facts have led the Americans to drive a very hard bargain in the way of 
establishing the Court and procedure in accordance with Anglo-Saxon ideas.22 
As a result, the Four Powers had agreed upon a significant „dramatic‟ element for the 
trial during the negotiations at the London Conference. Rather than the continental 
system of court procedure whereby the lawyers, at the start, would submit all 
evidence to the judges who would then conduct their own inquest, they adopted – 
under American pressure – the Anglo-Saxon adversarial system instead.23 With the 
inevitable conflict between two „sides‟ through the cross-examination of witnesses 
and defendants, the rebuttal of argument and evidence and discussions of law and 
procedure, many American planners automatically expected that any legal 
procedure would be put to great dramatic use.24 
As Dean continued in his memorandum to Jackson, reporting the story of the trial 
would require American control from its source: 
                                                     
22 Sir A. Cadogan, „Brief for Mr. Attlee‟, 1/Aug/1945, repr. in: Butler & Pelly, (eds.), Documents on British 
Policy Overseas, p. 1101. 
23 See: Jackson, (ed.), Conference, pp. 76-77. 
24 This is to reverse Richard Harbinger‟s observation that a criminal adversarial trial is „a dramatic thing put 
to legal use‟. Richard Harbinger, 'Trial by Drama,' Judicature, Vol. 55, No. 3 (1971). An assumption, so 
fundamental that it can easily be overlooked, is that any drama derived from adversarial procedure 
depends on pleas of innocence that the prosecution can then counter. Thus it is possible to suggest 
that, given their expectations of drama, the planners of Nuremberg did not expect – and were correct 
in their assumptions – that any of the defendants would plead guilty as charged. 
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The United States should proceed on the assumption that since the trial is to be in 
the American control zone, it must bear the large share of the burden of organiz-
ing, staffing and equipping those who will be responsible for the Public Relations 
phases of the trial.25 
Although he referred to organizing the trial as „a burden‟, the Americans‟ insistence 
on hosting it in the American zone of occupation ensured that it also amounted to an 
opportunity to convey the story of the trial in their own way. Being liberals, legalists, 
democrats, and winners of what was believed to be a just war against Nazi 
oppression, the appropriate American method of conveying the story of Nuremberg 
was to persuade rather than to coerce. What all the American planners seemed 
agreed upon from the earliest stages was that there should be no censorship of 
reporting from the courtroom. Apart from security concerns that the Army might have, 
„the world should have every bit of the news regarding [the proceedings] - good or 
bad‟.26 To facilitate this, the „best possible communications‟ would be required.27 With 
the possibilities for speedy transmittal of both positive and critical reporting, there was, 
therefore, a need to ensure that what happened in the courtroom would reflect the 
best ideals of American justice so that „the world must be convinced that we are 
right‟.28 
The only qualification to facilitating the reporting of the trial was the desire to 
maintain what Dean and Jackson referred to as the „dignity‟ of the court: to show 
that Reason, rather than passion, was, in contrast to Nazi – and Soviet – justice, what 
distinguished a trial run on American (i.e. liberal) grounds. Both Dean and Jackson 
expressed their wish to ensure the maintenance of „dignity‟ on many occasions – most 
often in regard to just how press reporters and cameramen could be accommodated 
successfully. Implicit in all such concerns was the belief that, necessary as they were, 
such trappings of modern public life were, in contrast to the proper functioning of a 
court, inherently undignified. As early as May 1945, Dean had envisaged a solution to 
what he and Jackson saw as a problem with the issue of press reporters. The solution 
was to construct a glass screen that would separate them from the court.29 In this 
way, the sound of calm and dispassionate proceedings, unhampered by unruly 
interruption, impulsive reactions, or general chatter, would be relayed to onlooking 
                                                     
25 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „Plan for Public Relations Organization for the Trial of the Major War Criminals‟, 
11/Aug/1945, „NARA/RG-238/51/27/‟Suggestions Re Publicity‟. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „An Educational Program in Connection with the Prosecution of the Major War 
Criminals‟, 30/May/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/26/‟Untitled Folder‟. 
29 Ibid. 
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reporters via a speaker system.30 All such undignified noise generated by the reporters 
themselves could be isolated to the other side of the glass screen. Francis Shea, one 
of Jackson‟s senior aides, agreed strongly with the idea and suggested that it be 
considered as an important factor in choosing an appropriate venue for the trial.31 
However, General William J. Donovan, the chief of the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), with public reception foremost in his thoughts, took great exception to the idea 
of a separate room for reporters: 
I have gone over Dean's memorandum to you on "Site of the Trial". It contains one 
fundamental fallacy which, I believe should be dealt with at once. This is the idea 
that the Press should be separate from the court. If the Press were to be placed 
behind a glass partition in a separate balcony, I am afraid they would, in effect, 
feel themselves separated from the court. If any limitation must be placed on the 
audience, I do not believe it should be imposed on the Press [...] The Press should 
be given precedence over all visitors to the court inasmuch as they are the 
medium through which information on the proceedings of the trials will reach the 
general public.32 
The proposal for a glass screen, as Donovan appreciated, was at odds with 
producing theatre and drama to inspire sustained interest form the „general public‟. It 
was as though, Donovan implied, press reporters would be representatives of the 
general public, and to separate them from the court was, in some way, to separate 
the public itself. There appears to have been no discussion of Donovan‟s point. 
Rather, Dean and Jackson simply heeded his objection and resolved, instead of a 
glass screen, to organize a system of accreditation whereby a representative 
selection of the world‟s press would be allocated a total of 250 seats – within the 
courtroom itself.33 
                                                     
30 This is, in fact, the method now used in various international courts in the Hague – leading the observer 
to feel slightly detached from the proceedings on the other side of the bullet-proof glass screen. 
31 Francis M. Shea to Gordon Dean, [memorandum], 31/May/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/26/‟Untitled Folder‟. 
32 William J. Donovan to RHJ, „Lt. Dean‟s Memorandum on the Site of Trial‟, 28/Jun/1945, NARA/RG-
238/51/39/‟Untitled Folder‟. 
33 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „Plan for Public Relations Organization for the Trial of the Major War Criminals‟, 
11/Aug/1945, „NARA/RG-238/51/27/‟Suggestions Re Publicity‟. 
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Yet just how representative the selection of reporters would be was already 
apparent in August 1945. The policy was as follows: first priority was give to reporters 
from the „Four Powers‟ represented on the Tribunal; the next was for those from other 
Allied nations; thirdly came seats for „neutrals‟.34 It would be left to the Psychological 
Warfare section of the Army (soon to become the Information Service Division) to 
determine what news would be made available to German-language newspapers 
operating with Control Council approval.35 In the final list, detailing the names and 
nationalities of 249 correspondents, the numbers of allocated seats for reporters are 
as follows: 
American ..............................................71 
British ......................................................42 
French ....................................................36 
Russian ...................................................39 
Others ....................................................61 (36) 
The American planners allocated no seats to any trusted German (anti-Nazi) reporters 
even though they viewed German reception of the proceedings as important. This 
mattered to the Americans so much, in fact, that they made an exception to the rule 
of non-censorship in the case of German reporters. The process of „re-education‟ 
could ill afford criticism of the trial or the Allies even from liberal and/or anti-Nazi 
                                                     
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Anonymous [possibly Gordon Dean], „Correspondents at Nuremberg Trials‟, c. Nov, 1945, NARA/RG-
238/51/26/‟Press Coverage‟. The 61 other nationals were as follows: Brazil -1, China – 1, Czechoslovakia – 
15, Denmark – 5, Italy – 1, Luxembourg – 1, Netherlands – 9, Norway – 4, Poland (including 2 „London 
Poles‟) – 14, „South America‟ – 1, Spain – 2, Sweden – 4, Switzerland – 2, Turkey – 1. 
 
F I G U R E  1 :  Journalists in the courtroom at Nuremberg with a direct view of the 
proceedings, 14/Nov/1945. NARA/RG-226/85/39/653/SC 216217. 
79 
 
 
German sources since it might play into the hands of unrepentant Nazis or Nazi 
sympathizers. The number of seats allocated to American newspaper reporters 
suggests that, along with the Germans, it was for domestic consumption that 
American planners considered the lessons of Nuremberg to be significant. Thus, if the 
trial might appear as good foreign policy for America, it was the audience at home 
that seemed to constitute the most immediately important priority.37 Press reporters 
were, therefore, well fed and watered and allocated the most grandiose of all 
billeting throughout Nuremberg in Faber‟s aptly nicknamed „Pencil House‟. As one 
American news magazine reported even before the trial had begun, „No trial in 
history has had such elaborate press arrangements‟.38 
Also affecting the functioning of the court was Dean and Jackson‟s desire to 
ensure that the trial would be filmed „for historical purposes and for the newsreels 
[and that] such coverage could be used to great advantage‟.39 By „historical 
purposes‟, Dean meant that once the trial was over, „documentary and historical 
films‟ could be made about the trial.40 As for the newsreels, in order (once again) to 
maintain the „dignity‟ of the proceedings, the plan to incorporate „inconspicuous 
[camera] installations‟ into the design of the courtroom would allow a single, official, 
team of (stationary) cameramen to provide a source of footage. This would be 
pooled for the newsreel companies – avoiding any uncoordinated jockeying for 
position (both in the sense of procuring permission to film and in the quite literal, 
physical, sense - within the courtroom itself).41 
Circumstances suggested that the OSS, with a primed Field Photographic Branch 
ready for action, seemed the natural choice to film the proceedings.42 This prompted 
at least one (anonymous) individual within the OSS to become very excited at the 
prospect of recording the „drama‟ of the trial. The memorandum circulated within the 
FPB began as follows: 
                                                     
37 See Chapter 2, section 2.7. 
38 „The Press‟, „Skiing, Tennis, Tail-Coated Waiters to make War Trials Heaven for Press‟, Newsweek, 
1/Oct/1945. 
39 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „An Educational Program in Connection with the Prosecution of the Major War 
Criminals‟, 30/May/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/26/‟Untitled Folder‟. 
40 Gordon Dean to RHJ, „Plan for Public Relations Organization for the Trial of the Major War Criminals‟, 
11/Aug/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/27/‟Suggestions Re Publicity‟. 
41 Ibid.; E. R. Kellogg to John A. Stacy, „War Crimes – Field Photographic Functions‟, 16/Jul/1945, NARA/RG-
226/90/15/196-A („War Crimes‟). 
42 See above: Chapter 2, pp. 26-31. 
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The makers of these films will be recording the greatest and most dramatic trials 
[sic] the world has ever seen, or probably will ever see. They will have an un-
equalled opportunity for perpetuating the nemesis that has overtaken the war 
criminals; but upon them will also rest the responsibility for producing an historic 
record that will stand as a permanent justification of our democracy as well as 
serve as a deterrent to the conquered peoples for all time. 43 
What, in hindsight, appears as naive optimism in regard to what the trial could 
achieve  was typical of the attitude of the OSS in general, an organization that had 
successfully expanded and had achieved so much during the war.44 Yet the 
expectations expressed in this passage (and throughout the memorandum) were 
particularly high. Most obvious is the assumption that the trial would provide 
unparalleled drama ready to be captured on film. Next, the trial, and the process of 
filming it, would provide an opportunity for „perpetuating the nemesis‟ of the Nazi 
defendants. Showing images of Nazis being forced to account for their horrible crimes 
would constitute the final nail in the coffin for Nazism. In contrast to the situation after 
the First World War, it would now be possible to make a visual record of the enemy‟s 
defeat or, as framed in Chapter 2 above, to explode the swastika.45 Yet another 
assumption was the belief that filming the trial would provide an opportunity to 
proselytise the cause of „our‟ – that is, American – democracy. What better way was 
there to convince people around the world that liberal democracy was the best form 
of social organisation than to picture the dramatic contrast between defeated 
barbarians and the successful defenders of „civilization‟?46 Finally, the memorandum 
contained an expression of faith in the utilitarian, or „consequentialist‟ purpose of law: 
a visual historical record of the trial would serve to deter the Germans „for all time‟ 
(most probably against starting wars of „aggression‟, although this was not stated).47 
All these assumptions and expectations resulted from the failures of the First World War 
and its failed peace. In that case, justice had been delayed and denied and this was 
                                                     
43 Anonymous, „A Note on the film record of the War Crimes Trials‟, undated [c. Jun-Jul, 1945], NARA/RG-
226/90/12/126; NARA/RG-226/148/73/1038; NARA/RG-226/148/76/1087. Although individual authorship 
cannot be confirmed for this document, there are (at least) three copies of it (in separate locations) 
within the files of the OSS. During 1945 lawyers and others spoke of trials (i.e. in the plural) in two senses. 
First, individual defendants were each deemed to constitute a „trial‟ even though they would be part of 
a single procedure in the same courtroom. Later, a second trial of major war criminals was envisaged, 
but the idea was dropped. See Donald Bloxham, '"The Trial that Never Was": Why there was no Second 
International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg,' History, Vol. 87, No. 285 (2002). To complicate 
things further, historians occasionally refer to the „Nuremberg Trials‟ without distinguishing between the 
IMT and the 12 „subsequent‟ trials based on the (international) laws of the London Charter, but run 
exclusively by Americans. 
44 See: Chapter 2 above; Smith, O.S.S; Katz, Foreign Intelligence; Brown, The Last Hero. 
45 See Chapter 2, pp. 19-20. 
46 As we shall see, such terms were used to dramatize the contrast between the defendants and their 
enemies. 
47 That pacifism amongst the German population is even considered a „myth‟ worth refuting implies, at 
least, an acknowledgment of the existence of a thesis that suggests the Germans have „learnt lessons‟ 
from their history (including those taught by Nuremberg). See, for example: Brian C. Rathbun, „The Myth 
of German Pacifism‟, German Politics and Society, Vol. 24., No. 2 (2006), pp. 68-81. 
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a tragic mistake to be avoided: such mistakes had enabled greater injustices to 
unfold in a Second conflict.48 Not only would justice need to be done this time: it 
would also need to be seen to be done, to be witnessed as a lesson writ large that 
crime would no longer pay. As a lesson deemed capable of affecting future 
behaviour, it was not just aimed at the „vanquished‟, but also at the „victors‟ and 
„neutrals‟ too. Thus, for such a wide audience, careful stage-management of the trial 
was imperative, requiring, for its foundations, an appropriate setting that would 
facilitate the production of a visual record, a lesson „for all time‟. 
Not only would the court need to be designed to accommodate news and radio 
reporters as well as a film crew; it would also require facilities for what would now be 
called multi-media presentation – graphics, photographs and films – so that evidence 
could be conveyed to the judges and the public in accessible forms. As Jackson was 
advised, however, there was an initial problem in procuring the very best person 
available to take charge of graphic design: 
Dave Zablodowsky is a top-flight Presentation man who played a major role in the 
San Francisco conference work. [...] He was coming over here [to London] to 
head up the work which Presentation Branch will do [for the IMT trial]. He has a 
left-wing background [and so the] State Department apparently refused passport 
clearance [for him to leave the United States. Thus,] the importance of your 
mission [has been stressed] as a ground for having an exception made.49 
An „exception‟ was made and Zablodowsky, an OSS man, did end up in Nurem-
berg.50 War-time innovation in turning complex information into digestible graphics for 
the President and Chiefs of Staff, as well as the experience gained in design and 
presentation at the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations Organization, meant 
that Zablodowsky and his fellow OSS presentation men were indispensible – whatever 
their politics.51 
The courtroom itself would be engineered to facilitate such presentations and, 
once again, an OSS Presentation Branch man was given responsibility for this task.52 
The architect, Dan Kiley, was appointed in July and immediately set to work on 
designs and drawings – some purely conceptual, and others based on real locations 
(such as his favoured one, the Munich Opera House).53 Kiley accompanied Justice 
                                                     
48 James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: the politics and diplomacy of punishing war criminals of the First 
World War (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood, 1982). 
49 James B. Donovan to RHJ, [Memorandum], LoC/RHJP/106/‟OCC Staff, P-Z‟. 
50 Zabladowsky‟s „left wing background‟ would lead him to become „Case Number 103‟ in Joseph 
McCarthy‟s Government Operations Committee hearings. 
51 Of course the only politics unacceptable was Nazism. Barry Katz, 'The Arts of War: "Visual Presentation" 
and National Intelligence,' Design Issues, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1996). 
52 Bruce M. Stave, Michele Palmer, & Leslie Frank, Witnesses to Nuremberg: an oral history of American 
participants at the war crimes trials (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), pp. 15-36.  
53 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Jackson, General Donovan, and others on a German reconnaissance trip in order to 
visit potential locations for the trial. Although advising them of his favoured location 
(Munich) he later recalled that „it was [already] in the works to have [it in] 
Nuremberg.‟54 The sketch below, however, dates from July 1945 – just before 
Nuremberg was chosen as the site of the trial.  
 
As we can discern from this example – which has not been examined since 1945 – the 
presentation of charts and films was viewed by the OSS as fundamental to the 
American case and an essential factor in the design of the courtroom. The projection 
screen displays a scene from an atrocity film. Well before the court was convened, 
therefore, the projection of atrocity film shot by Allied „liberators‟ of the concentration 
camps in Western Germany was already envisaged as playing an important role in 
conveying the crimes of Nazism – even if the supreme crime, according to the 
American Prosecution, was that of conspiracy to wage „aggressive war‟. The intention 
to accommodate the presentation of film and graphical evidence into the design of 
the courtroom, as well as the intention to accommodate the making of a visual 
record of the proceedings, was entirely new in 1945. As Gordon Dean advised 
Jackson: 
                                                     
54 Ibid. 
 
F I G U R E  2 :  An early sketched proposal of the layout of the IMT courtroom. The proposed 
projection screen above the charts shows a scene from an atrocity film. c. 17/Jul/1945, 
NARA/RG-238/51/39 (declassified, NND 780063). 
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The attached diagram and sketch prepared by one of the men in the Presenta-
tion Branch of OSS, suggests a novel, if not intriguing, court room arrangement 
intended to give audience, witnesses, judges, attorneys, etc., each a better view 
of the other and afford at the same time a concentration of the “functioning” 
personnel. Such an arrangement also affords better opportunity for showing 
evidentiary film, charts, diagrams, and standing exhibits. It also gives better angles 
for the cameramen who are making the official movies of the trial. 
At least it is worth thinking over.55 
Dean‟s comments – that the sketch suggested something „novel, if not intriguing,‟ but 
worth „at least [...] thinking over‟ – implies that he suspected that the layout might be 
a little unconventional for Jackson‟s tastes. Yet the final layout of the courtroom, in 
the Nuremberg Palace of Justice, was even more unorthodox. Unlike the common 
setup of Allied nations‟ domestic courts, the judges‟ bench would not be positioned 
as the central point of focus for the other participants and observers in the room. 
 
Instead, the judges‟ bench was set to one side, opposing the defendants‟ dock on 
the other. The four Prosecution teams, as well as all non-participating observers, 
directly faced the wall on which charts, other graphics, and films, would be 
presented. Sitting to one side of this wall was positioned the witness-stand so that 
witnesses would also face directly the onlooking observers in court (i.e. the Press and 
visitors in the balcony above them). Thus visual evidence, and witness-testimony, 
would take centre stage, and the defendants and their judges, whilst being clearly 
                                                     
55 Gordon Dean to RHJ, 17/Jul/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/39. 
 
F I G U R E  3 :   A simplified plan of the IMT courtroom in the Palace of Justice, 
Nuremberg, 1945-6.[Based on a (more complex) plan within a pamphlet given to 
visitors of the court. IWM/Docs/Cat 5706/Ger Misc 11 (55)]. 
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visible, would appear at each side of the scene, facing each other. The American 
Prosecution would be positioned centrally among the rows of the other prosecutors 
and the IMT Secretary. All the Prosecution teams would sit and present evidence with 
the Press and visitors directly behind them: as though to confirm the effect of 
accusing and presenting evidence on their behalf. A few days into the trial, James B. 
Donovan, working in the OSS Presentation Branch on behalf of the OCC (not to be 
confused with General William J. Donovan, the chief of the OSS), wrote home with 
much enthusiasm regarding the results of this courtroom design: 
Everyone imaginable is here. Hundreds of newspapers, all over the world, have 
correspondents. The courtroom is very ingeniously designed – we did it (Presenta-
tion Branch) you know. It looks like an ordinary courtroom but in every wall are 
hidden broadcasting booths, photographers, etc. Talk about your historic occa-
sions.56 
 
 
4.2. Theatrical Words 
The trial opened with three days of preliminary hearings and motions followed by an 
opening statement by the presiding judge. Originally, it had seemed likely that the 
President of the Tribunal would be Francis Biddle, the senior American judge. Yet, as 
Jackson noted in his diary, if Biddle were to become President, the entire process 
might appear to be (even) more of an American, rather than international, trial: 
I became convinced that the British were intending to offer the chairmanship of 
the Tribunal to Biddle [who] has indicated that he would desire it. 
[...] It now looks as if the whole responsibility of these trials will be pushed onto 
the Americans [who will be held] responsible in the eyes of the world for anything 
that goes wrong. [...] 
The Americans are hosts at Nuremberg and have all the responsibility for physical 
arrangements. They have the leading part in the prosecution. If they are also to 
have complete responsibility for the Court, it does not seem that the United States 
is being placed in its proper relationship to European affairs. I have agreed to 
present this matter to Biddle myself and try to persuade him to decline the chair-
manship...57 
Given America‟s embroilment in two European wars during his lifetime, it seems 
difficult to imagine that Jackson would have been much concerned with 
overreaching America‟s „proper‟ relation to European affairs. What seems far more 
probable is that this was merely a way to avoid reiterating his anxious concern that 
Americans would be held exclusively responsible for anything that might go wrong 
during the trial. Biddle was persuaded to relinquish his coveted position (although it is 
not entirely clear how much choice he had in the end) and, bitterly disappointed, 
                                                     
56 James B. to Mary Donovan, Personal Letter, Friday [23/Nov/1945], Hoover/JBDP/34/20. 
57 RHJ, Diary, 8/Oct/1945, LoC/RHJP/95/‟Diary‟. 
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saw the Presidency go to Lord Justice Lawrence.58 Thus, inadvertently, the trial began 
with an aristocratic British voice slowly delivering an opening address that, whilst 
mostly dealing with simple matters of procedure, provided an air of ancient, Old 
World, predictability and adherence to long-established principles of justice. It 
concluded with a rather elevated sense of occasion: 
The Trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of 
the world and it is of supreme importance to millions of people all over the globe. 
For these reasons, there is laid upon everybody who takes any part in this Trial a 
solemn responsibility to discharge their duties without fear or favour, in accor-
dance with the sacred principles of law and justice.59 
This statement, reminding the audience of solemnity of an occasion to be based on 
„the sacred principles of law and justice,‟ was followed by the reading of the 
indictment which served as a historical narrative of the Nazi Party and its leaders as 
much as a legal document. 
The courtroom drama began on 21st November 1945 when the defendants‟ pleas 
(of “nicht schuldig”) were heard and followed by Robert H. Jackson‟s eloquent 
opening speech.60 He viewed the occasion (he told his wife in a letter) as the 
„opportunity of a lifetime to say something worthwhile on international law‟.61 His 
words reached well beyond the technicalities of the legal innovations and 
negotiations that had preceded the opening of the international court. As Norman 
Birkett, the „associate‟ British judge on the bench, later recalled: „Here was a man 
who had read Blackstone and was obviously a man of law; but here also was a man 
who had read and loved King James‟s Bible, and was also a man of letters‟.62 As 
another observer, Telford Taylor, later recalled, „I know of nothing else in modern 
juristic literature that equally projects the controlled passion and moral intensity of 
many passages‟.63 Jackson‟s style of speech, in general, and at this particular 
moment, was not typical of a lawyer. He had realised early in his career as a country 
lawyer that more than just a good command of the right evidence was required in 
any case: „A young lawyer that went into [a case] had to take care of himself and 
put on a good show. If he didn‟t, he didn‟t get any more business‟.64 What he had 
                                                     
58 Article 4(b) of the London Charter stated that „The members of the Tribunal shall, before any Trial begins, 
agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a President‟. IMT, Vol. I, p. 10. 
59 IMT, 20/Nov/1945, Vol. II, p. 30. 
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61 RHJ to [I]Rene Jackson,15/Oct/1945, LoC/RHJP/2/3. 
62 Norman Birkett, „Forward‟ in: Gerhart, America's Advocate, p. vi. 
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running of the twelve „subsequent‟ Nuremberg Trials. 
64 RHJ cited in: Hockett, New Deal Justice, p. 221. 
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also learned was to appeal “to people‟s sense of natural justice”.65 This was fortunate, 
since he was not only addressing the judges, lawyers, and defendants in the room; 
the court was packed to capacity with press reporters, dignitaries and other guests, 
and the speech would appear in newsreels of Allied and other nations (including 
Germany). In addition to millions of contemporaries, Jackson hoped – as did some of 
his colleagues – that the trial would leave something to „posterity‟.66 There is little 
doubt, therefore, that the style of his speech was influenced by his own appreciation 
of the significance of the occasion. As he later recalled, „I had a rather strong sense 
of responsibility about the speech, and recognised that it was probably the most 
important task of my life‟.67  
It was, furthermore, influenced by his upbringing.68 As his daughter-in-law would 
recall (much later), „He was educated in [...] the two things that were most important, 
I think - the Bible and Shakespeare – and [educated] well... [but he] never boasted 
about it‟.69 These two important literary influences – ignored, until now, by legal and 
other historians (including biographers) – contributed to the moral and theatrical 
dimensions of his speech which began, not only with (some) mention of law, but with 
„wrongs‟, „civilization‟, „Power‟ and „Reason‟:  
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the 
world imposes a great responsibility. The wrongs which we seek to condemn and 
punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civiliza-
tion cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being 
repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay 
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid 
to Reason.70 
Already, Shakespeare had made his mark, a point that seems to have remained 
unnoticed (or, at least, unworthy of mention) by Gary Bass, author of Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance, as well as all other historians of Nuremberg and International Criminal 
Law.71 The phrase, „stay the hand of vengeance‟, was adapted from Richard II and 
Jackson‟s notes included other related thoughts derived from Shakespeare.72 Fair 
                                                     
65 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
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69 Nancy Roosevelt Jackson, Jackson Center Video and Audio Archive, 
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70 IMT, 21/Nov/1945, Vol. II, pp. 98-99. 
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play was his general theme. Alongside the theatrical eloquence of such words – 
adapted, borrowed, and invented – emerged hints of the moral judgement of the 
Prosecution that became more explicit further on in the speech: the defendants were 
guilty, contended Jackson, of „planned and intended conduct that involves moral as 
well as legal wrong‟.73 
As though to express consciousness of the fragility of Allied virtue – in the self-
appointed role of political, legal and moral judgement – Jackson made clear that 
„the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history 
will judge us tomorrow‟.74 In other words, if the proceedings were characterised by 
unfairness or hypocrisy, or if the laws now applied were not, in the future, deemed 
equally applicable to the Allies now sitting in judgement, International Criminal Law 
would lose any moral validity it might have. Herbert Wechsler, advisor to the 
American judges, repeatedly stressed to Judge Biddle the importance of this point – 
what he later expounded upon in print as the „Neutral Principles‟ in law: judging 
others only by standards that judges would be happy to be judged by themselves.75 
Such a concern had led Jackson to drop any idea of holding the defendants 
criminally responsible for the bombing of civilians from the air – despite the fact that 
the aerial bombing of Rotterdam or Coventry (to name only two examples) were 
clear breaches of well-established International Law. As he explained to the other 
delegations at the London Conference: 
[W]e left out of our [American] draft [of the Charter] the destruction of villages 
and towns, because I have seen the villages and towns of Germany. I think that 
you will have great difficulty distinguishing between the military necessity for that 
kind of destruction as distinguished from some done by the Germans [...] It seems 
to me those subjects invite recriminations that would not be useful in the trial.76 
Such recriminations would have possibly related to the Allied bombing of Dresden or 
Berlin. But the (Allied) destruction of the city in which the trial itself was to be held was 
perhaps what constituted the most obvious moral case for dropping such charges 
against the defendants. The man in charge of all American visual evidence at the 
trial, James B. Donovan, described Nuremberg in particularly graphic terms in a letter 
to his wife: 
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It is the most complete picture of devastation that could be conceived. You stand 
in the "Grand Hotel" (about 50% of which is intact but frightfully damaged) and so 
far as you can see it looks like the ruins of Carthage. You can drive for ten minutes 
in any direction and cannot see a building standing. The damage to London is 
negligible compared with this. The [ancient] walled city is simply a huge mass (for 
several miles in every direction) or rubble, twisted steel and great concrete slabs. 
Parts of the wall can still be seen in places, but very little of it. I cannot believe that 
this city could be re-built in anything less than a century.77 
Only twelve days after Jackson had expressed his concerns at the London 
Conference, an American B-29 bomber dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, killing 
70-80,000 civilians in an instant. On the day after the London Charter was signed, 
Nagasaki was also bombed with a nuclear weapon. For the Allies to indict any other 
nation‟s leaders – even Nazi leaders – for the bombing of civilians would have aided 
considerably any scepticism towards their aims to shape the future of international 
relations based on the rule of law. As Jackson had implied rather cautiously, the Allies 
– in regard to the bombing of civilians – did not inhabit the moral high-ground. This 
partly explains why, for him, the supreme international crime was to start an unjust, or 
„aggressive‟, war. This sincerely held belief that „aggressive war‟ was the greatest 
crime, entailing within it the responsibility for all others (i.e. War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity), helped to deflect qualms about any (criminal) Allied behaviour.78 
Jackson addressed the Allied bombing of Nuremberg within his speech, but only in 
the context of „Aggressive War‟ unleashed by the Nazis: 
It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and beautiful city with untold 
members of its civilian inhabitants still buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition 
that to start or wage an aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of 
crimes.79 
As Wechsler put it, „To be sure, the depravity of our enemies and the fact that theirs 
was the aggression accord us such large leeway in this connection that our relative 
moral position is secure‟.80 
Jackson had intended to stress further the importance of „neutral principles‟ (as 
Wechsler framed it) in the Allied legal case during his opening speech. But it appears 
that only as he spoke did he decide to omit another Shakespearean flourish (this time 
it came from Hamlet). „To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice,‟ he had 
intended to say, „is to put it to our own lips as well‟.81 No one who has published on 
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the trial since, it seems, appears to have noticed that these words were not actually 
spoken in the courtroom.82 Although his personal secretary was asked by James B. 
Donovan (a year after the trial) why he omitted them, there appears to be have 
been no explanation from Jackson. Was it the case, wondered Donovan, that he had 
simply made a mistake?83 This seems unlikely since – due to the (not quite) 
„simultaneous‟ translation system – he was required to speak very slowly. He later 
recalled that the red warning light at the prosecutor‟s stand – signifying that the 
translators wished he would speak more slowly – seemed to be lit „a good deal of the 
time‟.84 Another possibility is that Soviet inclusion in the trial grated with Jackson and 
this particular line – he may have considered – might come back to haunt the entire 
enterprise. Even though Jackson had decided to make little mention of German 
aerial bombardment, the Soviets had insisted on holding the Nazi leaders responsible 
for the massacre of 11,000 Polish officers at Katyn in 1943.85 Jackson, along with the 
other leading prosecutors – including the Soviets – knew that this crime had been 
committed by the Soviets themselves.86 He had been warned by General Donovan 
that Soviet insistence on prosecuting the Nazis for a crime they had committed 
themselves „would present a difficulty in the trial‟ and that the Defence might 
produce witnesses who would testify that this murder was „done by the Russians‟.87 
The Soviets were already putting it to their own lips as well: using the trial to airbrush 
their own (criminal) record of the war, something entirely at odds with the point of 
„neutral principles‟ that Jackson had already made in his speech. 
Whatever the reason for Jackson‟s omission, however, the „poisoned chalice‟ line 
was deemed significant enough to be retained, both in the official record published 
by the Tribunal as well as the separate, official publication of the American 
Prosecution.88 In this way, an effective piece of dramatic language was officially 
reinstated after the event. The line was also deemed significant by Paramount 
filmmakers who hoped that Jackson would agree to re-record his speech for use in 
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Lewis Allen‟s Sealed Verdict, an early dramatisation of post-war justice.89 The 
filmmakers wanted to do this, not only to achieve a better quality of audio than had 
been recorded at the trial, but also, specifically, to capture the „poisoned chalice‟ 
line.90 The line has been used more recently to condemn American military behaviour 
and the failure to apply the international legal standards first applied by America and 
its allies at Nuremberg.91 
As for the Germans, perhaps nothing better represented the failure to live by long-
established and publicly-proclaimed moral standards than the actions (or most often, 
the inaction) of senior figures within the German Christian Churches during the Nazi 
period. Heroic Christian leaders were few and far between: only Bishop Sproll and 
Pastor Niemöller made an appearance in the part of Jackson‟s speech devoted to 
„The Battle Against the Churches‟.92 The American Prosecution viewed the churches 
as nothing other than victims of Nazi persecution – Christian collaboration or 
acquiescence had no part in proving Nazi guilt – and it devoted time to proving this 
in court (the man responsible with preparing the brief on „Suppression of the Christian 
Churches‟ was Father Edmund A. Walsh, a Jesuit from Georgetown University).93 In his 
opening speech, Jackson presented the churches (just like Jews94) as simply 
opponents of the Nazis, as though any Christian dissent would automatically lead to 
persecution.95 In particular, Jackson stated, a „most intense drive was directed 
against the Roman Catholic Church‟.96 After outlining some details of „suppression‟, 
he continued: 
We will present to you from the files of the Vatican the earnest protest made by 
the Vatican to Ribbentrop, summarising the persecutions to which the priesthood 
and the Church had been subjected in this Twentieth Century under the Nazi 
regime. Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not deny. He dared not 
justify‟.97 
That such things could happen „in this Twentieth Century‟ suggested an almost 
inexplicable reversion to barbarism and evil, out of all keeping with the progress and 
nature of modern „civilization‟ („evil,‟ „sinister‟ and „civilization‟ were words that 
Jackson employed repeatedly throughout his opening speech; „barbarism‟ appeared 
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less frequently but several words and phrases were used to suggest that Nazism was 
essentially atavistic98). Jackson had already implied what he had meant by 
„Civilization‟: the defendants had endangered Christian-era civilization: „Against their 
opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labour, the Nazis directed such a 
campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation as the world has not witnessed 
since the pre-Christian ages‟.99 The Nazis‟ „despotism‟ was equalled only by „the 
dynasties of the ancient East‟.100 The defendants were not only „criminals‟ but men 
who had „set in motion evils which [left] no home in the world untouched‟; now, 
however, their „capacity for evil‟ was forever past.101 
According to Jackson, however, the Nazis were not quite barbarians since, 
although their „bestiality and bad faith [had] reached such excess that they aroused 
the sleeping strength of imperilled Civilization,‟ they had always been aware, he 
implied, that what they were doing was immoral.102 The exposition of their horrors, he 
later recalled, appeared to have some effect on the defendants: 
At times, surprise was plainly registered on their faces. At times when they thought I 
was being too severe with them, an attitude of resentment showed up. The men in 
the dock were an interesting study during the speech, particularly Goering whose 
spirits were quite deflated by the recital.103 
Yet, if only „surprise‟ and „resentment‟ showed on their faces – rather than any signs of 
remorse or acknowledgment of their guilt, Jackson believed that they were 
nevertheless aware of it. That Ribbentrop „could not deny‟ and, more tellingly, „dared 
not justify‟ Nazi behaviour suggested that the Nazis shared – at least in some degree – 
the same moral codes as the rest of modern „civilization‟. Jackson and his team of 
prosecutors would have found it difficult to accept the idea of a particular „Nazi 
conscience‟, as Claudia Koonz has characterised it.104 Instead, the defendants, 
sharing at least some measure of morality with their (civilized) accusers, were men of 
„troubled conscience‟ who had taken from their own people „all those dignities and 
freedoms that we hold [to be] natural and inalienable rights in every human being‟.105 
Their only hope had been that „International Law will lag so far behind the moral 
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sense of mankind that conduct which is a crime in the moral sense must be regarded 
as innocent in law‟.106 Here was expressed not only the view that the Nazis were 
aware of their own immorality; so too can be inferred Jackson‟s understanding of the 
relationship between morality and law: the job of legislators (such as himself and 
others who defined Nuremberg‟s laws at the London Conference) was to strive in 
aligning law to „the moral sense of mankind‟.107 Jackson did not explain, however, 
from where any such standards of morality (that were universally „sensed‟) ultimately 
derived. 
His personal notes provide a clue. Alongside Shakespearian quotations and various 
thoughts on aspects of the trial can be found quotations from Bishop Konrad Graf von 
Preysing, whose actions during the Nazi period were more admirable than most of his 
peers.108 Preysing had repeatedly written to Pope Pius XII to request that the head of 
the Catholic Church make some statement against the persecution of „these 
unfortunate people,‟ as he put it in 1941, the Jews in Germany and neighbouring 
countries. The replies Preysing received were only concerned with the other topics he 
had mentioned in his letters: he received praise for his public stand against 
euthanasia and answers to other issues that usually related only to the fate of fellow 
Christians.109 Yet Preysing did not require guidance from any earthly power in his 
understanding of what was right and wrong: 
Right is not a free creation of man. Right is not subject to man's caprice, nor to the 
power of the community, even though the codes of law naturally developed 
differently among various peoples. Right can not be determined by considering 
whether an action brings forfeit or not... there is an eternal law outside of all 
human will, guaranteed by God, a clear and permanent appreciation between 
good and evil, between what is permissible and what is not permissible.110 
Preysing‟s view of the source of morality was fairly predictable but, nonetheless, 
Jackson wrote it down (this was not the only citation of Preysing‟s views in Jackson‟s 
notes). It is relatively easy to contend that this reflected Jackson‟s thinking , not merely 
because he had made a point of noting it, or had strongly implied that the job of 
legislators was to adapt human law to reflect human morality. Jackson had learnt his 
trade on a „steady diet of readings from the oracle of the common law, Black-
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stone‟.111 Preysing‟s statement closely echoed Blackstone‟s views on „the nature of 
laws in general‟: 
Considering the Creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unques-
tionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, 
however unjust or severe. But, as he is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid 
down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice that existed in 
the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal 
immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator himself, in all his dispensa-
tions, conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as 
they are necessary for the conduct of human actions.112 
Blackstone went further than Preysing in being explicit about immoral human laws: 
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself is of 
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all 
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; 
and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority medi-
ately or immediately, from this original.113 
For Jackson, and the American Prosecution, therefore, the positivist dilemma with how 
to deal with Nazi Law was no dilemma at all.114 If Nazi law had been immoral, then it 
had simply not deserved the name of „law‟.115 As for the laws posited in the London 
Charter, these were not „new‟ but eternal, applicable to all humanity, and 
discovered by mankind through the application of Reason. All that was new was the 
effort to encode and apply them. 
In Jackson‟s view, therefore, there was only one universal morality, discoverable 
through the application of human reason. As he had told the American Bar 
Association in April 1945, on the subject of War Crimes Trials: 
We may go forward on the assumption that reason has power to summon force to 
its support, confident that moral standards embodied in law for the governance of 
nations will so appeal to the better natures of men that somehow they will ulti-
mately vouchsafe the force to make them prevail.116 
His view of the moral consciousness of the defendants, and the Party they had led, 
can be summed up by quoting a single line that stands by itself in his notes: „Dachau 
– [they] knew it was wrong but thought [Germany] was winning.‟117 This statement 
reached well beyond the necessary concerns of a Prosecution lawyer, since 
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perpetrators‟ ignorance of either legal or moral codes – or, more broadly, whether or 
not the defendants had known their actions to be illegal or „wrong‟ – was irrelevant to 
a strictly legal case. Yet Jackson‟s concern with the defendants‟ conscious 
transgression of universal moral standards made it to his opening speech. Allegiance 
to the Party by the defendants and their followers had amounted to an „abdication‟ 
of „moral responsibility‟ rather than a shift in moral values.118 
In short, the defendants were guilty and had been aware of their guilt since the first 
days of their „conspiracy‟. This was, naturally, a theme Jackson returned to when 
delivering his final speech – after the Defence had completed its own case. The 
defendants‟ guilt was, he implied, a matter of „common sense‟, a phrase he used in 
both his opening and final speech: 
These men saw no evil, spoke none, and none was uttered in their presence. This 
claim might sound very plausible if made by one defendant. But when we put all 
their stories together, the impression which emerges of the Third Reich, which was 
to last a thousand years, is ludicrous.119 
To all the defendants‟ claims of ignorance of criminal behaviour, Jackson proclaimed 
– using, once again, some words of his favourite bard – „They do protest too much. 
They deny knowing what was common knowledge...‟.120 But, he suggested, the very 
nature of Nazism entailed a habit for lying: with such a litany of „false statements and 
double talk‟ during the trial, and with a pre-trial history of continual „broken vows and 
false words‟, Jackson asked, „[w]hen for years they have deceived the world, and 
masked falsehood with plausibilities, can anyone be surprised that they continue their 
habits of a lifetime in this dock?‟.121 The very last words of his closing speech – his last 
words of the trial – developed this theme with yet more help from Shakespeare: 
It is against such a background that these defendants now ask this Tribunal to say 
that they are not guilty of planning, executing, or conspiring to commit this long list 
of crimes and wrongs. They stand before the record of this Trial as bloodstained 
Gloucester stood by the body of his slain king. He begged of the widow, as they 
beg of you: “Say I slew them not”. And the Queen replied, “Then say that they 
were not slain. But dead they are...” If you were to say of these men that they are 
not guilty, it would be as true to say that there has been no war, there are no slain, 
there has been no crime.122 
That the defendants had committed crimes and wrongs demonstrates that, just as he 
had been concerned with the morality of the defendants in his opening speech, so 
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too were Jackson‟s closing words of the trial concerned with moral as well as legal 
transgressions. The character of Richard III conformed to – and perhaps even 
influenced – his view of the defendants: wrong-doers fully conscious of their own evil. 
His analogy permits us to discern an unstated desire in the Prosecution, expressed in 
Richard III:  
If heaven have any grievous plague in store 
Exceeding those that I can wish on thee, 
O let them keep it till thy sins be ripe, 
And hurl down their indignation 
On thee, the troubler of the world‟s peace! 
The worm of conscience still be – gnaw thy soul!123 
As Jackson had jotted in his personal notes, such was the enormity of their crimes, the 
defendants could never pay enough for what they had done - even if they could be 
killed „a hundred thousand times‟ over.124 Although he was, in principle, against the 
death penalty, this was not a punishment that troubled Jackson in the case of the 
Nazi defendants.125 The best that he could hope for (in addition to the punishments 
handed down by the Tribunal) was that the „worm of conscience‟, as Shakespeare 
had it, might „gnaw‟ at their „souls‟. To realise the extent of their crimes – to 
appreciate themselves the evil they had done – was not only possible, but what they 
deserved. 
 
 
4.3. The Trouble with Witnesses 
Once Jackson had delivered his opening speech, the American Prosecution began 
presenting evidence which appeared mostly in the form of original German 
documents. Jackson and his closest colleagues were not, however, against the use of 
witnesses per se. When, for example, less than a month before the trial began, the 
British expressed their view that none should be used, Francis Shea – acting as 
Jackson‟s negotiator with the British in planning matters – pointed out that the 
Americans still intended to use some.126 They used seven as part of their Prosecution 
case (others were used later on during the trial). The use of witnesses had appeared 
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to General Donovan and others in the OSS and OCC to offer the best chance of 
generating the most dramatic proof of Nazi crimes. This seemed to suggest the most 
effective way to generate public interest in the trial. There were many more than 
seven available to the Prosecution. The choice of emphasis on either witnesses or 
documents, however, was only one of a number of points of disagreement between 
Jackson (who came to favour basing the case on documents) and General Donovan 
(who continued to prefer the use of witnesses). Their disagreement related to the way 
in which witnesses should be used – as well as how much the case would rely upon 
their testimony. Donovan, for example, hoped to use some of the defendants to 
testify as witnesses against their fellow-defendants. The irreconcilable differences that 
led to Donovan leaving Nuremberg – just as the trial was underway – was, therefore, 
more complicated than a clash between a general preference for witnesses versus 
documents. Since Michael Salter has, relatively recently, investigated thoroughly the 
many disagreements between the two personalities, there is little point in revisiting 
them here.127 It is, however, worth examining the more fundamental issues surrounding 
the use of witnesses – including those who were very successful in incriminating some 
of the defendants – in order to appreciate the differences to other forms of evidence, 
such as documents and film. 
It was even before the end of the war that the discovery of a variety of evidence 
had materialised most dramatically from witnesses. A particularly important (and now, 
well known) case was that of Jan Karski, working for the Polish underground (and, 
subsequently, for the London-Polish government in exile). Karski had managed to slip 
in and out of the Warsaw ghetto (twice) and visit what he believed at the time to be 
the Belzec death camp before escaping Nazi-occupied territory with the knowledge 
of (and some help from) the OSS (which would play a significant part in evidence-
gathering for Nuremberg).128 Among other things, he reported his observances of the 
treatment of the Jews in Poland to prominent individuals in the UK and then in the US. 
However, many of those who listened to his horrific reports of mass-murder and cruelty 
found them hard to believe. It was not, as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter 
explained, that he thought Karski was lying: rather, such horrific descriptions seemed, 
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to him, literally unbelievable.129 With the memories of the atrocity-propaganda of the 
First World War, such horrors, it seems, needed to be seen to be believed.130 
Disheartened by such reactions, and constrained by the politics of the Polish 
government in London, Karski therefore often censored his experiences of the ‟final 
solution‟ from his reports when meeting other individuals such as President Roosevelt, 
Francis Biddle (then Attorney General, and later a judge at Nuremberg), and several 
members of the OSS in Washington - including General Donovan himself.131 Donovan 
appeared to be most interested in the details of escape from occupied Europe.132 
In addition to disbelief, there were other issues with Karski‟s testimony that would be 
problematic for American prosecutors by the end of the war. As an early witness to 
the Holocaust (as it would later be known), and a living example of just how informed 
the Allies had been of the mass-murder of Jews during the war, Karski was, in fact, an 
embarrassment to the Allies: nothing had been done to stop the genocide. Yet 
another political problem existed: Karski shared the bitter disappointment that other 
Polish representatives felt towards war-time British and American acquiescence in the 
ceding of Polish territory east of the „Curzon Line‟ and, subsequently, in what 
amounted to a Soviet annexation of Poland.133 Furthermore, his testimony proved 
incompatible with the legal aims of the American Prosecution at Nuremberg, 
asserting as he did that the murder of Jews had no utilitarian purpose for the Nazis in 
regard to war but was, rather, an end in itself: 
The unprecedented destruction of the entire Jewish population is not motivated 
by Germany‟s military requirements. Hitler and his subordinates aim at the total 
destruction of the Jews before the war ends and regardless of its outcome. The 
Allied governments cannot disregard this reality. The Jews in Poland are help-
less.134 
Such a view would have been damaging (in courtroom testimony) to Jackson‟s 
contention that „aggressive war‟ (Crimes Against Peace) was the supreme crime of 
the Nazis, of which all other crimes were merely derivative. Karski was not even 
considered as a potential witness for the IMT trial at Nuremberg.135 
There were, however, other individuals that appeared to offer more „reliable‟ 
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testimony that might fit the legal and political constraints of the American 
Prosecution. In a list of thirty-seven potential witnesses drawn up by Colonel John 
Harlan Amen, the head of interrogations at Nuremberg, the first to appear was 
General Erwin Lahousen.136 Lahousen had been an Austrian intelligence officer who 
had come to work for German Military Intelligence after the Anschluss of 1938. He had 
never joined the Nazi Party and had worked under Admiral Canaris who was 
murdered after the failed 20th July (1944) plot to assassinate Hitler and take control of 
the German state. Lahousen‟s testimony – the facts that he related in court – would 
do much to directly incriminate Keitel and Ribbentrop. Historians have repeatedly 
recounted this without taking account of the broader reasons why the American 
Prosecution deemed him to be so suitable as a witness.137 Their decision to use him 
had almost as much to do with their perceptions of his character as it did with the 
„facts‟ he could relate. The existence of a virtuous German who had witnessed Nazi 
criminality from its centre in Berlin served to demonstrate that moral integrity had 
remained possible in the Third Reich, a proposition that served to reinforce their 
condemnation of the defendants for their „moral abdication‟. As though to distinguish 
a „good‟ German from most others, Colonel Amen recognised noble American 
features in the ex-General of the Military Intelligence branch: 
General Erwin Lahousen is one of the best witnesses available on the subject of 
aggressive warfare from 1938 to the end of the war. This is so not only because of 
the testimony which he can give, but because of the fact that his appearance 
and manner are those of a blunt, honest, sincere Abraham Lincoln type of person 
and also because he will be practically invulnerable on cross examination.138 
As the first witness to be called in support of the American case, Lahousen fulfilled 
both the legal and political requirements of the American Prosecution. Speaking of 
the circle of intelligence men around Admiral Canaris (that, including himself, was 
disdainful of Nazi aims and methods), Lahousen adopted the legal terminology of the 
American Prosecution without immediate prompting. He paraphrased the „inner 
attitude‟ of his superior, Admiral Canaris, as follows: „We did not succeed in 
preventing this war of aggression.[...]‟139 He also made a good case against the 
defence of following „superior orders‟ when stating that he, a „subordinate‟, was 
occasionally sent to meetings with Keitel, Ribbentrop, and others – instead of Canaris 
– to protest against terroristic Nazi methods: 
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[Admiral Canaris] selected me for tactical reasons since he, as department chief, 
could by no means be as outspoken as I, whom thanks to my subordinate position, 
could use much stronger language.140 
Lahousen mentioned a specific example of his own (and others‟) openly expressed 
dissent. When informed in late 1940, by a representative of the Armed Forces, of 
Keitel‟s order to have (the French) Marshal Weygand assassinated, he had, 
according to his testimony, no hesitation in rejecting it: 
I, myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to carry out 
this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not the slightest intention of 
executing this order. My division and my officers [Lahousen recalled stating], are 
prepared to fight but they are neither a murderer‟s organization nor murderers .141 
He could not, however, express such dissent directly to Keitel who subsequently 
contacted him to inquire as to how the matter was proceeding. Lahousen stalled with 
excuses and, as a result, Weygand was never murdered.142 Lahousen‟s story 
reinforced the impression that blind obedience was not always necessary for survival 
within the Third Reich – and that moral courage could have an effect. Jackson was 
very pleased with the Prosecution‟s use of Lahousen. As he explained in a letter home 
to his wife, „[w]e just had a dramatic day. General Lahousen testified all day and 
certainly hung the Nazi crowd [...].‟143 
The Defence made little impact on Lahousen‟s testimony against Keitel and 
Ribbentrop when it came to cross-examine him the following day. In some cases, they 
made blunders that helped the Prosecution. They could do little to deny that Keitel, 
Ribbentrop, and others were implicated in a systematic plan of terrorism and cruelty 
that was adopted as part of the strategy for conducting war on the eastern front. 
Instead, for the most part, the best Defence lawyers could to do was to attempt to 
discredit Lahousen by characterizing him as an untrustworthy witness. Yet this only 
backfired. When accused by Dr. Otto Nelte, Keitel‟s counsel, of acting as a mere 
mouthpiece for Admiral Canaris – as though, like the Nazis, he was compelled to 
obedience without thinking for himself – Lahousen dismissed the suggestion outright, 
strongly implying that, unlike the defendants; he had enough moral integrity to retain 
his own thoughts and actions: 
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The impression is completely fallacious. I am not a mouthpiece, and am now, as I 
was then, completely independent inwardly in what I say. I have never allowed 
myself, nor shall I ever allow myself, to become the mouthpiece for any concep-
tion, or to make any statements that are contrary to my inner convictions and to 
my conscience.144 
That Lahousen had retained the ability to maintain his own „inner convictions‟ 
throughout the war and up to the present at Nuremberg in 1945, suggested that it 
must have been possible for other Germans to retain at least an „inner‟ independ-
ence from external pressures – be they from dissenters such as Canaris, or criminals 
such as the Nazis. Lahousen had retained a „civilized‟ conscience throughout the Nazi 
years, demonstrating that it had been possible to be a „good‟ German who shared 
moral values with the rest of the „civilized‟ world. Through his questioning of the 
witness, Dr. Nelte had done little other than to demonstrate the Prosecution‟s view 
that Lahousen stood as a noble example of how acceptance of Nazi beliefs and 
actions were not inevitable in a system albeit frequently described by the prosecutors 
as „totalitarian‟. 
However, the greatest blunder made by the Defence, was during Dr. Fritz Sauter‟s 
advocacy for Ribbentrop. After asking whether his defendant had „really talked of 
killing Jews‟ – to which Lahousen answered that indeed he had – Sauter switched 
from his focus on Ribbentrop to the character of the witness himself.145 Without stating 
the exact words, Sauter accused Lahousen of criminal negligence: 
DR. SAUTER:  [...] You have told us about murderous designs on which you or your 
department or other officers were employed or which you were 
charged to carry out. Did you report these to any police station as 
the law required? May I point out that according to German law 
failure to report intended crimes is punishable with imprisonment or 
in serious cases with death. 
LAHOUSEN:  Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I am 
not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man. 
DR. SAUTER.  As far as I know, that is also punishable according to Austrian law. 
LAHOUSEN:  At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was no longer valid. 
DR. SAUTER:  In other words, you never reported the intended crime, either as a 
private person or as an official?  
LAHOUSEN:  I should have had to make a great many reports - about 100,000 
projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. 
You can read about them in the records - and about shootings and 
the like - of which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted 
to know or not, because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it.146 
This was widely seen, as Telford Taylor has pointed out, as a ridiculous approach for 
Sauter to adopt – causing consternation in the defendants who wished they had 
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been permitted to ask the questions themselves.147 But this exchange was significant 
for another reason that has not been commented on. It represented as good an 
argument as any other the Prosecution lawyers might have made in favour of the 
proposition that law under Nazi rule had had no validity whatsoever. Not only had 
Nazi „law‟ been invalid; such was the reach of Nazi rule and its corruption of law that 
it had made pre-existing laws meaningless too. 
Of all (seven) witnesses used by the American Prosecution in the presentation of 
their case, Lahousen proved to be, as Colonel Amen had originally stated, „the best 
[witness] available on the subject of aggressive warfare‟.148 Not only had examination 
by the Prosecution directly incriminated some of the defendants; the Defence‟s cross-
examination led to their further incrimination. Yet even Lahousen caused some 
problems for the Prosecution. The very nature of cross-examination permitted the 
Defence some control over the issues that could be discussed in the courtroom. For 
example, as we have already seen, Jackson wished to avoid emphasising German 
aerial bombardment of civilians because of his concern that the Allies had engaged 
in the bombing of German civilians.149 But the cross-examination temporarily brought 
this subject to the fore with the suggestion that Keitel had, in fact, been sensitive to 
the issue of protecting civilians – a galling proposition for the Prosecution that could 
not be disproved by the witness:  
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put the question to you, 
whether, when this order for the bombing of Warsaw was made 
known he did not stress the fact that this was to be put into effect 
only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender after the demand 
made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even then only after 
an opportunity to evacuate the city had been given to the civilian 
population and the diplomats. 
LAHOUSEN:  I cannot recall the precise words he used but according to my 
knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite possible, indeed 
probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did make this remark.150 
As well as being able to highlight issues that the Prosecution might wish to avoid, each 
witness they used provided another type of opportunity for the Defence. Although the 
Prosecution might use a witness to incriminate a limited number of specific individuals 
in the dock (in this case, Lahousen was used against Keitel and Ribbentrop151), putting 
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a witness on the stand gave all Defence lawyers – whoever they might be 
representing – the opportunity to ask questions on anything they thought relevant to 
their own case. Again, this allowed for topics and questions that the Prosecution 
might wish to avoid. The very first Defence lawyer to cross-examine Lahousen was not 
concerned with Keitel or Ribbentrop at all. Instead, Dr. Egon Kubuschock managed to 
establish that his defendant, Franz Von Papen, had shared and expressed a 
„negative‟ attitude towards „Hitler‟s war policies‟ and „violent methods‟.152 Lahousen 
admitted that his superior, Canaris, believed that Von Papen continued to hold office 
in order to exercise a „mitigating influence‟ on Hitler‟s regime.153 As a result, the use of 
Lahousen to incriminate Keitel and Ribbentrop did something to boost von Papen‟s 
defence (he would, in fact, be one of the three defendants acquitted by the 
Tribunal). With twenty-one individual defendants sitting in the dock, and seven 
organizations indicted, the use of any witness by the Prosecution risked losing control 
to the Defence – not only of the topics to be investigated; it would also mean that, in 
the interests of fair play, the time each witness would take to be cross-examined 
would be unpredictable and controlled by the Defence who had very good 
incentives to prolong the trial as much as possible.154 After a day of Lahousen‟s cross-
examination, Wheeler concluded that: 
[...] any idea of offering many witnesses must be dropped, [otherwise] the trial will 
be indefinitely lengthened. [...] I never heard of such a wandering and irrelevant 
series of questions [as posed by the Defence lawyers], or so long and verbose and 
complicated. [...]155 
Jackson complained to the court that Lahousen‟s testimony, which had taken nearly 
two full days, could have been submitted to the court in an affidavit which would 
have taken only fifteen minutes of the Tribunal‟s time.156 
There would only be another six witnesses called by the American Prosecution. 
They would need to provide testimony that focused sharply on a limited number of 
incriminated defendants, so that Defence lawyers had little excuse to waste time in 
relation to other defendants. The next was Otto Ohlendorf, head of Office III (the SD) 
within the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). As the office charged with „internal 
security‟ within the Reich, it competed for authority with the Military Intelligence of the 
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Army run by Admiral Canaris. Ohlendorf and the organization he had worked for, 
therefore, represented a dramatic contrast to the previous witness, Lahousen, who 
had worked under Canaris in the Abwehr. Ohlendorf, provided evidence against 
Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, and the SS/SD as organizations, which included testimony of his 
estimation of 90,000 murders of Jews (and some Soviet political commissars) reported 
by his own „Einsatzgruppe D‟.157 As might have been expected, he was cross-
examined by Dr. Otto Nelte for Keitel, Dr. Kurt Kauffmann for Kaltenbrunner, and 
Ludwig Babel for the SS/SD. But he was also cross-examined by the following: Dr. Egon 
Kubuschok for the Reich Cabinet, and then on behalf of Dr. Hans Flächsner for 
defendant Speer;  Dr. Rudolf Merkel for the Gestapo; Dr. Franz Exner for the General 
Staff & High Command of the German Armed Forces; Dr. Herbert Kraus for Schacht; 
Dr. Otto Stahmer for Göring; Otto Kranzbuhler on behalf of Dr. Walter Siemers for 
Raeder; Dr. Robert Servatius for the Leadership Corps of Nazi Party and then for 
Sauckel. Most of the remaining five witnesses called by the American Prosecution 
were used to testify to very particular events so that the Defence would be given as 
little opportunity to prolong the proceedings. But this limited the value of what the 
American Prosecution could gain from its own use of witnesses. 
In addition to these practical disadvantages from the perspective of the American 
Prosecution, there were more fundamental concerns with the very nature of witness 
testimony even before the trial had begun. As a British observer had noted during the 
Charter negotiations in London, Jackson was „very afraid of Soviet methods being 
adopted at the trials, thus bringing them into discredit‟.158 What he probably had in 
mind was the dubious testimony that had been on display during the purge-trials at 
Moscow during the 1930s. But Jackson did not need to look back to the 1930s for 
examples of dubious testimony procured by the Soviets. The OCC had a very up-to-
date example in the Soviet interrogation of defendant Fritzsche before he had been 
brought to Nuremberg from Russia. The very first question and answer of a Soviet pre-
trial interrogation suggests either a threatening atmosphere or an unimaginative post-
interrogation job of editing and fabrication (and probably a mixture of both): 
Q: You were arrested as one of those guilty of the war begun by Hitler in Europe. 
Do you admit that you are guilty of this? 
A: Yes, I admit it. For a considerable time I was one of the directors of German 
propaganda and I took a direct part in the preparation of the second impe-
rialistic war begun by Hitler.159 
To the unlikely admission by Fritzsche of being „guilty of the war‟ was added the 
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utterly implausible characterisation of that conflict as „the second imperialistic war‟, a 
description that sounded as though it had come from the ghost of Lenin rather than a 
living Nazi „major war-criminal‟. Yet, in a certain regard, what was more obvious with 
Soviet methods was still true of any witness that might be used by the Americans 
against Nazi defendants in the dock: such witnesses were easily defined politically in 
relation to the defendants and their defeated system. In short, witnesses could be 
perceived by the defendants and others as either Nazis or anti-Nazis. The evidence 
they gave, therefore, could always be defined in political terms regardless of the 
reliability of the testimony itself. Thus, even though evidence from Lahousen, an anti-
Nazi, might appear to be truthful to the members of the Tribunal, his testimony would 
be viewed by the Nazis in the dock as a politically motivated and treacherous 
betrayal. Such evidence, therefore, would never be the best way to induce remorse – 
to „gnaw the souls‟ of defendants that were naturally inclined to avoid taking 
responsibility. Instead, Lahousen‟s testimony only prompted Göring to regret that Nazi 
terror had not been even more widespread after Hitler had ordered the assassinations 
of his enemies after the failed plot to kill him in 1944: “That Traitor! That‟s one we forgot 
on the 20th July [...] What good is the testimony of a traitor?”.160 Göring would later 
react to another Prosecution witness by calling him a treacherous swine in the 
courtroom (as punishment, he would only be fed bread and water for the 
weekend).161 
Conversely, even though the testimony of a Nazi witness might be truthful – for 
example, Ohlendorf‟s admission that 90,000 Jews (and some Soviet commissars) had 
been murdered under his watch – those who might wish to deny such evidence (or 
responsibility) would feel able to question the potential motivation for such a 
confession. Once again, of all the defendants, Göring expressed most succinctly the 
Nazi route to avoiding responsibility: “Ach, there goes another one selling his soul to 
the enemy! What does the swine expect to gain by it? He‟ll hang anyway”.162 
Suspicions could always be manufactured: was the witness trying to save his own 
neck and, for that or some other reason, was he simply saying what the Prosecution 
wanted to hear? (Ohlendorf himself did not appear to show any remorse for his own 
part in mass-murder and merely reverted to the common justification of having had 
to carry out the orders issued by his superiors).163 Why, if the Soviets could not be 
trusted with any testimony they procured, could the Americans – who were just as 
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committed to destroying Nazism – be trusted either? Such a Nazi perspective resisted 
the route to contrition from any witness-testimony. Whilst it did not affect the 
Prosecution‟s case in a legal sense of proving a case beyond reasonable doubt, the 
use of testimony could never force the defendants themselves to examine their own 
consciences. As the first Holocaust deniers of the post-war period, the men in the 
dock would always have the option and incentive to ask themselves „is this testimony 
really truthful?‟ – no matter how truthful it actually might appear to the  Tribunal. 
Jackson would recall appreciating the impossibility of attaining „objectivity‟ in the 
use of witness testimony. He identified the moment of his decision to base the bulk of 
the case on documents instead to an initial brief period spent in Europe interrogating 
individuals who had been opposed to Hitler‟s regime. These individuals had been in 
contact with, or discovered by, the OSS.164 With General Donovan and Allen Dulles 
(the latter having been chief of OSS war-time operations based in Switzerland) he had 
spent the afternoon of 7th July 1945 „interrogating‟ them at an OSS base in 
Wiesbaden, Germany.165 Whilst all of these interrogations had „pointed to other 
sources of information‟, Jackson later recalled: 
The interrogations revealed that the use of witnesses would have serious weak-
nesses. Sometimes these witnesses differed in their recollection of events. They saw 
events from different observation points. They had different personal relations to 
different people. They had a strong bias against the Hitler regime [–] strong 
enough so that they risked their lives in plots to assassinate and murder [Hitler and 
other Nazi leaders]. We could not vouch for them as unbiased witnesses, even 
though we believed them to be credible witnesses. Their stories, on their own 
admissions of their activities, would be self-serving statements of highly interested 
persons trying to vindicate their own past.166 
As a Supreme Court judge, who had climbed his way up from working as a country 
lawyer in upstate New York, this characterization of witnesses appears a little naive in 
its acknowledgment of what must have been very obvious to him for years: that 
witnesses each have their own perspectives and motivations. Perhaps Jackson sensed 
that „politics‟ – something he wished to leave outside the courtroom – was inherently 
involved in using witnesses against the Nazis in particular. But Jackson‟s recollection 
itself was not „unbiased,‟ since he would have been concerned to portray his 
formulation of trial-strategy as consistent – based on matters of long-standing 
principle and planning rather than, for example, affected by any passionate 
disagreements with “Wild Bill” Donovan who, because he believed that the 
Nuremberg project “was a lawsuit plus something else,” insisted that it required “an 
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affirmative human aspect with German as well as foreign witnesses”.167 Whilst Jackson 
noted the more factual circumstances of these „interrogations‟ in his diary in July 
1945, the specific timing of his attitude towards the use of witnesses appeared only in 
hindsight, as part of an oral history project in 1953.168 The impression he left at this later 
stage is that his decision to base the case primarily on documents, and to do so at 
the expense of using witness-testimony, dated from early July 1945: 
The contrast between the weakness in their stories and the very indisputable 
character of the documents, of which we saw only a couple on that day, set 
going in my mind the question of whether we shouldn‟t concentrate on documen-
tary proof rather than oral proof from witnesses.169 
It is more of an acknowledgment of the way human memory functions – than any 
implication that the Justice intentionally misled his own „interrogator‟ – to suggest that 
Jackson probably thought of witnesses in this way only considerably later – after it 
became increasingly clear that a case based predominantly on documents was 
possible. What helped Jackson most to develop his preferences in the development 
of trial-strategy was the requirement to work on an indictment that, as had been 
agreed at the London negotiations, would entail considerably more detail than 
Anglo-Saxon lawyers were accustomed to.170 As Telford Taylor recalled, the building 
of a „narrative‟ required by the indictment forced an assessment of the evidentiary 
material that had accumulated into the autumn of 1945: 
The conspiracy charge [Count 1] required a narrative of the conspiracy‟s origin 
and course and a showing of its criminality, for which evidence had to be avail-
able. Such evidence began to accumulate in July, and the flow continued 
throughout the summer and fall. Jackson‟s sense that the evidentiary basis for final 
drafting [of the indictment] had not been laid until mid-September was sound 
[...]171 
It seems fair to assume, therefore, that Jackson‟s personal predilection for using 
documents was only confirmed in September 1945. Furthermore, this did not yet 
preclude the use of significantly more witness-testimony than was eventually used by 
the American Prosecution during the trial. Only a month before the American case 
began, Leonard Wheeler, Deputy Chief of the Documents Division, wrote home that 
„[W]e don‟t know yet what our policy will be as to oral testimony‟.172 It was as late as 
                                                     
167 Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 150. 
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7th November – the very month that the trial began – that Colonel Amen, head of 
interrogations, submitted his list of thirty-seven potential witnesses for the American 
case.173 Nine days after that – only four days before the American case began in 
court – a revision was made by Amen distinguishing between nine witnesses who 
were „unqualifiedly recommended‟ and another fourteen „who would be useful‟. 174 
And whilst, as we have seen, there were important legal and political factors that 
would limit the choice of which witnesses the Prosecution might deem suitable, 
Jackson‟s growing confidence in the accumulated documentation was not the only 
factor in the eventual restriction of witness-testimony. 
It was not long before the preliminary hearings began that there emerged an 
entirely practical problem which came as a late, unexpected, and unpleasant 
surprise to the Prosecution. A number of courtroom rehearsals were staged, primarily 
in order to test the use of the „simultaneous‟ translating system that had been installed 
free of charge by the International Business Machines Corporation.175 This rehearsal 
was not just to test the skills of each team of twelve translators; it was also a chance 
for the users of the system – the lawyers and judges – to familiarise themselves with its 
workings: with wearing headphones and speaking into microphones.176 The only 
players missing from the scene were the defendants (and any of the proposed 
witnesses). Instead, a number of soldiers sat in the dock and one sat at the witness 
stand. To Wheeler, it looked like a big game of bingo.177 
                                                     
173 Col. Amen to Board of Review, „Witnesses Competent to Testify at Trial‟, 8/Nov/1945. Cor-
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But Wheeler made the more disturbing observation that the translation system only 
appeared to be „simultaneous‟ to its users if they spoke very slowly: 
So far, the rate of speaking has to be kept down to about 50 [words] a minute - 
much slower than ordinary speech, and slower than most dictation. [...] The 
necessary result is that we are going to have to concentrate mostly on documen-
tary evidence, and to confine our oral witnesses to the minimum. [...] Conse-
quently, there may be less drama about the trial than many people are hopefully 
expecting.178 
There was already a fundamental problem with translation: even a fast translation – 
perhaps, for example, conducted by one of the best translators, „the Passionate 
Haystack‟ (nicknamed for her gesticulations and hair-style) – would inevitably tend to 
lose any of the colour or drama in the original speech.179 To this was added the more 
particular circumstances of Nuremberg: the potential for several Defence-lawyers to 
engage in prolonged cross-examination of each Prosecution witness; and the newly-
discovered problem of a particularly slow rate of translation. It appeared as though 
the use of witnesses – and, in particular, the cross-examination of German-speaking 
witnesses by German-speaking lawyers – might be very dull for monolingual Anglo-
Saxons within and beyond the courtroom – even though the speed of translation 
                                                     
178 Leonard Wheeler to Mrs Wheeler, 8/Nov/1945, Harvard/LWP/4/3. 
179 On the „Passionate Haystack‟, see: West, A Train of Powder, p. 13. 
 
F I G U R E  4 :  A court rehearsal held the day before preliminary hearings begin. American soldiers 
take the defendant‟s places on the left. A soldier also acts as a witness seated to the right of the film 
screen. The rehearsal is held primarily to test the use of the translation system. (Signal Corps, 
13/Nov/1945. NARA/RG-226/85/39/653/SC 216343). 
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would improve.180 In particular, most English-language newsreels and radio reports 
would most likely only have the time (and inclination) to replace slowly delivered and 
translated German with voice-over narration in English:  narrators such as Ed Herlihy 
(for Universal Newsreels) would do a better job of instilling drama into their reports by 
creating dramatic narratives themselves. 
 
 
4.4. The Banality of Documents 
Just before the trial began, therefore, it appeared that the only way to run it 
„expeditiously‟ was to rely almost entirely upon documents. Whilst this was bound to 
lessen the potential for dramatic effect, the „citadel of boredom‟ that would 
materialise was by no means inevitable as the American Prosecution began its case 
(this oft-quoted phrase of Rebecca West‟s was, in fact, coined in relation to the 
closing months of the trial – after the Defence lawyers had dragged out their cases 
with the help – in contrast to all the Prosecution teams – of numerous witnesses).181 
Whilst Jackson had already demonstrated the power of words, many of the words in 
„captured‟ German documents were penned by some of the defendants and their 
subordinate bureaucrats who preferred banal euphemisms to words such as „murder‟ 
and „persecution‟ or any others that might clarify too well (to themselves as much as 
to others) what exactly they were engaged in. As it was later put by Jackson‟s son, 
William E. Jackson, „the language of National Socialists was often merely a turgid and 
mystical aggregation of words signifying nothing, to which the German language 
easily lends itself‟.182 Whilst there was Shakespeare, Kipling, and more to be found in 
the words of the Anglo-Saxon prosecutors, there was no Goethe or other classics to 
be found in official German documents.183 Furthermore, there was a very basic 
problem with original German documents, so obvious that scholars seem to have 
ignored the issue: the very process of translation would only serve to remove any 
colour that might have existed in the original. By the time the trial had begun, there 
was no shortage of documents that, although they contained such „turgid‟ language, 
nevertheless stood as evidence that Robert Jackson proclaimed was more reliable 
than the words of any Prosecution lawyer or witness: 
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183 Goethe, however, was popular reading for the defendants whilst imprisoned in the jail connected to 
the Nuremberg Palace of Justice. See: Andrus, The Infamous of Nuremberg, p. 131. 
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If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would think me intemperate 
and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not take the word of any witness but the 
Germans themselves.184 
By this, he meant the documents that the defendants had penned themselves. 
Jackson‟s faith in the use of documents as the most reliable source of history  reflected 
a classical Rankean approach: the most reliable traces of the past as it had „actually 
happened‟ were to be found in the official documents of diplomats and leaders of 
state (an approach which tended to exclude substantially the wider social and 
cultural context of the events of the previous twelve years).185 Fortunately for Jackson, 
the Nazi state was particularly suited to this historical methodology which compli-
mented the emphasis on leadership responsibility: 
We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes. There is no 
count in the Indictment that cannot be proved by books and records. The Ger-
mans were always meticulous record keepers, and these defendants had their 
share of the Teutonic passion for thoroughness in putting things on paper.186 
Of the thousands of documents that were sent to Nuremberg, by far the most 
numerous were those numbered by the American Prosecution with the prefix „PS‟, 
signifying „Paris-Storey‟.187 Although usually having been discovered in Germany, 
these documents had found their way to Paris to be screened and selected by a 
team headed by Colonel Robert G. Storey. It was therefore appropriate that Jackson 
chose Storey to summarize for the Tribunal the Prosecution‟s work in retrieving and 
selecting documents. „The Germans,‟ Storey told the judges, had „kept accurate and 
voluminous records‟ found „in Army headquarters, Government buildings and 
elsewhere‟ such as „in salt mines, buried in the ground, behind false walls, and many 
other places believed secure by the Germans‟. He mentioned, as an example, the 
large collection of Rosenberg‟s personal correspondence found behind a false wall in 
an old Bavarian castle.188 The impression given was that the leading Nazis had a lot to 
hide from the invaders, but that they had been unsuccessful: „Literally hundreds of 
tons of enemy documents and records were screened and examined and those 
selected were forwarded to Nuremberg for processing‟.189 The Americans, Storey 
continued, had selected more than 2,500 documents to be kept at Nuremberg, and 
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„at least several hundred‟ would be offered in evidence.190 The scale of documenta-
tion had already astonished the other Prosecution teams upon arrival at Nuremberg. 
Jackson appeared to relish the memory of this when he later recalled the pre-trial 
preparations: 
[The arrival of the British prosecutors to Nuremberg] was preceded by a request 
that all of the documents be gotten out so they could look them over before 
meeting with us. Little did they know that our documents were a roomful and they 
were considerably surprised at the extent of the exhibit. Finally on Friday, October 
8th, the Russians appeared with a team who wanted to go to work at once 
interrogating [the defendants and imprisoned witnesses]. They asked that the 
documents be given to them so they could look them over during the evening 
before interrogating the following morning. They too were astonished to find the 
accumulation of evidence.191 
So vast was the collection that, as the trial began, the American Prosecution did 
not intend to read, verbatim, all the documents it wished to be considered as 
evidence. Instead, Jackson‟s opening speech can be viewed as the introduction to a 
number of subsequent narratives – or „briefs‟ – that would, just like that speech, only 
quote the most interesting, shocking, and relevant passages from documents whilst 
referring to many more as one would cite a document in a scholarly text. The 
prosecutors realized that basing their case on documents would be less dramatic 
than witnesses, but sought, through the presentation of these „self-proving briefs,‟ to 
provide an engaging, coherent and comprehensible exposition of Nazi criminality. 
Although the prosecutors had originally intended to read directly from the briefs in 
court, a last-minute decision was made to merely summarize them before submitting 
them in full to the Tribunal for „judicial notice‟ – together with an accompanying 
„document book‟ containing all the cited and relevant documents.192 This would, the 
prosecutors believed, speed up the trial and facilitate the presentation of more 
engaging presentations in the courtroom so that the Press and other observers would 
only hear the most interesting arguments and evidence. Storey expressed his hope 
that by this method, „the usual laborious and tedious method of introducing 
documentary evidence may be expedited‟.193 In this way, the judges could be left to 
read the briefs in full or to the extent they themselves deemed necessary – outside of 
the courtroom and in their own time. 
The Tribunal accepted this method and took the Defence‟s silence to signify that 
there were no objections.194 But with the rapid submission of briefs and documents it 
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became clear during the first day of these presentations (Thursday, 22/Nov/1945) that 
too much was being asked of the Tribunal and of the Defence. In the afternoon, two 
problems emerged that should have been avoided by the Prosecution: all the briefs 
submitted to the Tribunal were only in English and, therefore, useless to the French and 
Russian judges. To make matters worse, only six English-language copies had been 
made for the Defence who, due to a „misunderstanding‟ – i.e. a mistake of the 
Prosecution –  did not have possession of them in the courtroom.195 Storey assured the 
court that the Defence would get the briefs (which were being fetched from the 
document room) and, although no German translations were yet available, he 
reported that a Prosecution lawyer had „approached some of the distinguished 
counsel for the Defence, and learned that a great many of them not only speak 
English, but understand it when they read it‟.196 
After a recess, during which Prosecution and Defence lawyers discussed the 
problems of translation, the Defence – remarkably – agreed to proceed with German 
versions of the documents, but only English copies of the briefs.197 The first day had 
been confusing for Defence council who, it seems, were temporarily willing to permit 
teething problems. Perhaps by the weekend, as the Prosecution implied, translation 
and duplication problems would be resolved and things would become more 
comprehensible to the Defence. 
But the following day, Friday, Dr. Dix, on behalf of the Defence, asked for clarifica-
tion: was everything in the documents (by which he also meant the briefs) viewed by 
the Tribunal as a basis for judgement of the defendants – even though portions of 
argument or documents might not be made in court?198 When the President of the 
Tribunal answered in the affirmative, it became clear that the Defence would need to 
read everything and contest anything incriminating contained within the briefs or 
documents even if they had not been read in the court. With only English-language 
briefs, therefore, they would need to contest arguments made in a language that 
many of the defendants, and some of the lawyers, did not understand. 
Matters became worse from the Defence‟s perspective, when Sidney S. Alderman, 
for the Prosecution, could only offer one copy of a document book to the Defence in 
court. Dr. Dix, for the Defence, politely refused to accept it. It would be unfair to all 
the other defendants, he said, and implied that he did not wish to submit to such a 
precedent that might permanently disable the Defence as a whole. Besides, he 
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continued, the Prosecution and Defence would meet at the weekend to resolve the 
problem. But how many copies of the current document book, wondered the 
President, would materialise by Monday? Alderman admitted that he couldn‟t say, 
and proceeded to suggest a solution to the current problem with his own 
presentation: 
I think many of us have underestimated the contribution of this interpreting system 
to this Trial. [...] I expect to read the pertinent parts of the documents into the 
system so that they will go into the transcript of record. Counsel for the German 
defendants will get their transcripts in German; our French and Russian Allies will 
get their transcripts in their language, and it seems to me that that is the most 
helpful way to overcome this language barrier.199 
Without realising it, Alderman had lodged in the minds of the judges an idea that 
would be viewed as disastrous by the Prosecution. Soon after further discussion of 
whether or not sufficient copies of documents would be produced in the right 
languages by Monday, the Tribunal adjourned the proceedings. When the court 
convened after the weekend, Justice Lawrence (the President) made a ruling that 
would inevitably result in boredom: 
[I]n the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court by the Prosecu-
tion shall in the first instance be part of the record. In that way those parts of the 
documents will be conveyed to defendants' counsel through the earphones in 
German.200 
From that point onwards (until the ruling was revoked on 17th December201) the 
Prosecution would no longer be allowed to proceed at a pace that, while designed 
to maintain interest in the outside world, simply overwhelmed everyone in the 
courtroom. Still to be presented by the American Prosecution were phases such as 
aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R., Collaboration with 
Japan, Exploitation of Forced Labour, Concentration Camps, and The Persecution of 
the Jews. To engage in laborious readings of voluminous and lengthy documents 
would drain pathos from even the most horrible crimes. The defendants were pleased. 
As a result, Jackson later recalled that there were undoubtedly problems that needed 
to be resolved: 
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The trial was dragging. That couldn‟t be denied. The defendants were becoming 
more confident and arrogant. The trial badly needed a shot in the arm to pep up 
our own staff, as well as to give the correspondents something to write about. The 
remedy that we sought to use was to show, rather out of order, and rather before 
we had expected to, the films, both those taken by the Americans and captured 
German film, of the concentration camps.202 
By using film, Jackson hoped to revive public interest in the trial. He also wished to see 
the defendants feeling less comfortable. By the time the first film was shown, the use 
of documents had not, on the whole, seemed to trouble the defendants. They 
appeared rather comfortable with the way the proceedings were progressing, 
viewing their trial-by-document with „mixed glee and disdain‟.203 
 
We can, therefore, conclude that the American Prosecutions‟ staging of a morality 
play had failed in one significant regard. The defendants had not appeared to feel or 
express any sorrow for the crimes that had been described in the courtroom. As a 
result, they still appeared to inhabit an entirely alien moral universe to their captors – a 
situation that did not reflect Jackson‟s belief in their consciousness of wrong-doing. 
Furthermore, the Prosecution had only partially succeeded in delivering to its 
audience a sufficiently dramatic and engaging narrative of Nazi criminality. 
Prosecutors‟ expectations for a dramatic trial had been dashed soon after Jackson‟s 
opening speech. Protracted cross-examination and slow translation had drained 
witness-testimony of the drama that Americans had expected before the trial had 
begun. This problem was only compounded by the slow pace of delivering evidence 
to the Tribunal through the use of original German documents. Jackson was aware 
that the credibility of the trial was now in danger: to host up to 71 potentially bored 
American reporters in the courtroom would do little to advocate the value of such an 
enormous investment of manpower and expense in extending the principle of the rule 
of law beyond the borders of the United States. Much hope rested, therefore, in his 
decision to show some films somewhat earlier than had been planned.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CELLULOID MOUSETRAP 
 
 
A man can wish to slink away from many things in life, and he may 
even succeed, so that life’s favoured one can say in the last moment, ‘I 
slipped away from all the cares which other men suffered’. But if suc h 
a person wishes to bluster out of, to defy, to slink away from remorse, 
alas, which is indeed the most terrible to say of him, that he failed, or 
that he succeeded? 
Søren Kierkegaard1 
 
 
I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently  
They have proclaimed their malefactions. [...]  
The play’s the thing wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King.  
William Shakespeare2 
 
This chapter addresses the particular way in which the American Prosecution used 
film in the courtroom at the Nuremberg Palace of Justice.3 As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the trial began with Jackson‟s theatrical words that appeared to 
offer the prospect of a dramatic trial. Expectations were high amongst the 
prosecutors themselves that their case would provide an engaging portrayal of Nazi 
criminality. The proceedings, however, would be characterised by some observers as 
being very dull.4 But the subsequent use of witnesses and documents failed in one 
other very important respect: it appeared to Jackson and others that the defendants, 
on the whole, were not exhibiting much acknowledgment of the wrongs they were 
responsible for. Unlike previous historical research on the Americans‟ use of film at 
Nuremberg, using the case of the film Nazi Concentration Camps, I will show just how 
film came to be used as an effective theatrical device that was used to impart moral 
lessons. The historian who already comes closest to explaining this most significant 
function of film at Nuremberg is Christian Delage who states: 
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Far from subjecting the audience of the trial to a complacent show, or assigning 
the film [Nazi Concentration Camps] a simple documentary value, the point was 
to force the Nazi dignitaries to recognize, before a court, the crimes for which they 
were responsible. Against their wishes, the defendants had to show themselves, 
close to the images screened in the courtroom.5 
Whilst it is true that the audience were not subjected to a complacent show, I 
contend that they were, in fact, made part of a spectacle that constituted an 
effective form of morality play. Furthermore, whilst it is true that the American 
Prosecution did not assign a simple documentary value to the film, I argue that the 
American Prosecution understood film to possess considerable „documentary value‟. 
Finally, I begin from where Delage concludes in explaining exactly how and why the 
point of showing the film was to attempt to make the Nazi defendants recognize their 
responsibility for the crimes that could be seen on the screen. 
 
 
5.1. The Celluloid Experiment 
During the Charter negotiations at London in August 1945, and during his opening 
speech at the trial, Robert Jackson had suggested that the particular identities of the 
individuals in the dock would hardly matter: it was the „social forces‟ and crimes they 
represented that, most importantly, had to be condemned.6 Yet the very novelty in 
applying international criminal law at Nuremberg was that individuals were to be held 
accountable for what they themselves preferred to classify as „acts of state‟. Jackson 
observed that, combined with the excuse of (only „following‟) „superior orders‟, 
treating wrongful behaviour as „acts of state‟ provided immunity to guilty individuals: 
„Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a 
fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons‟.7 
Once those particular persons were imprisoned at the Palace of Justice in 
Nuremberg, concerns with principles of law and procedure were eclipsed by a 
fascination with the defendants. It was principally Americans and Britons who were 
fascinated. Reporters, visitors, and members of the Prosecution commented on 
various aspects of their appearance – the clothes they wore, the way they walked, 
the colour of their skin, the way they groomed, and the mannerisms they exhibited. 
Perhaps the most graphic portrayals were provided by Rebecca West who thought 
that  
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Most of them, except Schacht, who was white haired, and Speer, who was black 
like a monkey, were neither dark nor fair anymore; and there was amongst them 
no leanness that did not sag and no plumpness that seemed more than inflation 
by some thin gas.8 
A concern with showing the world the faces of the defendants had already been 
envisaged at a very early stage in planning the trial. A visual record of the 
proceedings, thought one member of the OSS, would be invaluable for the newsreels, 
and the maker of these films would need to be „a very good director indeed,‟ 
capable of „translat[ing] on to the screen the great drama evolving before his eyes‟: 
[...] If there are more than one accused, the close up camera should pan across 
the faces of the various prisoners. If possible, these cameras should be hidden [...] 
for it the accused know that they are being filmed, they will pose and posture, 
and it is essential that they should not prejudice the inherent drama of the pro-
ceedings by behaving unnaturally.9 
What was desirable, therefore, was to see their „natural‟ react ions to evidence 
presented in the courtroom. But before reaching this stage, the Americans had ample 
opportunity to indulge their fascination with „the mind of the Nazi‟, as their jailer put 
it.10 
Prison-chief Colonel Burton C. Andrus recalled that, even before the defendants 
arrived at the jail of the Palace of Justice, American psychologists and psychiatrists 
had already thoroughly examined them: 
From almost the first day of capture, the Nazis of Nuremberg had been under 
constant psychiatric examination. In their prison cells and in interview rooms they 
were questioned, given tests and asked about their background. There was little in 
the end that our prison psychiatrists and psychologist did not know about them.11 
Andrus‟ use of these professionals was driven by a well-founded concern that some of 
the prisoners might consider suicide.12 For Andrus, therefore, it was essential to monitor 
their morale. The psychologists and psychiatrists themselves, however, viewed the 
chance to examine the remnants of the Third Reich‟s leadership as a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to develop their professional talents with unique and fascinating 
subjects. As Dr. Douglas Kelley, a psychiatrist, put it, „As a scient ist, I regarded my duty 
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in the jail to be not only to guard the health of men facing trial for war crimes but also 
to study them as a researcher in a laboratory‟.13 Kelley and others used a variety of 
techniques to examine whether or not there were personality traits that were 
particular to the prisoners, and whether, as a group, they shared these traits in 
common. Whilst Dr. Gustave Gilbert, a psychologist, asserted that several of the 
prisoners exhibited certain „pathological tendencies‟ (for example, paranoia or 
narcissism), both he and Kelley viewed them as legally sane.14 Kelley believed that 
they „differed from the normal chiefly in their lack of conscience‟ whereas Gilbert 
perceived in Göring „the consciousness of guilt [but] the need to escape it while 
brushing it off with dramatic gestures‟.15 Whether or not their „scientific‟ methods were 
reliable, these observations demonstrated a desire to test the defendants for the 
presence or absence of feelings of guilt and remorse. „Two or three of them‟, thought 
Gilbert, „appeared to show some signs of remorse‟.16 The most vocal of them was 
Hans Frank who had proclaimed his conversion to Catholicism and denounced Hitler 
as „evil‟ and „a psychopath‟.17 Gilbert‟s perception of „abject remorse‟ in Frank 
perhaps conveys some wishful thinking on the psychologist‟s part since, as Raphael 
Gross has convincingly argued, the prisoner‟s moral feelings are more accurately 
characterised as those of shame.18 
One of the clinicians‟ methods in examining their unusual subjects was the use of 
the Rorschach inkblot test, a technique that, although controversial, is still taught and 
applied in the U.S. today.19 Kelley administered the test to seven of the Nazi inmates; 
Gilbert used it with another sixteen.20 It was conducted by examining prisoners‟ 
reactions to ten abstract images which had no particular meaning. As Kelley 
explained in his book relating to his work at Nuremberg, a Rorschach examiner need 
not be particularly interested in the content of what a subject deciphered from an ink 
blot card.21 What was more important, he explained, was how the subject conveyed 
his interpretation: he would project some of his own psychological traits via the 
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manner in which he behaved whilst interpreting each card.22 
Yet, as Jose Brunner has pointed out, it was not only the Nazi subjects that 
„projected‟ their own psychological traits upon the cards: Kelley himself began with 
his own political assumptions which affected, and were shaped by, his own 
psychological make-up.23 As Kelley himself recalled: 
I shared the opinion of ethnologists and politicians alike that Nazism was a socio-
cultural disease which, while it had been epidemic only among our enemies, was 
endemic in all parts of the world. I shared the fear that sometime in the future it 
might become epidemic in my own nation.24 
His „shared‟ concerns (he did not mention specific individuals) influenced the manner 
in which Kelley conducted the Rorschach tests.25 His work in the „laboratory‟ of 
Nuremberg began – by his own admission – with a fear that individuals with very 
similar psychological traits to the prisoners could threaten the survival of American 
democracy. His conclusions suggested that, rather than there being any pathological 
characteristics particular to his subjects at Nuremberg, all that made them unique, 
and all that they shared in common, were the historical circumstances under which 
they had acted.26 Various observers echoed the conclusion that most of the Nazi 
leaders were not particularly special – not only during the trial, but also long after it. 
Years later (in 1972) the British chief prosecutor, Hartley Shawcross, recalled that most 
of the defendants would not have seemed out of place on the Clapham Omnibus.27 
His point was that most of them were „average‟, not particularly impressive.28 It was 
also several years after the trial that, more controversially and troubling, Hannah 
Arendt had described Adolph Eichmann (tried in Israel in 1961) as „normal‟, a man 
who was driven, not by ideology or racism, but only by a desire to succeed in his 
career by pleasing his superiors.29 Her observations seemed just as applicable to some 
of the defendants at the IMT. They reflected Kelley‟s anxiety at Nuremberg that 
begged the question: How different are we (Americans) from the Nazis?. 
There were, however, two or three defendants that would have seemed out of 
place on any London bus or in almost any setting in the autumn of 1945 – besides the 
                                                     
22 Ibid., p. 24. 
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26 Ibid. 
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Palace of Justice in Nuremberg. The clinicians, lawyers and reporters viewed Hermann 
Göring as an „outstanding personality‟ with a penchant for dramatic gestures.30 
Several of the Nazi prisoners themselves shunned contact with Julius Streicher who, 
according to Gilbert, had a „lewd and perverted mentality‟ despite being legally 
sane.31 And many observers thought Rudolf Hess was, indeed, simply „insane‟.32 An 
American soldier who had been present during Hess‟ first interrogation at Nuremberg 
related to Stuart Schulberg (working for the Documentary Evidence Section) that 
when his interrogators mentioned Russia „he leaped from his chair and began 
screaming incoherently‟.33  As Schulberg wrote home, „They never calmed him down 
after that, and he was finally led off to his cell in a condition just short of epilepsy, 
shrieking about the Russian barbarians‟.34 To Gilbert, Hess was, without doubt, „the 
chief candidate for a mental examination‟.35 
In 1941, perhaps feeling a little neglected by his Fuehrer, Hess had flown to 
Scotland on an unauthorised „diplomatic mission‟ hoping to make peace between 
Germany and Britain (in preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union). Yet he was 
astonished to discover that the British refused to take his peace plans seriously (or take 
them to the King) and, instead, sent him to a cell in the Tower of London – where he 
stayed until he was moved to Nuremberg in October 1945. Hitler and the Allies 
concurred in one respect: Hess had „taken leave of his senses‟.36 He did not appear 
to have regained them by the time he reached Nuremberg. What made his 
interrogations and examinations difficult for the Allies was that he appeared to have 
lost his memory. To nearly every question that anyone put to him regarding his past 
there came the same reply: „I cannot remember‟.37 There was considerable doubt 
amongst the lawyers and interrogators as to whether or not Hess was faking his 
amnesia – and, if he was, how to catch him out. Goering was put into a room with 
him (they were left alone for hours but their conversation was recorded), and asked 
him several personal questions. He also attempted to remind Hess of experiences they 
had shared. But the Reichsmarshall could not revive Hess‟ memory any better than his 
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jailers could – Hess behaved as though he had never met Goering before.38 
Kelley felt, without offering much explanation, that „with people like Hess‟ the 
Rorschach test was particularly useful. Luckily, for Kelley, the prisoner was „quite 
cooperative‟.39 After conducting the test, Kelley diagnosed Hess as suffering from „a 
true psychoneurosis, primarily of the hysterical type, engrafted on a basic paranoid 
and schizoid personality, with an amnesia, partly genuine and partly feigned‟.40 He 
informed Jackson of the results, stating that Hess was partially „malingering‟.41 Three 
other American psychiatrists, together with three Russian, a French, and three British 
clinicians subsequently examined Hess and confirmed Kelley‟s diagnosis.42 Kelley 
sought Jackson‟s permission to administer certain drugs that would assist hypnosis in 
his attempt to break the amnesia. But Jackson demurred, concerned that such a 
procedure might later be used by Hess or any sympathisers as an explanation for any 
decline in the health of the „balmy exhibitionist‟.43 Yet the problem remained as to 
what to do to break Hess‟ (genuine and/or fake) amnesia. „We finally decided,‟ 
recalled Jackson, „on another experiment to see if we could bring back his 
memory‟.44 
On Thursday 8th November 1945, Hess was brought to a film-projection room in the 
Palace of Justice and seated towards the back, facing the screen. There were 
approximately twenty other people present: psychiatrists, psychologists, medical 
doctors and members of the American Prosecution – including senior figures such as 
Jackson and William Donovan.45 Hess would be shown some of Leni Riefenstahl‟s 
Triumph of the Will, including a scene in which the Rudolf Hess of 1934, opening the 
proceedings, screamed praise and allegiance to his Fuehrer.46 
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But before the film was shown, arrangements were made - „by the psychiatrists‟, 
according to Jackson – to ensure that when the main lights were switched off (so that 
the film would be viewable on the screen) Hess would be lit from below.47 He was, 
therefore, visible to all observers in the room. There was considerable excitement as to 
how he would react to eleven-year-old images and sounds of himself. As Lt. James B. 
Donovan put it: „I wonder what will go through his mind when he sees [the film]. [... I] 
am going to sit there and just watch his reactions‟.48 Lt. Donovan felt sure, 
beforehand, that Hess was faking his amnesia and, without stating exactly how, 
hoped the film would unravel his act.49 As Jackson recalled, it appeared, at first, to 
work, but only before disappointing the observers in the room: 
Rudol[f] Hess watched Rudol[f] Hess [in the] Sportspalast where the proceeding [of 
the Nazi Party Congress] was in session. At first we thought that the picture had 
awakened his memories. He leaned forward and looked at it intently. The martial 
music seemed to stir him. Then in a minute he settled back and took no more 
notice of the film. It finished and then the psychiatrists [and psychologists] at-
tempted to talk to him about what he had seen. He claimed that he didn‟t 
remember anything about it. Our experiment produced no changed attitude 
whatever.50 
Nevertheless, Lt. Donovan described it as the most fascinating event he had ever 
attended. Looking back and forth between the screen and the prisoner was a 
„terrific‟ experience. But he was no longer so sure that Hess was faking his amnesia – 
that was „terribly difficult to figure out‟.51 As Stuart Schulberg noted: 
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F I G U R E  1 ,  A / B :   A window on a past that Hess would rather everyone forgot: The American team of 
lawyers, psychiatrists and psychologist show Hess, the Nuremberg „Major War Criminal‟ of November 
1945, scenes from Triumph of the Will (Dir: Leni Riefenstahl, 1935). As the Deputy of the Third Reich, Hess 
can be seen opening the 6th Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg in 1934.  
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Col. Amen, [...] and the psychiatrists [and psychologists] who are working with 
Hess, hoped he would give himself away under the shock of seeing himself in 
action. They hoped he would give some clue that his amnesia is a fraud by which 
he hopes to escape heavy punishment. The experiment was a failure. Hess per-
formed brilliantly – if he is faking – and gave a perfect imitation of a man who has 
truly lost his memory.52 
The „performance‟ continued when the trial was under way. On the 30th November, 
the court was cleared of visitors and all other defendants in order to discuss Hess‟ 
mental state so that the Tribunal could judge whether or not he was fit to stand trial. 
Dr. Von Rohrscheidt, his defence counsel, claimed that he was not.53 But Jackson, 
basing his arguments on psychiatric reports already quoted to the Tribunal, asserted 
that „[h]e is in the volunteer class with his amnesia‟.54 When Hess‟ chance finally came 
to address the court directly, he resolved the Tribunal‟s dilemma: 
Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world. The reasons for 
simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature. Only my ability to concentrate 
is, in fact, somewhat reduced. My capacity to follow the trial, to defend myself, to 
put questions to witnesses, or to answer questions myself is not affected thereby.55 
Despite the dramatic courtroom confession, Kelley still believed that Hess‟ amnesia 
had not been entirely false and that his memory, in some respects, was still cloudy. 
Contrary to Hess‟ reasoning, Kelley felt, there had been little to gain from any 
pretence. As Kelley recalled, it only made the preparation of his defence much more 
difficult.56 He viewed Hess‟ admission in court as a „dramatic, hysterical gesture‟ 
designed to disguise from others the deficiencies of his mind.57 He also believed that 
showing Hess the film, an experiment that appeared to have failed at the time it was 
conducted, had produced some effect on the subject. When he asked Hess if he 
recalled viewing the film, the prisoner‟s memory (now) appeared to be working: 
Yes, I remember [...] when the pictures were shown. I thought then that you knew I 
was pretending. All the time you looked only at my hands. It made me very 
nervous to know you had learned my secret.58 
Kelley had been convinced that, as Hess watched the screen, he had remembered 
more than he would admit. Kelley had stared at Hess‟ hands „in a deliberate effort to 
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make him crack‟.59 Whilst Hess was well practiced in „keeping a straight face‟, Kelley 
believed that he displayed nervousness by tightening his fingers – a symptom that 
could be observed whilst the film played. When it had finished, Hess had attempted 
to avoid speaking to Kelley as much as possible.60 For Kelley, at least in hindsight, this 
all suggested that there was some value in the experiment. Whether Kelley‟s belief in 
the possibility of detecting Hess‟ nervousness was reliable or not, it is clear that he 
believed, as with the Rorschach inkblot test, that the form of Hess‟ reactions were 
worth noting carefully. Kelley would have an opportunity in court to take part in similar 
experiments when the American Prosecution would present film as evidence to the 
Tribunal. 
 
 
5.2. Film as Courtroom Evidence 
The use of film in courtroom proceedings was not new for Americans. Most of the first 
motion pictures presented as evidence in domestic US courts – from approximately 
1915 onwards – had been used in personal injury cases.61 They were particularly useful 
for plaintiffs who hoped to demonstrate a previous ability to perform activities that 
were no longer possible, or, more commonly, against „malingerers‟ who, professing to 
be immobilized after a real or invented accident, were shown to be more agile than 
they claimed.62 From the earliest of these cases, jurists understood film as a form of 
witnessing that, once authenticated by a living, breathing witness (preferably the 
camera operator who would confirm that the film reflected a „true likeness‟ to the 
events seen with his/her own eyes), was usually accepted by a court as being 
admissible (if having legitimate, relevant and „probative‟ value). A standard 
American legal handbook, updated and republished in 1944, summarized the value 
of film as evidence for any municipal court: 
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A sound moving picture, if offered in evidence, raise[s] questions somewhat 
unusual, yet not difficult of solution, if the character of the film [...] as a witness be 
kept in mind. The human witness describes in his testimony what he has seen or 
heard, if it be relevant and material. A [...] film performs the same service. In the 
former case, the record was made on the brain, in the latter on the film. The latter 
may be even more accurate than the former. Thus subject to competency being 
first established there is no reason why the film should not be heard as well as seen 
as to any matters relevant and material to the issues.63 
That a film could be „more accurate‟ than a live witness implied that there was 
potential for greater „objectivity‟ with film than with the subjective human brain. 
Nevertheless, as this was not always the case, then judges‟ willingness to admit 
filmic evidence suggested that they deemed it capable of providing something 
qualitatively different from oral testimony. To avoid being classed as merely 
cumulative, filmic evidence would need to provide information that added detail to 
a process or event that was more difficult (or perhaps impossible) to convey with 
words alone. If a judge deemed a particular film to be “dramatic” or „gruesome‟, this 
needed to be weighed against its „probative value‟ in determining its admissibility. But 
judges never rejected the use of film simply for the reason of it being film.64 By 1945, 
therefore, the use of motion-picture film – primarily viewed as a form of witnessing – 
was not new to American jurists. All the framers of the London Charter (American or 
otherwise) saw no need to declare explicitly that it should be admissible at the IMT. 
Instead, Article 19 of the Charter addressed the issue of accepting various forms of 
evidence (including film) in a very general manner, handing powers of discretion 
entirely to the judges of the court: 
The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and 
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, 
and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.65 
If the judges themselves viewed any particular filmic evidence as a valid form of 
witnessing (or, indeed, valid in providing proof of anything relevant to the trial) it 
would be legally valid according to the London Charter. 
Jurists since Nuremberg have continued to characterise film, primarily, as a form of 
witnessing – albeit with a much more critical eye regarding any attribution of 
„objectivity‟ to the camera‟s lens.66  This is true of relatively recent scholarship 
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concerned with film at Nuremberg and in other international criminal courts. Christian 
Delage has provided insightful discussions of film used at Nuremberg and credits filmic 
evidence with a „double ability to prove and to testify‟.67 Lawrence Douglas has, 
perhaps, provided the most enlightening treatment of filmic evidence of atrocities at 
Nuremberg in an article entitled „Film as Witness‟ which highlights the manner in which 
the American Prosecution presented the now well-known images of concentration 
camps discovered by Allied troops (in the west of Germany towards the end of the 
war).68 He addresses the question of just what Nazi Concentration Camps, the most 
significant film presented as evidence of conspiracy to commit Crimes Against 
Humanity, was a witness to – and what, exactly, it attempted to prove. He points out 
that, although it was used to represent the Holocaust in trials after Nuremberg, this is 
not how the American Prosecution (or the filmmakers at the camps) understood it in 
1945. They used the film, Douglas observes, to represent the excesses of militarism, the 
annihilation of political opposition (real and mostly imagined by the Nazis) rather than 
an example of the specific Nazi project of murdering all Jews within occupied Europe. 
Douglas demonstrates how the American Prosecution was driven by the aim of 
marrying unprecedented images of atrocity with a legal case that emphasised, more 
than anything else, the crime of „aggressive war‟.69 As we have already seen, War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity were viewed by Jackson as offshoots of the 
supreme crime of Conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Peace. Thus, Nazi 
Concentration Camps, presented a particular narrative of atrocity that was shaped 
by, and fitted well, the American Prosecution‟s overall legal vision. 
The images of the „liberated‟ western concentration camps that appeared in the 
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courtroom did conform to the classic legal view of film-as-witness. They represented a 
(partial) likeness to what filmmakers had seen as their cameras recorded the scenes. 
The camera (and sound) operators made written notes of the circumstances they 
perceived that they could not record with their filmmaking equipment. These notes 
were used „directly‟ (i.e. without modification but, of course, through a process of 
selection) in the creation of an audible narration that accompanied the visual 
narrative within Nazi Concentration Camps.70 One of the directors of photography, 
George Stevens, provided the American Prosecution with an affidavit attesting to the 
authenticity of these images.71 
Yet whilst American jurists generally understood film as a form of witnessing, the 
American Prosecution at Nuremberg also used it as both less and more than that. As 
we have already seen, problems were encountered with live witnesses that became 
apparent as the trial began. To recall, there were two significant practical problems 
with the use of living Prosecution witnesses.72 One was the potential for lengthy and 
multiple cross-examinations by the Defence which threatened to prolong the duration 
of the trial considerably. The other was the opportunity that each cross-examination 
of a witness would provide to the Defence for widening the scope of issues to be 
investigated – including topics that might help certain defendants. The Prosecution 
eradicated these problems with the use of film. 
Unlike living witnesses, using film enabled the Prosecution to deliver a complete 
and controlled narrative in the time it took to project it - without interjections from the 
Tribunal or objections from the Defence which would have to wait until after it finished 
running. (The Defence, however, did not object, in principle, to the use of film at the 
IMT). It was, of course, impossible to cross-examine Nazi Concentration Camps after it 
was shown. What made matters worse for the Defence is that the film‟s principle 
director of photography – authenticating, via the use of an affidavit, its true likeness 
to the conditions witnessed by the filmmakers – was not available for cross-
examination.73 The use of the film, when understood simply as a form of witnessing, 
therefore, conformed to the definition of hearsay – an „atrocious use of evidence,‟ 
suggests Susan Twist, who judges the laws of the London Charter and the proceedings 
at the IMT by English/Welsh legal standards of the twenty-first century.74 
Jurists in 1945, however, commonly understood that the single most significant 
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reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in common-law jurisdictions related to 
the problem that jurors were unqualified to assess the reliability of such evidence 
(many jurists still see this as the primary reason for excluding hearsay evidence).75 But 
this did not apply to the continental system of law where the only „triers of facts‟ were 
judges.76 As Jackson put it in response to the Defence‟s objection to the use of 
affidavits (rather than having those that authored the affidavits available for cross-
examination): 
[...] the [London] Charter sets up only two standards by which any evidence [...] 
may be rejected. The first is that evidence must be relevant to the issue. The 
second is that it must have some probative value. That was made mandatory 
upon this Tribunal in Article 19 because of the difficulty of ever trying this case if we 
used the technical rules of Common Law proof. [...] We have no jury. There is no 
occasion for applying jury rules.77 
Thus, the „relaxed‟ rules of evidence (as Douglas puts it) specified in Article 19 of 
the London Charter were only „relaxed‟ from an Anglo-American perspective: they 
reflected continental European legal standards instead, where the rules of evidence 
were far less stringent.78 In keeping with continental rules, Article 17 of the Charter 
gave the Tribunal powers to summon witnesses itself for any reason it saw fit – such as, 
for example, to determine the value of any particular affidavit or hearsay evidence.79 
As Jackson was keen to point out to the Tribunal, this (along with other rules) 
represented a reluctant American concession to continental negotiators of the 
London Charter.80 It was the judges, therefore, who would decide upon the probative 
value and fairness of any evidence, including hearsay evidence and including film. By 
the end of the first week of the trial, the defendants expressed their feelings that the 
Tribunal, presided over by Lord Justice Lawrence, was doing its very best to be fair to 
them.81 
However, Twist has implied that justice was not served by the use of film at 
Nuremberg because images of atrocities, in addition to constituting hearsay, proved 
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76 For a critique of John Wigmore‟s theory of hearsay evidence – based only on a concern with common 
law practice where the only „triers of facts‟ were juries – see: Koch, 'The Hearsay Rule's True Raison 
D'Être,' pp. 253-254. 
77 IMT, 14/Dec/1945, Vol. III, p. 543.  
78 Douglas, 'Film as Witness,' p. 466. 
79 IMT, Vol. I, p. 14. 
80 IMT, 14/Dec/1945, Vol. III, pp. 545-546. 
81 Major Kelley to General Donovan, Memorandum, 27/Nov/1945. Cornell/WJDP/XIX/61.04. 
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little more about the defendants than that they were capable of being horrified – as 
too, implies Twist, were the judges who, being human, were also susceptible, like 
jurors, to the effects of viewing unprecedented images of inhumanity: 
[...] did the film [Nazi Concentration Camps] establish a direct link between the 
Defendants and the acts it sought to depict? Ultimately, from a strictly evidential 
perspective, was its use therefore gratuitous?82 
Nazi Concentration Camps was certainly gruesome and, as a member of the 
American Prosecution admitted, did not establish a direct link between the behaviour 
of the defendants and the scenes portrayed.83 But the connection Twist draws 
between individual culpability and the „gratuitous‟ nature of the images is a false 
dichotomy, and her assertion that it is difficult to justify use of the film „from a strictly 
evidential perspective‟ presumes that the acceptance of hearsay evidence, or that 
which is gruesome, is necessarily in conflict with legal principles.84 Yet nowhere did the 
Prosecution imply that individual culpability could be demonstrated from the films‟ 
content alone. And neither was the film shown merely in order to horrify the judges. It 
was used as demonstrative (rather than substantive) evidence for the purpose of 
illustrating the significance of a horrific, criminal, institution seen by the Prosecution as 
a result of a „conspiracy‟ which necessarily contemplated such horrors. 
Film was not the only form of demonstrative evidence used by the American 
Prosecution. It also presented charts and other graphics in order to clarify the 
structure and functioning of the Nazi state. The Stroop report, with photographs, 
statistics and commentary, was used to illustrate the nature of „the Persecution of the 
Jews‟85. In a similar manner, the presentation of Nazi Concentration Camps, declared 
Mr. Dodd for the Prosecution, was designed to illustrate what the words „concentra-
tion camp‟ signified: 
This is by no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to 
the subject of concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a 
brief and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words "concentration 
camp" imply.86 
Once this demonstrative evidence was submitted, individual culpability would be 
proved later with numerous documents – the substantive evidence – relating to 
concentration camps in separate presentations specifically concerned with each of 
                                                     
82 Twist, 'Evidence of Atrocities or Atrocious Use of Evidence,' p. 288. 
83 Taylor, Anatomy, p. 187. Taylor, however, played no part in the preparation or presentation of any film, 
nor any presentations related to concentration camps at the IMT. He is therefore not an ideal source for 
determining the American Prosecution‟s aims and methods in relation to the use of film. 
84 Twist, 'Evidence of Atrocities or Atrocious Use of Evidence,' p. 289. 
85 See Chapter 6, p. 182 (including note 10). 
86 IMT, 29/Nov/1945, Vol. II, p. 431. (Emphasis added). 
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the individuals in the dock. For example, as part of the case against Ernst Kaltenbrun-
ner, the Prosecution made a direct connection between his various (criminal) 
activities and several concentration camps, including Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, 
Dachau, Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück.87 
This substantial volume of evidence included his orders for civilians and prisoners of 
war to be sent to these camps, as well as orders to murder some of them. The 
Prosecution also provided evidence of his visits to Mauthausen including one 
occasion during which he observed the killing of inmates by gas.88 
The film was relevant to the Americans‟ conspiracy charge because it related 
activities, such as torture, that had occurred whilst Kaltenbrunner had held the 
second most significant position of responsibility for the entire network of concentra-
tion camps (second to Himmler). As we have seen in Chapter 3, one of the purposes 
of applying the doctrine of conspiracy was to hold superiors personally responsible for 
the criminal actions of their subordinates. To prove the occurrence of criminal 
activities in the camps, and to demonstrate that Kaltenbrunner was in a position of 
leadership (or „responsibility‟) would have been enough to satisfy the requirements of 
conspiracy and personal culpability as outlined in Article 6 of the London Charter.89 
But the Prosecution also demonstrated that Kaltenbrunner was directly responsible for 
ordering the „liquidation‟ of certain concentration camps due to his concern that 
they would be discovered by approaching Allied armies.90 Among his several crimes 
towards the very end of the war, Kaltenbrunner had ordered the entire surviving 
inmates of a Jewish camp at Landsberg to be marched to Dachau.91 He had 
intended for them to be murdered there (or, when this became impractical, to march 
them to Tyrol and have them killed there) so that the only remaining inmates of 
Dachau would be „Aryan nationals of the Western Powers‟.92 But in the chaos of the 
closing days of the war this plan was not implemented.93 Thus the scenes of Dachau 
in the film were, in part, a direct result of Kaltenbrunner‟s orders and activities – the 
camp was overcrowded with prisoners from other camps that were being shut down. 
As demonstrative, hearsay evidence, combined with the subsequent use of 
substantive evidence, justice was, therefore, served very well with the screening of 
Nazi Concentration Camps. Furthermore, words, by themselves (in documents or from 
                                                     
87 IMT, 2/Jan/1945, Vol. IV, pp. 295-302. 
88 Ibid., pp. 296-297. 
89 See Appendix I. 
90 IMT, 2/Jan/1945, Vol. IV, p. 306. 
91 Ibid., p. 307 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 308 
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witnesses), could not have conveyed the depths of injustice (and criminality) of the 
camps. But, combined with the use of documents, the film made a very strong case 
against Kaltenbrunner and others. 
There is another reason why the use of film and documents worked so well 
together. This is because, although the American Prosecution used films as a form of 
witnessing, it also treated them, as much as possible, like documents. Helen Lennon, 
also classifying the use of film at Nuremberg primarily as a form of witnessing, has 
emphasised the problem of representing such (visual) evidence in an official record 
that is purely textual.94 All that was encompassed within a film at Nuremberg was 
reduced, in the transcript, to the brief and parenthetical statement, „[The film was 
then shown]‟.95 Yet, whilst this appears to be a problem with the official transcript of 
Nuremberg, the American Prosecution ensured that the full record of the trial would 
include transcriptions of films as part of the documentary record. Thus, in addition to 
the publication of the daily proceedings (in 21 volumes), transcriptions of the films 
appeared together with all relevant written evidence in the accompanying 18 large 
volumes of the officially published record. Films were assigned document numbers 
which were cited in court and could (and can) be used to refer to authenticating 
documents as well as narration-transcriptions and descriptions of scenes.96 
Furthermore, the American Prosecution made their films to look like documents in a 
literal sense. There were three films shown by the Americans as part of the conspiracy 
case presented during the first weeks of the trial (before the British97, Soviets and 
French presented their own cases98). The first two – Nazi Concentration Camps and 
The Nazi Plan – began with a narrator reading affidavits attesting to the authenticity 
of the images that would follow (for the third, fragile film, Original 8mm film of 
Atrocities against Jews, this method was impractical).99 This audio was accompanied 
                                                     
94 Helen Lennon, 'A Witness to Atrocity: Film as Evidence in International War Crimes Tribunals' in Toby 
Haggith and Joanna Newman (eds.), Holocaust and the Moving Image: Representations in Film and 
Television since 1933 (London; New York: Wallflower Press, 2005), pp. 65-73. Lennon‟s chapter sits within a 
section entitled „Film as Witness‟ and her research deals with other international criminal trials that took 
place during the 20th century. 
95 Ibid., p. 70. 
96 See Appendix 1. 
97 To be precise, the British presented evidence before the Americans had finished their case. But by this 
time, the Americans had already projected the three films as part of the conspiracy case. For a list of all 
films presented at the trial, see Appendix 1. 
98 The Americans decided to use two more films at a later stage in the proceedings (after they had 
already presented their conspiracy case). These were: German newsreel of Hitler’s arrival from France 
and Reichsbank Loot. For the content of Reichsbank Loot, see Chapter 6, p. 191. For a list of all films 
presented at the trial, see Appendix 1. 
99 James B. Donovan implied that the Prosecution wished to project the original 8-millimetre film (silent and 
„captured‟, i.e. German-made) for reasons of authenticity. Another probable factor in the decision not 
to provide an edited version with narration and on-screen affidavits is that the film was so delicate and 
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by slowly scrolling images of the written affidavits themselves – an entirely novel 
method of presenting filmic evidence to a court.100 It was novel because, given the 
legal logic of film as witness, it was entirely redundant: the very method of 
authenticating a filmic witness was to provide a living being (i.e. external to the film) 
who could vouch for its authenticity and likeness to „reality‟. But the film was treated 
by the Prosecution to be a witness attesting to the authenticity of itself.101 Since the 
Prosecution held, and presented to the Tribunal, the original affidavits, their 
appearance on the screen was unnecessary. Nevertheless, despite the novelty of this 
approach, images of documents on the screen implied that film was not radically 
different to the bulk of evidence upon which the case was based – a roomful of 
documents. The films, therefore, were understood not only as a form of witnessing, but 
also as having documentary value – a description that happens to match the first use, 
in the English language, of the term „documentary‟ as applied to a genre of film.102 In 
this sense, despite the fact that only Nazi Concentration Camps was explicitly 
introduced to the Tribunal as a „documentary film,‟ all films presented by the 
American Prosecution were „documentaries‟ – mostly appearing in what Bill Nichols 
would class as the „expository mode‟ – with some having greater „documentary 
value‟ than others.103 
 
 
5.3. Inside Nazi Concentration Camps 
Nazi Concentration Camps was the first film presented as evidence by the American 
Prosecution at Nuremberg.104 Members of the Field Photographic Branch (FPB) of the 
OSS, working for the American Prosecution, constructed (edited) it, including an 
audible narration. Lasting just under an hour, it showed a sequence of crime scenes – 
mostly concentration camps – discovered by British and (mostly) American troops as 
they invaded Germany from the west.105 After the images of authenticating 
documents (noted above), it began with a simple map of Europe upon which were 
                                                                                                                                                           
damaged that it could not be safely reproduced. It was, however, duplicated after being used as 
evidence. IMT, 13/Dec/1945, Vol. III, p. 536. NARA/RG-238.7, ARC 43456. 
100 Douglas, 'Film as Witness,' p. 446. 
101 This point is also made in: Ibid., pp. 465-466. 
102 John Grierson & Forsyth Hardy, Grierson on Documentary (Revised ed.) (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1966), p. 13. 
103 IMT, 29/Nov/1945, Vol. II, p. 431; Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 34-38. Douglas also refers to Nazi Concentration 
Camps as a „documentary‟ and explains that its makers aspired to represent atrocities in what has 
subsequently been theorised as the „realist‟ mode. Douglas, 'Film as Witness,' p. 470. 
104 For a list of all films presented as evidence at the trial, see Appendix 1. 
105 PS-2430 (Exhibit E), IMT, Vol. XXX, pp. 462-472. For a list of the sites, see note 107 below. 
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quickly overlaid, in succession, the names of approximately 90 camps (see Figure 2). 
As the narrator explained, „This film report, covering a representative group of such 
camps, illustrates the general conditions which prevailed‟.106 
 
With this use of graphics, it was already clear that the scale of Nazi injustice was 
impossible to convey comprehensively – all that the filmmakers attempted was to 
offer „representative‟ examples. The film would focus on only twelve sites.107 Much of 
the footage appearing throughout was sourced from the work of U.S. Signal Corps 
(SC) crews that had been directed by SHAEF to make the filming of atrocities and 
concentration camps „a top priority‟ – „above the priority of combat photography‟.108 
Whilst SHAEF-command and members of the U.S. War Department intended such 
filming to assist the prosecution of future war crimes trials, there were, in fact, several 
reasons for filming specified in their communications. As a Signal Corps colonel 
summarized on 25th April 1945: 
This film will be used for the following purposes: 
 
a. Evidence for [the office of] Judge Advocate General [...]. 
b. Showing to U.S. troops. 
c. Possible release in civilian theatres in the US. 
d. Showing [...] to German civilians. 
e. [For release] by [the] Office of War Information.109 
Filming would provide evidence of war crimes to the (military) office of the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), for use, envisaged by JAG at this stage, in running (only) 
traditional war crimes trials. As with domestic criminal trials, the first prerequisite to 
conducting war crimes trials was to have custody of one or more „perpetrators‟  of 
                                                     
106 Ibid., p. 462 
107 The twelve examples were (in order of appearance): Leipzig, Penig, Ohrdruf, Hadamar, Breendonck, 
Hannover (Harlan), Arnstadt, Nordhausen, Mauthausen, Buchenwald, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen. Not 
all of these sites were concentration camps: Hadamar was a „Nazi institution [...] under the guise of an 
insane asylum‟; Breendonck was a Belgian fort-turned Nazi prison. PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, pp. 464-465. 
108 Col. K. B. Lawton, Signal Corps to Signal Corps Officer, 6th/12th Army Unit/Special Motion Picture 
Coverage Unit, 25/Apr/1945, NARA/RG-226/148/73/1038. A significant portion was shot by British camera 
crews – for example, at Bergen-Belsen. 
109 Ibid. 
 
F I G U R E  2 ,  A / B / C :   The opening scene of Nazi Concentration Camps (after images of 
authenticating documentation). There are too many names, appearing too quickly, for the viewer to 
read most of them – effectively portraying the massive scale of Nazi injustice. 
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crime. This would, of course, also be necessary in conducting an international criminal 
trial with civilian judges (which, despite its name, is what occurred at the Nuremberg 
International „Military‟ Tribunal).110 But, in contrast to the IMT, the (truly) military-run war 
crimes trials envisaged by JAG were only aimed at judging individuals who had 
directly perpetrated „war crimes‟ against their victims – including those in 
concentration camps. Allied troops captured several of these perpetrators – camp 
guards, as well as commanders. Their very presence at the camps constituted strong 
evidence against them: a knowledge, at the very least, of the conditions in which 
(their) victims had lived and died.111 And so they were filmed. 
 
When it came to editing this footage for use at Nuremberg, however, more important 
than showing local perpetrators was the Prosecution‟s attempt to demonstrate the 
results of an overall conspiracy that contemplated the horrors of the camps – a 
conspiracy led by the leaders who would sit in the dock at Nuremberg. Featuring only 
twelve sites permitted the editors to portray – to the degree that was possible112 – the 
depth of suffering, past and present, that Allied troops had discovered upon 
„liberation‟. The first concentration camp to appear in the film was near Leipzig. The 
narrator told of the murder, by SS troopers and a Gestapo agent, of Russian, Czech, 
Polish and French inmates – just before Allied troops reached the camp. The 
accompanying images were horrific, including close-ups of murdered prisoners who 
had been burned alive, shot, or electrocuted by the camp-fence in their attempt to 
escape the killing. There were many more horrific images to come: the film as a whole 
was full of images of dead victims. But such images provided little legal proof by 
                                                     
110 Of the eight judges at the IMT, however, the two Russians held military rank – and wore military uniforms. 
111 This point was made, for example, by judges in both the Dachau and Mauthausen military trials. See: 
UNWCC, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, (15 vols.), (London: H.M.S.O., 1947-49), Vol. XI, p. 15. 
112 There are, of course, limits to representing the reality of the Holocaust and, more generally, atrocities or 
any events entailing immeasurable trauma. With regard to film, see: Libby Saxton, Haunted Images: Film, 
Ethics, Testimony and the Holocaust (London; New York: Wallflower, 2008). In relation to the writing of 
history, see: Saul Friedländer, (ed.), Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution", 
(Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
 
F I G U R E  3 ,  A / B / C :   Perpetrators before the cameras in Nazi Concentration Camps. The Director of 
Hadamar‟s murderous „medical‟ institution, Dr. Waldman, is questioned by an American soldier before 
being led away. Josef Kramer, the commander of Belsen concentration camp, is taken into custody 
whilst a British soldier has his gun at the ready. Female guards at Belsen are marched out of their 
barracks and forced to bury the dead. 
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themselves. Instead, they communicated a sense of horror and a profound sense of 
injustice. 
There were, however, many pictures of survivors too – several were emaciated and 
near death themselves. Some showed their wounds – the results of torture. Others, 
who were able and willing, demonstrated the various methods of torture that their 
Nazi guards had used on them and their fellow prisoners. At Breendonck, Belgium (a 
prison-fort rather than a „camp‟), ex-prisoners re-enacted the Nazi use of barbed-wire 
sticks and other torture devices, including the use of chains which had been wrapped 
around victims before „apply[ing] the tourniquet‟ (see Figure 4).113 A thumb-screw 
that had been used by the torturers was „Berlin-made‟ – suggesting evidence of a 
pre-determined effort and organized collaboration in cruelty. 
 
Such reconstructions demonstrated that, in some instances, Allied camera crews 
attempted to make more than simple records of what they discovered at first-
hand.114 Some other scenes appearing in Nazi Concentration Camps featured 
survivors whom the filmmakers asked to pose for the cameras. Furthermore, the editors 
included two interviews of survivors (with sound). For just over three minutes, a 
woman, speaking in German, told of the horrors of Bergen-Belsen. Without much 
explanation, the film‟s narrator stated that this doctor, as a prisoner, had been placed 
in charge of the female section of the concentration camp. He translated what she 
said: there had been a typhus epidemic, people had starved to death, and some of 
the men had resorted to cannibalism. She also described how, when Red Cross 
shipments of food finally began to arrive during the last days of German control, the 
commandant and SS men kept most of the supplies for themselves. Finally, she spoke 
of „medical experiments‟ that Nazi doctors had conducted at the camp. She 
concluded by stating that „pretty‟ (schöne) nineteen-year-old girls had been selected 
                                                     
113 PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 465. 
114 Breendonck was liberated by the British on 4th September 1944. Some survivors were filmed (showing 
their wounds) in city locations (presumably in Antwerp and/or Brussels). 
 
F I G U R E  4 ,  A / B / C :   Reconstruction: survivors of Breendonck, Belgium, with help from British 
filmmakers, demonstrate, for the cameras, how their fellow-inmates were tortured: a barbed wire stick 
(a), chains that were slowly tightened (b), and a thumbscrew, „Berlin-made‟ (c). 
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for sterilization and „other gynaecological experiments‟.115 The narrator, however, did 
not provide a complete translation – so that the woman‟s description of the victims 
(as „pretty‟) was excluded. Since much of her original German was inaudible – due to 
the narrator‟s overdubbed English – it was difficult for any viewer to identify what else 
may have been lost in translation. Given that the film was edited and narrated for the 
specific purpose of providing evidence in a courtroom, it is surprising that a verbatim 
translation was not provided. Yet enough of her original German was audible to 
recognize that, whilst details or subtleties may have been lost, the narration was 
essentially faithful to what she had said.116 Nevertheless, that the editors of Nazi 
Concentration Camps felt entitled to exclude words from the original German 
demonstrates that adherence to legal convention did not always take precedence 
over their desire to provide a narrative in accordance with what they deemed 
suitable or relevant in portraying injustice on the screen.117 Also missing from the film 
was any information relating to the identity of this witness – information that would 
have been appropriate for a Tribunal to know. 
To viewers unfamiliar with the sound of German speech, this woman may have 
appeared to be German herself. This would have suggested that Germans too had 
suffered the injustices of the camps – and that the editors of Nazi Concentration 
Camps wished to make this point. In fact, her accent and pronunciation may have 
suggested to a perceptive viewer that, perhaps, she originated somewhere further 
eastwards. However, the narrator did not divulge the nationality of this witness (which 
would have clarified the significant point that she was not German). Despite the 
probability that uninformed viewers would have perceived her to be German, neither 
the British cameramen, nor the American editors of Nazi Concentration Camps, 
intended to provide evidence of any German victims of the camps: throughout the 
entire hour-long film, there was only one mention of „German Jews and German 
political prisoners‟ who had suffered (in Ohrdruf concentration camp, in addition to 
„Poles, Czechs, Russians, Belgians, [and] Frenchmen‟).118 The only mention of Jewish 
victims, therefore, was combined with the only mention of German ones, reflecting 
what Tony Kushner has characterised as the universalism of the „liberal imagination‟ in 
                                                     
115 PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 471. 
116 This can be confirmed by listening to the original recording held at the Imperial War Museum, UK: 
IWM/Film/A70 514-97. 
117 I have discovered no conclusive evidence as to why the narration excluded the description of female 
victims as „pretty‟. The woman‟s use of this description implied a particularly cynical Nazi cruelty, even if 
some „scientific‟ Nazi method lay behind such selection. It would, therefore, have helped in portraying a 
particular aspect to Nazi injustice. Yet, either this point may have been lost on the filmmakers, or they 
may have considered it as distasteful or irrelevant. 
118 PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 464. 
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which the only particularism deemed noteworthy by the liberators of the camps was 
nationality.119 
In fact, this woman was Hadassah Bimko, a 32 year-old Jewish dentist from Poland 
(see Figure 5-a).120 That the filmmakers repeatedly referred to the nationality of other 
victims of the camps (including Poles) suggests that they did not wish to conceal her 
nationality. But the fact that she was Jewish suggests a reason for the filmmakers to 
avoid the issue of her identity altogether. Although, at the very least, half of the 
survivors at Bergen-Belsen were Jewish, it seems an understatement to say that this 
fact was downplayed by the (British) „liberators‟ and reporters of Bergen-Belsen.121 As 
Hagit Lavsky has noted after assessing various forms of British reports from the camp – 
including those recorded by camera-crews: 
[T]he total disregard by the British witnesses of any reference concerning the 
Jewish identity of the victims, or at least most of them, is astounding. Except for [a 
single instance of] testimony, all the other public testimonies completely disre-
gard[ed] the existence of Jewish prisoners and, as a matter of course, also of 
Jewish victims.122  
Before this particular footage reached the American film-editors of Nazi Concentra-
tion Camps, therefore, the Jewish identity of more than half the remaining survivors 
had already been removed from the story of Bergen-Belsen. Yet it was not just the 
British at Bergen-Belsen who (self) censored the Jewish identity of victims from their 
reports. Kushner observes the same (liberal-democratic and universalist) phenomenon 
in American reporting (including filming) of concentration camps.123 The American 
Prosecution did not attempt to censor reports of Nazi crimes that were directed 
specifically towards Jews, but from the earliest days of planning the IMT, Jackson 
himself expressed his fear that too many Jewish voices at the trial would only 
perpetuate the „racial tensions‟ that the Nazis had succeeded so well in spreading 
across Europe (as he understood it). Whilst he was quite willing to accept any 
evidence from Jewish sources, and employed „at least one‟ Jewish lawyer as part of 
his team at Nuremberg, his approach reflected the efforts of the filmmakers 
                                                     
119 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994), pp. 205-228. 
120 Hadassah (a.k.a. „Ada‟) Bimko met Josef Rosensaft, chairman of the Central Committee of Liberated 
Jews in the British zone of Germany. They married and she adopted his surname. She published her 
memoirs as: Hadassah Rosensaft, Yesterday: My Story (2nd ed.) (New York: Yad Vashem and the 
Holocaust Survivors' Memoirs Project, 2005). For a brief biography, see The Jewish Women‟s Archive 
[online], Encyclopaedia entry „Hadassah Rosensaft‟, http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/rosensaft-
hadassah (last access: 31/Aug/2010). She is identified in the cameraman‟s „dope sheet‟ (notes) as Ada 
Bimko. IMW/Film/A70 514-97/LOC 227. 
121 Hagit Lavsky, 'The Day After: Bergen-Belsen from Concentration Camp to the Centre of the Jewish 
Survivors in Germany,' German History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1993), p. 50. 
122 Ibid., p. 47. 
123 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p. 216. 
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themselves in universalising the suffering of Jews in concentration camps.124 Jackson 
had met several prominent Jewish leaders in America and Britain125 and, in answer to 
their requests to take an active role in the forthcoming trial, he had warned against 
what he viewed as the dangers of such an approach: 
I pointed out to them that what we must do was to get away from the racial 
aspects of the situation. We were prosecuting these Nazis not because they had 
killed Jews, but because they had killed men and women. We didn‟t want to 
exaggerate racial tensions. The only thing to do was to avoid making this a 
vengeance trial. [...] We tried to steer a course that would cause no greater anti-
Semitism that would eventually be taken out on the few surviving Jews in 
Europe.126 
Whilst Donald Bloxham has pointed out that Jackson succumbed to „the stereotype 
of the vengeful Jew‟ (through the mention of „a vengeance trial‟), Bloxham did not 
include the last sentence above when partly quoting from Jackson‟s recollections.127  
The American Chief Prosecutor hoped – whether one decides to commend or 
criticise his tactics – to conduct the trial without provoking further anti-Semitism in 
Europe. His comments betray the fear that anti-Semitism was widespread and not 
limited to Germans or Nazis. Furthermore, given the „racial tensions‟ closer to home, 
any American condemnation of racism had the potential to detract from the 
American Prosecution‟s moral case against Nazism. As a result, the film – edited for 
the prosecution in the weeks before the beginning of the trial – was full of images of 
Jewish victims presented as anonymous „men and women‟. 
                                                     
124 RHJ, Phillips Oral History, p. 1,207. LoC/RHJP/259/3. Jackson was probably referring to Robert Kempner 
as the one relatively seniorJewish lawyer in the Prosecution (there were other Jewish aids and 
filmmakers). Kempner headed the Defence Rebuttal Section dedicated to preparing counter 
arguments and evidence against anticipated Defence arguments and evidence. 
125 See, for example, Anonymous, „Minutes of a meeting with RHJ held at the Federal Court House, N.Y.C‟, 
12/Jun/1945. NARA/RG-238/51/14/‟Minutes of Meeting with RHJ‟. 
126 RHJ, Phillips Oral History, p. 1,205. LoC/RHJP/259/3. 
127 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 67. 
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Yet, whilst images of the anonymous dead and the testimony of an anonymous 
survivor-witness provided a striking representation of the depths of Nazi injustice 
against humanity, the editors of Nazi Concentration Camps decided, long before the 
film was completed, to include Signal Corps footage of a particular American survivor 
and witness of Mauthausen concentration camp.128 American troops and citizens 
would be able to identify with a fellow American who spoke their language and 
could relate what he had seen with his own, American, eyes. This man was Lt. Jack H. 
Taylor, „U.S. Navy, from Hollywood California,‟ as he introduced himself.129 Being a 
lieutenant of the Navy, however, was merely a nominal status which provided cover 
for his membership of the OSS – the same organization engaged in editing Nazi 
Concentration Camps for the American Prosecution.130 Taylor had been a member 
from the first days of the organisation‟s inception (in 1942) and had been captured by 
the Gestapo whilst on an OSS mission in Austria during October 1944 (he was moved 
to Mauthausen four months later).131 Whilst the film editors and members of the 
Prosecution were aware of his status, membership of the OSS remained a matter of 
secrecy long after the war.132 Taylor‟s full status was not, therefore, revealed on-
                                                     
128 Lt. James B. Donovan to Mr. Sidney Alderman, „Progress Report on Preparation of Prosecution‟, 
30/May/1945, Harvard/SGP/44/1; Lt. James B Donovan to The Planning Committee, „Memo to the 
Planning Committee‟, 19/Nov/1945, Cornell/WJDP/Vol. 18, 56.03.  It is clear from Donovan‟s memo of 
19/Nov/1945 that his 30/May/1945 memorandum – mentioning an „OSS naval officer‟ who‟s „testimony 
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F I G U R E  5 ,  A / B :   Ex-inmates relate the horrors witnessed in Nazi Concentration Camps. Hadassah  
Bimko, a 32 year-old Jewish dentist from Poland (unidentified in the film) tells of the unbearable 
conditions as well as murderous „medical experiments‟ at Bergen-Belsen. An American OSS operative, 
Jack H. Taylor, (who is identified) describes various methods of killing at Mauthausen. He shows the 
insignia of an executed American naval officer. 
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screen. Yet, being aware of his membership of their own organisation, it is easy to 
imagine that OSS filmmakers editing Nazi Concentration Camps would have felt 
considerable respect for, and comradeship with, this survivor-witness who spoke on 
the screen for just under two and a half minutes.133 Without displaying anger or 
expressing a desire for vengeance – a manner he shared with Hadassah Bimko – the 
film editors presented him as a noble example of the American soldier who deserved 
justice. 
Although this was, as Taylor commented, the „first time [he had] ever been in the 
movies,‟ he did not appear to be nervous in the presence of the camera.134 As an 
experience that often inspires discomfort or hesitancy in the uninitiated, it was nothing 
compared to his experiences of the camp. Furthermore, it is very likely that he had 
already given oral evidence to JAG war crimes investigators before being filmed and, 
thereby, gained some practice in providing useful responses to his interviewer(s).135 His 
testimony was concise, delivered without any show of emotion and, without 
appearing rehearsed or formulaic, provided a well-structured account of crimes 
committed at the camp. In response to questions from an off-screen interviewer, he 
told of maltreatment and murder that Nazi guards of Mauthausen concentration 
camp had perpetrated. He described several sadistic methods used to kill his fellow 
inmates. But it was already during his opening remarks that he stated „Two American 
officers, at least, have been executed here‟ and held up to the camera the insignia 
that had belonged to one of them (see Figure 5-b).136 Fortunately, he stated, his turn 
hadn‟t come. He did, however, discover (soon after the filming) that the camp 
administration had scheduled him for execution on 28th April 1945.137 Although this 
                                                                                                                                                           
when the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration released the relevant OSS files in August 
2008. See NARA/RG-226/ARC-1593270. 
133 Taylor did not appear as a witness at the IMT – most probably since his most effective evidence had 
appeared on the screen. He was, however, the first Prosecution witness to appear at the trial of U.S. vs. 
Hans Altfuldisch, et al. This was a military war crimes trial run at Dachau and held against 61 staff of 
Mauthausen concentration camp. The military commission found all guilty, sentencing 58 to receive the 
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134 This statement was an ironic reference to his origins – Hollywood, California. Douglas has characterised 
the use of Taylor in Nazi Concentration Camps as the „remarkable, if not grotesque, instance of filmic 
posturing [...] as the camera focuses upon this handsome young American who towers above the other 
liberated POWs crowding about him‟.  Douglas views „the perverse logic behind his ironic celebration of 
his filmic debut‟ as grotesque because the „robust‟ performance of this „handsome‟ American soldier is 
followed by images of mass graves. He implies therefore, that to use Taylor was somehow disrespectful 
to the many dead victims in the film who were not so fortunate. Yet Taylor‟s ironic reference was hardly 
a „celebration‟, his looks were not a matter of choice for the film-crew or editors (or himself), and 
Douglas does not explain just how this interview constituted a form of „filmic posturing‟ any more than 
any other piece of film. Douglas, 'Film as Witness,' pp. 470-471. 
135 Taylor alluded to this in his interview: „This – this is all true and has been seen and is now being 
recorded‟. PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 468. 
136 PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 467. 
137 Thomas L. Hawkins (UDT-SEAL Association President), „America‟s First SEa, Air, Land Commando [SEAL] – 
Lieutenant Jack Taylor, USNR‟, Blast Magazine, No. 3, (Sep, 2002) repr. at The 11th Armored Division 
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story of a very narrow escape could not be included in his interview, given the fact 
that Taylor had survived and could tell of what had happened in the camp, his 
inclusion within Nazi Concentration Camps appeared to echo briefly something of 
the typical Hollywood ending: in contrast to the images of vast numbers of dead, his 
own appearance suggested a triumph over adversity and injustice from which some 
justice might yet prevail. Yet, as a survivor, his function – at least as far as the law was 
concerned – was merely to relate what he knew, rather than deliver justice himself. 
Furthermore, Taylor‟s appearance was not the end of the film. Yet to come were 
further harrowing examples of Nazi crimes and there would be no Hollywood ending: 
only images of the dead being bulldozed into pits at Bergen-Belsen. 
Survivors were not the only witnesses in Nazi Concentration Camps, and Jack H. 
Taylor was not the only American to appear on the screen. There were numerous 
British and American troops – easily identifiable as such – included in the film. Rather 
than having witnessed the crimes taking place, however, the cameras recorded 
them witnessing the aftermath. As legal evidence, such images of the act of 
witnessing were of limited value. But the filming was originally also aimed at 
conveying the obvious sense of injustice felt by the filmmakers themselves, reflecting 
the „special obligation‟ felt by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied 
Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, to witness, „first hand,‟ the conditions 
of the camps.138 Eisenhower had ordered soldiers (uncommitted to frontline duties) to 
visit these sites of atrocity. With a first-hand view of these crime-scenes they would 
realise, he believed, what they had been fighting against.139 Some American soldiers 
who – according to Eisenhower – still questioned what they had been fighting for 
would be able to see a strong moral case for their involvement.140 
                                                                                                                                                           
Association Website: http://www.11tharmoreddivision.com/history/first_seal_jack_taylor.htm (last access: 
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139 Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the liberation of Nazi concentration camps 
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For those troops who could or would not witness the camps themselves, there was 
film to show them the justice of their cause.141 As an example to them, Generals 
Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton were filmed at Ohrdruf concentration camp as they 
witnessed the horrors themselves (not recorded by the cameras, however, was 
General Patton becoming physically sick).142 Their appearance reinforced the 
veracity of the images of death and suffering and lent authority and legitimacy to the 
act of witnessing itself. Such images of witnessing conveyed the profound sense of 
injustice felt by Eisenhower and his troops shortly after the camps were „liberated‟. For 
this reason, despite its limited legal value, the editors of Nazi Concentration Camps 
used such footage to convey their own sense of injustice. Eisenhower had invited 
various Congressmen to visit the camps – ensuring that democratic representatives of 
the American people would also witness the scenes. Whilst the editors of Nazi 
Concentration Camps did not include (available) footage of Congressmen at the 
camps, they deemed it important enough to include a reference to them in the 
narration: 
American congressmen invited to view the atrocities were told by General Eisen-
hower. "Nothing is covered up. We have nothing to conceal. The barbarous 
treatment these people received in the German concentration camps is almost 
unbelievable. I want you to see for yourselves and be the spokesmen for the 
United States.”143 
So too would the fact that Congressmen had seen the camps lend credence to the 
act of witnessing, the veracity of the images on screen and the sense of injustice 
conveyed by the film. Eisenhower had also arranged for a committee of respected 
                                                     
141 For Hans Frank, this led to being beaten by American troops who had recently seen pictures of 
„liberated‟ concentration camps. Barnouw, Germany 1945, p. 1. 
142 Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, p. 27. This visit took place on the same day that the three Generals also 
visited a mine which, along with much of the Third Reich‟s wealth, contained gold teeth and other items 
from the murdered victims of concentration camps. See Chapter 6. 
143 PS-2430, IMT, Vol. XXX, p. 463. 
 
F I G U R E  6 ,  A / B :   Military leaders see for themselves: General Dwight D. Eisenhower (a, foreground), 
Omar N. Bradley (a, left) and George S. Patton (b) witness the horrors of Ohrdruf. 
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journalists (including a committee headed by Joseph Pulitzer) to come and see.144 
Reports of such atrocities, he believed, would no longer be dismissed as mere 
„propaganda‟ once democratic representatives and (sometimes previously 
sceptical) press-reporters could relate what they had seen to American audiences at 
home.145 
The film also showed lower-ranking American and British soldiers witnessing the 
scenes. The first appearance of troops was within a sequence devoted to Penig 
concentration camp, the second camp to feature in the film. It had been „liberated‟ 
by American 6th Armored Division and „contain[ed] mostly Hungarians‟.146 Although 
hardly required, the narrator told of what appeared on screen: „American doctors 
examine the victims‟.147 The doctors could also be seen tending to the victims‟ 
wounds, many of which were horrific. „As soon as our troops arrived,‟ continued the 
narrator, arrangements were made to remove these people from the miserable 
surroundings‟.148 American soldiers and members of the American Red Cross could be 
seen slowly escorting survivors, barely able to walk, to trucks that would take them to 
a nearby hospital which had belonged to the Luftwaffe. Most shots, however, were of 
Americans carrying the victims on stretchers. 
The cameras followed the trucks to the hospital where, for the first time in the film, 
Germans were shown. As the narrator stated, „Nazis who formerly maltreated [the 
stricken inmates] are forced to help look after the patients. The staff of German nurses 
is also forced to attend the victims‟.149 Showing Germans forced to work was 
something that recurred throughout the film. Unlike with the images of „caring‟ for 
victims at Penig, however, this usually entailed Germans being forced to remove and 
bury the dead. At Arnstadt concentration camp, for example, American troops 
discovered that local townspeople had, during the war, complained of the stench of 
the dead. They had already taken part in burying the corpses further away from their 
town. Now, once again, they would exhume the bodies under American „armed 
persuasion‟.150 Implicit in such forced labour, at Arnstadt and elsewhere, was the 
American presumption of widespread guilt among the German population – at least 
of those who had lived close by to concentration camps. 
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The most frequent sign of Americans‟ presumption of widespread German guilt, 
however, was the inclusion of images of German civilians being forced to witness the 
camps. As already noted in Chapter 2, scenes of forced (German) witnessing had 
already briefly been presented to the American public before the Nuremberg IMT 
commenced (in the film entitled That Justice Be Done). Now, in Nazi Concentration 
Camps, more forced witnessing was on show. American troops coerced many 
hundreds of civilians into visiting local camps – they could be seen appearing for no 
other reason but to witness the conditions at Ohrdruf, Nordhausen, Buchenwald and 
Dachau. The first in the film were some of the local townspeople of Ohrdruf, including 
local Nazi party members and a stern-faced medical Major. Among several exhibits, 
they were taken to view piles of corpses in a woodshed. Although reluctant to enter, 
they were ordered to do so by the commander of the American troops that had first 
discovered the camp. To the camera crew at Ohrdruf, and to the editors of Nazi 
Concentration Camps, their reactions were important. But, in this regard, the narrator 
explained what, sometimes, the camera could not: 
According to reports, the local Nazis continued their tour of the camp without 
apparent emotion. All denied knowledge of what had taken place at Ohrdruf. [...] 
The day before these Nazis visited the camp, the Burgomeister [sic] of Ohrdruf was 
forced to view the horrors. He and his wife were later found dead in their home, 
apparently suicides.151 
Here were two entirely opposing reactions: one of denial – of both knowledge of the 
atrocities and, therefore, any responsibility for their occurrence; and one – suicide – 
that could be interpreted (by Americans) as the result of shame, disgrace or, more 
simply, guilt. For the American troops and the American prosecutors, there was no 
salvation for Germans in either case. Denial of knowledge or guilt was no sign of 
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F I G U R E  7 ,  A / B :   Germans forced to work. Civilians, „under Armed persuasion‟, bury the dead at 
Arnstadt concentration camp (a). The individual in the foreground turns around to look at the camera. 
At Belsen concentration camp approximately fifty SS men are forced to remove and bury the dead (b). 
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innocence, but merely the continued perpetration of further injustice. And suicide 
could imply the acknowledgment of guilt. One purpose of showing forced witnessing, 
therefore, was – rather than to assess the extent of Germans‟ guilt – to display either 
the acknowledgment or the denial of a guilt that Americans presumed undoubtedly 
existed. 
 
It was obvious, however, that at least one group of civilians was not aware of the 
nature or purpose of their visit until they had passed through the gates of Buchenwald 
concentration camp (see Figure 8-b). As the narrator explained: 
Twelve hundred civilians walked from the neighbouring City of Weimar to begin a 
forced tour of the camp. There are many smiling faces and, according to observ-
ers, at first the Germans act as though this were something being staged for their 
benefit.152 
With the prosecution of the remaining highest Nazi leaders of the Third Reich, there 
was little direct evidentiary value in seeing German civilians on their way to a 
concentration camp after the war – whether they were smiling or not. That civilians 
may have thought the exercise was „staged for their own benefit‟ was hardly directly 
relevant to the accusations aimed at the defendants in Nuremberg. Furthermore, 
there was little effort on behalf of the American Prosecution to corroborate the 
assertions said to be made by „observers‟ (that the civilians thought the exercise was 
„being staged for their own benefit‟). The identity of the „observers‟ – perhaps regular 
American soldiers or members of the camera crew themselves – was not revealed. 
Even as demonstrative evidence, the relevance of such images to the legal process 
of Nuremberg was questionable. But, despite the evidentiary deficiencies of the 
narrator‟s assertion, inherent in such images was the American sense of injustice: not 
only were the atrocities themselves an outrage; so too – the presentation of these 
images implied – did the attitude of local (guilty) populations constitute a form of 
injustice in continuance. But once confronted with shrunken heads – ornaments 
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F I G U R E  8 ,  A / B / C :   Germans forced to witness.(a) Some of the townspeople of Ohrdruf, including 
a Nazi medical officer are forced to witness the conditions of the concentration camp. (b) Women smile 
on their way to Buchenwald concentration camp. (c) Having seen macabre souvenirs kept by the 
commandant and his wife, the womens‟ reactions are captured by the camera. 
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created from two murdered inmates after their skulls were removed – as well as 
decorated „parchment‟ made from the skin of other murdered inmates, the cameras 
recorded the reactions of civilians who no longer smiled (Figure 8-c)153: 
These, and other exhibits of Nazi origin, are shown to the townspeople. 
The camera records the changes in facial expressions as the Weimar citizens leave 
the parchment display.154 
Such repeated examination of the reactions of German civilians begs the question: 
what exactly were the American cameras looking to find on the faces of these 
reluctant witnesses? 
Laurence Douglas has suggested that forcing German citizens to witness the 
camps was a sanction that amounted to „no more than the punishment of 
witnessing’.155 He continues: 
[This] is, in certain respects, an odd punishment, for although we might take grim 
satisfaction in watching the Germans forced to confront the legacy of their shame 
and quiescence, the film places the "innocent" viewer in much the same position 
as the German civilians.156 
However, there was a crucial difference in American expectations between those 
they presumed to be innocent viewers and those presumed to be guilty. Forcing 
German civilians to see atrocities at the camps (whilst filming them in the process) 
amounted to a form of indictment which demanded of each witness an internal, 
personal, plea of „innocent‟ or „guilty‟ – an individual confrontation with the 
universally constituted conscience that liberal Americans believed German civilians 
possessed. This was also the case for those German civilians forced to watch atrocity 
films throughout Germany after the war, and presumed by Americans to be, also in 
some way, responsible for what they could see. „Innocent viewers‟ certainly would 
experience painful emotions such as feelings of sorrow, empathy, horror, anger, or 
outrage. Some of these feelings might even be experienced by those deemed to be 
guilty too. But only those presumed to be guilty might be hoped (by Americans) to 
experience – and display – feelings of remorse. As Dagmar Barnouw so well 
demonstrated in relation to still photography of forced German witnessing, the moral 
incentive to seek out signs of remorse – or its absence - was, despite similar British 
attempts, a particularly American (Signal Corps) phenomenon.157 Just like the 
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aftermath of unprecedented atrocities, so too, Barnouw asserted, did the American 
Signal Corps photographers seek to make remorse or its absence visible because it, 
too, „needed to be seen to be believed‟.158 The same American phenomenon can 
be observed in Nazi Concentration Camps. Americans in fact, could, better than with 
the use of still photography, observe their reluctant witnesses through the use of 
moving images which could portray the effect of emotions over time – rather than in 
a single instant. Any detectable presence of remorse would signify some measure of 
affinity with the occupiers‟ moral universe. It would signify the acknowledgement of 
past wrongs that would aid transition to a new moral (and political) future. In contrast, 
the absence of remorse would signify the „otherness‟ of the Germans, the atavistic 
barbarity to which they had descended, and justify the punishment and damnation 
they deserved.159 For wrongs that reached beyond any purely legal framework, 
impossible to meet with any commensurate sanction, remorse was, therefore, the 
most salient form of punishment that might be meted out to civilians by such visual 
confrontation alone. Furthermore, following the logic of a liberal belief in a universal 
morality, such a punishment as remorse could discriminate between those civilians 
who were guilty and those who were not. Put simply, those who knew they had done 
wrong would suffer most from the experience of being forced to witness the camps. 
For the defendants at Nuremberg, forced to watch Nazi Concentration Camps, 
there would, of course, be other means of punishment available to the Tribunal. Yet 
any form of punishment – including death by hanging – would remain incommensu-
rate with the wrongs of which they were accused. „The Nazi crimes,‟ suggested 
Hannah Arendt in 1946, „explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what 
constitutes their monstrousness‟.160 Her choice of words might have been more 
precise, however, for what she really meant – in response to Karl Jasper‟s own answers 
to The Question of German Guilt  – was that Nazi „crimes‟ were unprecedented 
wrongs for which the word „crime‟ was inadequate.161 Words, laws, and legal 
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methods had to be invented in order to criminalise the leading perpetrators of Nazi 
injustice, a phenomenon more horrible than any previously, legally, defined „crime‟ – 
and also more effectively communicated through visual, rather than literary, means. 
(Legalists‟ critiques of ex post facto „law‟ at Nuremberg could not offer a solution to 
this requirement for invention – other than that of trying the defendants for lesser, 
traditional, „war crimes‟).162 Since the maximum penalty meted out to any individual 
could not constitute commensurate reckoning for million-fold murder, no punishment 
could ever be enough. All that might be done was to inflict such punishment as was 
possible – inadequate though it might be. The use of film in the courtroom would 
serve as a form of evidence but so too, through the inducement of remorse, would it 
function as a form of punishment – at least for each of those with a conscience which 
might be unearthed. It was not, however, the Tribunal that could bestow such a 
punishment upon the defendants. That was something only the prosecutors would be 
able to inflict when it presented its case against the defendants. 
 
 
5.4. Catching Consciences in the Courtroom 
Since the Americans were the first prosecutors to present their case, and because 
Americans, more than anyone else, were in control of their physical environment – for 
example, in the management of security and with the design of the courtroom – the 
American Prosecution had a unique opportunity to influence the way the trial would 
be conducted. Wherever some leeway existed in determining procedures or methods 
in presenting evidence, the Americans were, of all the prosecuting teams, the freest 
to experiment. It was, therefore, straightforward for members of the American 
Documentary Evidence Section to execute an idea that only sprang to mind on the 
night before the American Prosecution presented Nazi Concentration Camps. Stuart 
Schulberg and his colleagues realised only at that moment that, with the main 
courtroom lights switched off – a necessity in order to see images on the projection-
screen clearly – it would be impossible to monitor the defendants‟ reactions as they 
watched the film.163 He had been present when, before the trial had begun, the 
American Prosecution had shown Hess excerpts from Triumph of the Will – in the 
attempt to „cure‟ his amnesia. As we have seen, in preparation for that screening, 
American psychologists and psychiatrists had arranged for Hess to be lit from below, 
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so that his face was visible to the many observers who had watched keenly for his 
reactions to the film. Now, in the closing hours of Wednesday, 28/Nov/1945, Schulberg 
and his colleagues decided „on the spot‟ to have a row of neon tubing installed on 
the inside of the defendants‟ dock.164 
When, on the following afternoon, the main lights were switched off and the film 
was projected, the judges, the prosecutors and the observers in the gallery could see, 
not only the film on the screen, but also the faces of the defendants – lit softly by the 
neon tubing (see Figure 9). Gilbert, the American psychologist, and Kelley, the 
American psychiatrist, stood at each end of the dock so that they had the very best 
view.165 Gilbert made notes of what he observed whilst the film played: 
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Schacht objects to being made to look 
[...] 
Fritzsche [...] already looks pale and sits 
aghast as it starts [...] 
Ribbentrop closes his eyes, looks away 
[...] 
Frank swallows hard, blinks eyes, trying to 
stifle tears [...] 
Goering keeps leaning on balustrade, not 
watching most of the time [...] 
Funk now in tears, blows nose, wipes 
eyes, looks down [...] 
Frick mutters “Horrible!” [...] 
Rosenberg fidgets, peeks at screen, bows 
head, looks to see how others are 
reacting[...] 
Speer looks very sad, swallows hard [...] 
Saukel shudders at picture of 
Buchenwald crematorium oven [...] 
Keitel now hanging head [...] 
Funk crying bitterly, claps hand over 
mouth as women‟s naked corpses are 
thrown into pit [...] 
Film ends.167 
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F I G U R E  9 :  „Goering & Co. go to the 
pictures‟. 
The only visual record I have discovered of the 
defendants watching Nazi Concentration Camps in the 
Nuremberg Palace of Justice. The low levels of light (for 
available film-stocks in 1945) made this a difficult 
picture to take, requiring a very slow shutter speed. 
Hence the dim lighting appears much brighter than 
would have been perceived by human eyes. This 
picture was probably taken at the very start of the film – 
as documents were shown on the screen – since 
Schacht (bottom-left) has not yet turned his back to the 
screen. (IWM/Photo/SFX 9D (1)/HU 93592). 
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These notes, which Gilbert added to his „diary‟, were published two years after the 
trial.166 As might be expected of a psychologist at work, Gilbert had focused almost 
entirely on the defendant‟s behaviour: the section of his book entitled „The Showing of 
the Atrocity Film‟ provides little mention of what appeared within the film itself.167 After 
two pages describing the defendant‟s reactions, there are two more describing their 
responses, made later that day, to his questioning relating to the film. 
What is more significant, however, is that in the many other contemporaneous 
descriptions of the screening of Nazi Concentration Camps (made by non-clinicians), 
in addition to brief descriptions of the content of the film, as much text – if not more – 
was also usually devoted to describing the reactions of the defendants.168 The 
American prosecution had, in effect, provided to all observers in the courtroom an 
opportunity to take part in a psychological experiment. But whereas the Rorschach 
inkbot test had entailed examining reactions to images with no meaning, the images 
in Nazi Concentration Camps conveyed unprecedented representations of injustice 
that demanded of each defendant an assessment of personal responsibility. 
It was not only public reports of the spectacle that were predominantly concerned 
with the appearance of the defendants. Some observers wrote home to their wives or 
families with the defendants‟ reactions uppermost in their thoughts. In one letter 
home, for example, Leonard Wheeler viewed the screening of Nazi Concentration 
Camps, and the opportunity to watch the defendants, as a „psychological 
masterpiece‟: 
The climax came for them today, [...] when our motion picture showing conditions 
found in concentration camps by the Americans [...]. Keitel averted his gaze and 
blew his nose frequently, Goering looked very worried, Frank actually wept, all 
were silent, and not one looked up from the floor as they were shepherded out. 
They certainly looked as if they felt the noose around their necks.169 
James B. Donovan, in a similar vein, wrote home with an obvious sense of satisfaction 
and pride: 
My first films were a tremendous success. Perhaps you read about them. Up to 
then the defendants had been taking the case very lightly. You should have seen 
the expression on their faces during the showing.170 
Furthermore, without much analysis, several historians have replicated this pattern in 
                                                     
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
168 For examples, see: Raymond Daniell, „War-Crimes Court Sees Horror Films‟, New York Times, 
30/Nov/1945; „Nazi Aggression in Austria‟, The Times, 30/Nov/1945. 
169 Leonard Wheeler to Cornelia, Mother & Grandma, 29/Nov/1945. Harvard/LWP/4/3. 
170 James B. to Mary Donovan, [c. Dec 1945], Hoover/JBDP/34/20. 
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general narratives of the trial.171 The spectacle, however, consisted of more than 
merely showing and viewing a film that happened to affect the defendants. For most 
observers it entailed just as much – if not more – watching of the defendants as they, 
in turn, watched – or averted their gaze from – the film. 
The widespread impulse to examine the defendants‟ reactions was not driven by a 
desire to assess the extent of their guilt which was already widely presupposed to be 
extensive (this was, after all, officially, the „Trial of the Major War Criminals’ – not of 
„suspects‟). Instead, as with the „innocent viewers‟ of reluctant German witnesses 
within the film, the „innocent‟ viewers in the courtroom had an opportunity to inspect 
those they presumed guilty for signs, or the absence, of remorse. 
It is the case that, even without the use of film, the impulse to examine the 
reactions of the defendants was, for at least one American prosecutor, overwhelm-
ing. As James B. Donovan had already wrote home in a letter to his wife: 
I sit at the counsel table and within a few feet are sitting all the defendants, 
Goering being closest. I could just sit there all day, studying their reactions to the 
evidence going in against them.172 
However, by lighting up the defendants in a darkened room, the American 
Prosecution had made this impulse irresistible to most other observers present. This 
scene, in fact, constituted a plea by the American Prosecution to all observers to look 
at the defendants and judge them with their own eyes. It mirrored the functions of a 
Shakespearian theatrical device in which such a plea was made to an observer of a 
murderer watching his crimes re-enacted on a stage: 
There is a play to-night before the king; 
One scene of it comes near the circumstance, 
Which I have told thee, of my father‟s death: 
I pr‟ythee, when thou see‟st that act a-foot, 
Even with the very comment of thy soul 
Observe mine uncle [...] 
Give him heedful note; 
For I mine eyes will rivet to his face; 
And, after, we will both our judgements join 
In censure of his seeming.173 
What the American prosecutors shared with the fictional Dane was the belief that, 
through this spectacle, a perpetrator might discover his conscience. What they also 
shared was a desire to observe – and have others observe – the change this would 
effect on a perpetrator‟s face. 
 But neither of these morality-plays, fictional or real, were – like their medieval 
                                                     
171  For examples, see: Tusa & Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p. 160; Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 186-187. 
172 James B. to Mary Donovan, [c. 23/Nov.1945], Hoover/JBDP/34/20. 
173 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, III, 2. 
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English precursors – designed to facilitate or portray the salvation of their principle 
subjects.174 „For those who see punishment as a mechanism intended to remould the 
defendant into an accepted [...] member of society‟, states Bryan Ward, „the use of 
remorse for purposes of punishment is unfair and self-defeating‟.175 Yet as Jackson 
had assured his colleagues in Washington, he was „not in the least concerned that 
[Goering] be reformed‟.176 Rehabilitation of the defendants was of no concern to the 
American Prosecution (or most others) at Nuremberg. Instead, the inducement of 
remorse amounted to a (very) public damnation, a crucial element of punishment 
with ancient precursors and seen by Americans as crucial to the rehabilitation of the 
German nation.177 To experience remorse in a public setting – as, for example, 
Walther Funk appeared to do with his tearful reaction to the film – was not only to 
betray a personal sense of guilt; it was also to acknowledge publicly the moral 
legitimacy of the accusations and those who accused. On the other hand, to display 
no signs of remorse – as, for example, appeared to be the case with Hjalmar Schacht 
– was to refrain from betraying a sense of guilt. Schacht, more than his fellow 
defendants (and, indeed, perhaps more than many others in the courtroom), 
appeared to understand the mechanics and implications of this spectacle. Not only 
did he choose to turn his back to the film – as though to dissociate himself from the 
images and his fellow defendants – he also, rather than merely looking down or to his 
side, returned the gazes of the spectators in the gallery.178 This act of defiance 
demonstrated his outrage at being accused with the eyes of his observers. But whilst 
some (for example, a British official) took Schacht to be innocent, others (for example 
Jackson) presumed that he was guilty.179 The absence of remorse – if guilty he was 
presumed to be – could be interpreted as a sign that his conscience lay buried deep 
beneath his „Nazi mind‟.180 
Although the opportunity to inspect the defendants for signs of remorse or its 
absence was the result of American innovation in the courtroom, perhaps the best 
example of the limits of this test of conscience – which could only function through 
visual means alone – is provided by a British observer of the scene. Airey Neave‟s 
                                                     
174 Robert A. Potter, The English Morality Play: Origins, History, and Influence of a Dramatic Tradition 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 30-57. 
175 Bryan H. Ward, 'Sentencing without Remorse,' Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 
(2006), p. 132. 
176 RHJ, Diary, 5/Sep/1945, LoC/RHJP/95/‟Diary‟. 
177 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 58. 
178 Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, p. 29. 
179 For a British view on Schacht‟s innocence – before the trial began – see page 56. For Jackson‟s desire 
to indict Schacht – using the legal doctrine of conspiracy – see page 55. 
180Kelley, 22 Cells, p. 196. 
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recollections suggest that his view of the defendants was only entirely clear when the 
film finished playing and the courtroom lights were switched on: 
I cannot forget the sudden vision of those twisted guilty faces, some like Funk and 
Fritzsche with tears on their cheeks. I sometimes dream of it. I sought for any signs 
of true remorse and did not find them. These were crocodile tears. They wept for 
themselves, not the dead. They feared for their own necks as they watched...181 
Neave‟s recollections are particularly interesting because they highlight two 
significant interrelated matters regarding the impulse to seek out remorse or its 
absence in the courtroom. The first concerns the limits of a purely visual assessment of 
emotions. What exactly does remorse look like? The answer must be that visual means 
alone cannot be enough to identify it clearly. Being forced to watch the film in the 
presence of observers, the defendants were subjected to an experience that also 
had the potential to induce shame and self-pity. Visually, remorse cannot be clearly 
distinguished from these emotions. Yet Neave seemed quite sure in his conclusion that 
the defendants could not identify or empathise with the suffering of the victims – a 
necessary prerequisite for experiencing „true‟ feelings of remorse.182 Instead, he 
believed, „they wept for themselves, not the dead‟. 
Next, however, and in spite of the inherent problem of identifying remorse through 
visual means alone, there nevertheless remained a strong impulse in many of those 
present in the courtroom to identify the emotion, or its absence, on the faces of the 
defendants. Observers‟ motivation for this test of conscience was stronger than any 
proclivity for a rational consideration that such an inspection might be forlorn. But 
whilst the signs of remorse would always be impossible to discern clearly through visual 
means alone, the attempt to induce it by confronting the defendants with film was 
not a hopeless exercise - given the belief that at least some of the defendants knew 
they had done wrong. (As we have seen in Chapter 4, Robert Jackson firmly held this 
belief). To induce remorse in the defendants, in the very public setting of Nuremberg, 
was to hope that, derived from this spectacle, some justice might be seen before their 
eyes. As a form of punishment, it had the potential to inflict more pain than self-pity or 
shame (which might also be experienced at the same time).183 It could also do some 
justice to the memory of the dead. 
Whilst Neave‟s assessment was one of bitter disappointment, however, other 
observers (in particular, American ones) took a very different view. As Jackson later 
recalled, the film had „really scored‟: 
                                                     
181 Neave, Nuremberg, p. 270. (Emphasis added). 
182 Barnouw, Germany 1945, p. 13. 
183 For the idea of remorse as self-punishment see: Ilham Dilman, 'Shame, Guilt and Remorse,' Philosophical 
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It was a shot in the arm that the case needed at that point and it certainly de-
flated the defendants in an effective manner. They never got their courage back 
after that picture.184 
As far as Jackson was concerned, the use of Nazi Concentration Camps in the 
courtroom had succeeded at a time when the trial had required something in 
addition to the proof that resided in the many documents the American Prosecution 
had already submitted to the Tribunal. Since Jackson had persevered (against 
considerable criticism from within his own organization185) with his faith in the use of 
documents as the best way to prove to the Tribunal the guilt of the defendants, his 
willingness to employ film was not based purely on this legal objective. The „shot in the 
arm‟ that the use of film brought to „the case‟ entailed an unparalleled and dramatic 
portrayal of the depths and breath of Nazi injustice. 
„The case‟, as previously discussed, was not only a legal one. The spectacle 
surrounding the use of film constituted the most successful method of enacting the 
morality play that had been envisaged by the American Prosecution. Without it, the 
moral drama of Nuremberg would have been limited to (the far less dramatic) 
speeches of prosecutors and witnesses. Instead, to see most of the defendants 
horrified while the images were projected, and to believe that some of them showed 
signs of remorse, was to see a dramatic form of justice being done in a way that no 
other form of „evidence‟ could achieve. Whilst providing some proof to the Tribunal, it 
also provided a moral lesson for Germans and Americans outside of the courtroom: 
with those defendants who appeared to suffer remorse came an apparent admission 
that their actions and ideas had been morally wrong. For Americans, it constituted 
proof that their cause was just, and that justice was being done with the leaders of a 
nation who had embroiled their country in a Second World War – a war more horrible 
than most Americans had dared to imagine. Thus, the success of Nuremberg as a 
morality play was due, more than anything else, to the American use of film. 
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185 Salter, Nazi War Crimes, pp. 398-410. 
  
 
CHAPTER 6 
SPECTRES OF ATROCITY 
 
 
What would he do, 
Had he the motive and the cue for passion 
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears  
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech;  
Make mad the guilty, and appal the free; 
Confound the ignorant, and amaze, indeed,  
The very faculties of eyes and ears.  
William Shakespeare1 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the main effect of presenting Nazi 
Concentration Camps in the courtroom was to stage publicly a confrontation 
between the defendants and the results of their „conspiracy‟ in the hope of observing 
remorse or its absence – and encouraging all other observers to take part in the same 
experiment. The spectacle was a success. But since Nazi Concentration Camps was 
an entirely gruesome film, it makes sense to ask whether the success of that spectacle 
was due to the horrific nature of the images that were shown. It is, therefore, worth 
examining the use of other films that were, in a variety of ways, considerably different 
to the first. This chapter examines the use of two other (less graphic) films relating to 
Crimes Against Humanity presented by the American Prosecution. The first, made on 
a home-movie camera – most probably by a member of the SS – will be used to 
demonstrate that, although a film could be found which fitted the aim of presenting 
evidence produced by perpetrators, such evidence in visual form did not reach the 
same „probative value‟ of the written word. In contrast to the precision of written 
correspondence between high-level perpetrators, unofficial images shot by those „on 
the ground‟ were by their nature more chaotic and less informative. Such simple 
questions as who made the film and where or why it had been made, could not be 
answered at Nuremberg. 
The film with which this chapter is mostly concerned, however, is a simple recording 
– made by American filmmakers – of valuables taken from victims of concentration 
camps. It has only recently been discovered and restored in the Imperial War 
Museum.2 Coming closest of all films shown at the IMT to highlighting the culpability of 
an individual defendant, it will be used here to investigate the limits, not only of visual 
evidence in court, but also of any supporting evidence that had the potential to 
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2 The restoration was undertaken after my correspondence with Kay Gladstone at the Imperial War 
Museum. 
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cause controversy between the fragile alliance of American and Soviet delegations. 
This American-made film will be shown to have been potentially dangerous to this 
relationship when (again) such simple questions as to how and where it was made 
were asked. We shall see the extent to which such a fragile relationship could affect 
the use of this film and other evidence. We shall also see if a film that can easily be 
described as „boring‟ (at least, without any historical context) could replicate  the 
courtroom spectacle in which observers might look for the presence or absence or 
remorse. 
 
 
6.1. ‘Persecution’ on film 
After Nazi Concentration Camps had been screened in court, the American 
Prosecution assessed its stock of remaining film that might still, potentially, be 
presented as evidence. James B. Donovan, the head of the OCC‟s Visual 
Presentation Unit, considered three more films, each relating to Crimes Against 
Humanity. He decided that only one of them – „Original 8mm film of Atrocities against 
Jews‟, as it was named – would definitely be exhibited at the trial.3 The others were – 
as we shall see – deemed problematic by the prosecutors.4 The 8mm film would be 
shown on 13th December 1945 as part of the American presentation of „The 
Persecution of the Jews‟, a title admitted by Major William F. Walsh (who took charge 
of this phase) to be an inadequate description of the evidence that followed: 
Academically, I am told, to persecute is to afflict, harass, and annoy. The term 
used does not convey, and indeed I cannot conjure a term that does convey the 
ultimate aim, the avowed purpose to obliterate the Jewish race.5 
It may now seem obvious that Raphael Lemkin‟s neologism, „genocide‟, was 
precisely the appropriate term Walsh might have used.6 Yet the use of the term, as we 
have already seen, lost favour with the American Prosecution even before the IMT 
trial had begun (and was used seldom during it). However, while the genocide of the 
Jews itself was not central to the trial, the American Prosecution did, in its presentation 
of „The Persecution of the Jews,‟ provide a „brief‟ that constituted the first publicly 
disseminated draft of a history of the genocide of European Jewry.7 This phase 
                                                     
3 James B. Donovan to Colonel Storey, 12/Dec/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/26/‟Photographic Evidence‟. This 
film is listed, along with the appropriate document and exhibit numbers, as item 3 in Appendix 1. It is 
available to view at the US National Archives: NARA/ARC 43456/RG-238.7. 
4 These films were representations of the Warsaw Ghetto and another made in the vaults of the Frankfurt 
Reichsbank. See p. 161 below. 
5 IMT, Vol. III, 13/Dec/1945, p. 519. 
6 Lemkin, Axis rule in occupied Europe. 
7 Michael Marrus stated that „The Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg in 1945-46 [...] presented 
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consisted of the following sections: 
1. Hate propaganda against Jews 
2. Discriminatory decrees against Jews 
3. Anti-Jewish boycotts, raids, and violence 
4. The program of the complete elimination of Jewry 
5. Results of the extermination program8 
The case began by citing the 25-point Nazi program of 1920 – in which it was 
declared that „Only a member of the race can be a citizen‟ – and ended with 
evidence of Adolf Eichmann‟s estimation of the murder of 6 million Jews.9 Evidence 
submitted during the case included the „Stroop Report‟ regarding the „clearance‟ of 
the Warsaw ghetto with descriptions of murder and photographs that had featured in 
the meticulously crafted leather-bound volume sent by General Stroop to Heinrich 
Himmler.10 As with the screening of films, Walsh‟s presentation of photographs from 
Stroop‟s report provided an opportunity to evoke more than „proof‟ of crimes. It 
encouraged an emotional response that was greater than words, by themselves, 
might convey:  
This picture ... is entitled „The Leader of the Large Scale Action‟. The Nazi-
appointed commander of this action was SS Major General Stroop, who probably 
is the central figure in this picture. I cannot refrain from commenting at this point 
on the smiling faces of the group shown there, in the midst of violence and 
destruction.11 
Such images combined with commentary appeared to evoke a sense of injustice 
more salient to press reporters than purely documentary evidence of even greater 
horrors. For example, the American Prosecution also presented a report submitted by 
the Polish representative of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) that 
described Treblinka-B concentration camp as a site dedicated to the „wholesale‟ 
murder of Jews.12 Despite Donald Bloham‟s contention that the extermination camps 
of Treblinka, Belzeck and Sobibor were absent from the immediate postwar trials,13 the 
                                                                                                                                                           
the first comprehensive definition and documentation to a non-Jewish audience of the persecution and 
massacre of European Jewry during World War II -what we have come to term, in English at least, as the 
Holocaust.‟ Michael R. Marrus, 'The Holocaust at Nuremberg,' Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. XXVI (1998), p. 5. 
David Bloxham has disputed Marrus‟ claims without mentioning the latter s qualifications. Bloxham, 
Genocide on Trial, p. 1. 
8 These subtitles were not read out in court but applied subsequently to the brief when printed by the war 
department once the American prosecution was completed. See: NCA, Vol. I, pp. 978-1022. 
9 PS-1708, IMT, Vol. III, 13/Dec/1945, p. 521; PS-2738, IMT, Vol. III, p. 569. 
10 This report was translated at Nuremberg as „The Warsaw Ghetto is No More,‟ but is perhaps better 
translated as „The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw is No More‟. It is now commonly referred to by historians as 
„The Stroop Report‟ in reference to its author, the commander in charge of the „liquidation‟ of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, SS Major General General Jürgen Stroop. It consisted of both text and photographs 
bound in black leather. IMT, Vol. III, 13-14/Dec/1945, pp. 530, 553-558; PS-1061, IMT, Vol. XXVI, pp. 628-
694. 
11 IMT, Vol. III, 14/Dec/1945, p. 558. 
12 PS-3311; IMT, Vol. III, 14/Dec/1945, pp. 567-8. 
13 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 110. 
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evidence read in court suggested that „several hundred thousands of Jews‟ had 
been murdered at Treblinka-B.14 Yet such information being read from an official 
(Polish) report by an American prosecutor (after approximately two weeks of the 
presentation of an avalanche of documentation), did not provoke media interest to 
the same degree that – in regard to the same subject – the presentation of visual 
evidence, or the examination of a witness, did.15 The evidence relating to Treblinka-B 
was later supplemented by the Russian Prosecution‟s use of a witness who described 
the methods of killing and the fact that the site was designed for the exclusive 
purpose of „exterminating‟ only Jews.16 The use of this witness, and the cross-
examination of the commander of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss (who spoke of the 
„improvement‟ in killing machinery and procedures compared to Treblinka) led to 
some news-reporting that made mention of Treblinka as a site of „extermination‟ of 
the Jews.17 Yet largely due to Jackson‟s aversion to the use of witnesses (in part due 
to his distaste for the Soviet purge trials of the 1930s and the more recently conducted 
Kharkov trial) the American case would remain primarily based upon documents.18 It 
was in this context that the use of film was deemed to be a more reliable, „objective‟, 
source than witnesses in demonstrating Nazi criminality: rather more like „documents‟ 
than („subjective‟) witnesses who were open to cross-examination and influence from 
various quarters. 
Mere words read from written sources, as Dodd had implied before the screening 
of Nazi Concentration Camps, did not seem adequate to describe even single events 
or institutions in such a murderous enterprise, whether described as „genocide‟ or not. 
This was, in fact, precisely the problem with official Nazi documents – particularly with 
the correspondence of leaders and highly-placed administrators who continually 
                                                     
14 Bloxham states that Walsh did not cite the important passage that identified Treblinka as a site „closely 
connected with the German plans aiming at a complete destruction of the Jewish population in Poland 
[...]‟. Yet Walsh did read this passage in court. Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 121, fn. 143; IMT, Vol. III, 
14/Dec/1945, p. 567. The much expanded and revised 2003 edition of Raul Hilberg‟s classic work 
estimates a death-toll of „up to 800,000‟ for Treblinka: Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews 
(3rd ed.) (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2003), Vol. III, p. 1320. 
15 The day after Walsh spoke of Treblinka-B, this was not mentioned in the (London) Times report of the 
day‟s proceedings. Instead, the subject of this extermination camp was upstaged by that of the Stroop 
Report on the „clearance‟ of the Warsaw ghetto and the screening of „Original 8mm film of Atrocities 
against Jews‟: „Annihilation of a Ghetto‟, The Times, 14/Dec/1945. Treblinka was also absent from the 
report of the proceedings in the New York Times: „Yule Trees Scene of German Crimes‟, New York Times, 
14/Dec/1945. In contrast, after Höss had been cross-examined in court, both newspapers made note of 
the camp: „Oswiecim Leader Boasts of Killings‟, New York Times, 16/Apr/1946. „Extermination of Jews‟, 
The Times, 16/Apr/1946. 
16 IMT, Vol. VIII, 27/Feb/1946, pp. 324-329. 
17 See note 15. IMT, Vol. XI, 15/Apr/1946, pp. 416-7. Remarkably, Höss was called as a defence witness in an 
attempt to exonerate Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Thus the overall circumstance of holding the trial (and the 
tactics of defence council), rather than the efforts of the prosecution teams, are to be credited for the 
information that Hoess divulged. Once called as a defence witness, however, Hoess was cross-
examined by the prosecution (IMT, Vol. XI, 15/Apr/1946, pp.412-18). 
18 On the Kharkov trial – and Jackson‟s reactions – see Chapter 2. 
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referred to the murder of Jews with coded or euphemistic language, refraining from 
explicit acknowledgment of mass murder – such as the invention and use of the 
phrase „final solution‟.19 This issue also seemed to apply in conveying the horror of 
„persecution‟ that could be seen in the courtroom when the 8mm film was projected. 
Having been shot by a non-professional operator (probably a member of the SS) on a 
hand-held 8mm home camera, most of the scenes were very brief, poorly shot and 
difficult to comprehend.20 To assist the Tribunal in making some sense of the chaotic 
violence that appeared before them, a textual summary of the various scenes was 
submitted by the Prosecution.21 Every shot, usually lasting only a few seconds, was 
listed in a very brief manner as the following first ten entries demonstrate: 
1. Crowd milling in front of doorway. 
2. Naked girl runs across courtyard. 
3. Older woman is pushed past camera. Man in SS uniform stands by left of scene. 
4. Bicycle wheeled past man, lying on ground. 
5. Man with skullcap, and woman, are manhandled. 
6. Crowd at doorway as man and woman are pulled out. 
7. Two women come out of house, one tugging at torn clothes. 
8. Man hurries after woman apparently ripping clothes off. 
9. Milling. 
10. Man runs from doorway, dodging blows....22 
This text did little to convey what appeared on the screen and only served to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the written word in the representation of atrocity. But 
this is not to imply that the film itself could fully convey the meaning of events it had 
recorded. The American Prosecution deemed it necessary to project the film at a 
speed slower than it had originally been shot and to show it twice before the 
Tribunal.23 Even with these procedures, and the accompanying text, it was (and is) still 
difficult to make sense of exactly what had been filmed. It is possible to view a copy 
today at any speed (even frame-by-frame) in order to examine the film more 
carefully than was possible in the courtroom at Nuremberg. Yet even so, most scenes 
remain difficult to comprehend and some bear little relation to the (chronologically 
ordered) textual descriptions supplied by the Prosecution. An additional problem was 
that the film was badly burned in places before it was shown. 
                                                     
19 The longevity of this Nazi term – implying as it does the existence of a „problem‟ – far outlived the 
duration of the IMT trial. One of the first monographs on the genocide of the Jews used the Nazi phrase 
as its title: Gerald Roberts Reitlinger, The final solution: the attempt to exterminate the Jews of Europe, 
1939-1945 (London: Vallentine, 1953). 
20 The film was discovered by American troops in an SS barracks near Augsburg. PS-3052, IMT, Vol. XXXI, pp. 
520. 
21 PS-3052, Exhibit B, IMT, Vol. XXXI, pp. 522-4. 
22 Ibid., p. 522. 
23 IMT, Vol. III, 13/Dec/1945, p. 536. 
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However, what was apparent on the screen was the humiliating and utterly brutal 
violence towards men and women in an undetermined location at least partly 
perpetrated by, and certainly with the approval of, members of the SS and 
Wehrmacht.24 Beatings of clearly defenceless men – some of whom were bearded 
and wore skullcaps – and women were delivered by civilians while German soldiers 
stood by, sometimes observing, sometimes examining the victims and most often 
directing them towards their tormentors or away from the buildings from which they 
had been evicted. One German soldier could be seen preparing to take photo-
graphs of one of the victims, a man who was naked and being led away from the 
entrance of a building (see Figure 1-a).25  
It seems almost certain that the film was a record of the clearance of a Jewish 
ghetto.26 That there was no evidence that could date or locate what was recorded 
was „immaterial‟ as far as the Prosecution was concerned.27 What the film offered, as 
James Donovan stated to the Tribunal, was: 
                                                     
24 This is a conservative description of what can be seen, because it is not clear to me, for example, 
whether several victims on the ground are alive or have (already) been murdered. 
25 No mention in court or in documentation was made of the soldier-photographer in scene 39 of 
document PS-3052, IMT, Vol. XXXI, p. 523. 
26 The film, lasting three and a half minutes, is available for online viewing through the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum-Spielberg film archive. The online catalogue description states that the film 
represents a pogrom perpetrated in Lvov. Although I have not discovered any published material that 
confirms Lvov as the location, after correspondence with Bruce Levi at the museum, I have been 
informed that the location of Lvov has been confirmed through the comparison of scenes in the moving 
picture with still photographs of the town. http://resources.ushmm.org/film, „Lvov pogrom, Jews rounded 
up, beatings‟, Story RG-60.0441, Tape 402. A copy of the film is also available at the US national 
archives: NARA/ARC 43456 , RG-238.7. 
27 IMT, Vol. III, 13/Dec/1945, p. 536. 
 
F I G U R E  1 ,  A / B :   Original 8mm film of Atrocities against Jews. A Wehrmacht soldier, having taken a 
photograph, walks away from the scene of a naked man being evicted by civilians. In a later scene, 
other Wehrmacht soldiers look on as a woman is evicted. 
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[...] undeniable evidence, made by the Germans themselves, of almost incredible 
brutality to Jewish people in the custody of the Nazis, including German military 
units. [...] And, as the other evidence to be presented by the prosecution will 
indicate, the scene presented to the Tribunal is probably one which occurred a 
thousand times all over Europe under the Nazi rule of terror.28 
Thus, rather than constituting specific evidence that would implicate the defendants 
on trial with direct involvement, this film – as with Nazi Concentration Camps – was 
used as an illustrative example of the „conspiracy‟ that contemplated such brutal 
behaviour by subordinates and others throughout occupied Europe. Although more 
comprehensive proof of direct participation in other particular events would be 
offered in the form of documentation, the film provided an emotive visual 
representation of violence that could be associated with other (documentary) 
evidence of „persecution‟. Once again, as with Nazi Concentration Camps, the 
association made between pictures and the use of a particular word (or two) had the 
potential to conjure images of injustice with more import than words alone could 
achieve. The use of film brought greater import to the use of words. 
The decision to screen the 8mm film as evidence in court was also accompanied, 
however, by the decision not to utilize two other films. One was a Nazi-made film of 
the Warsaw Ghetto and, for Major Walsh, was too „controversial‟:  
The German film on the Warsaw Ghetto is not going to be used because the shots 
of Jewish policemen, Jewish defectives, etc., are, in the judgement of Major 
Walsh, too controversial and with the 8 mm we have (plus the written SS [Stroop] 
report) exterminations of Ghettos are well covered.29 
The other film deemed unsuitable for use as evidence was an American-made film of 
items in the vaults of the Reichsbank in Frankfurt. These items were believed by the 
Prosecution to constitute the remnants of SS deliveries of „loot‟ taken from 
concentration-camp victims and delivered to the bank. But, unlike the other 
American-made films, there appeared to be a dearth of written documentation in 
regards to what, precisely, had been filmed. Thus, at first appearances, the film 
seemed to offer little „proof‟ relating to the direct involvement of any of the 
defendants: 
                                                     
28 Ibid. 
29 James B. Donovan to Colonel Storey, 12/Dec/1945, NARA/RG-238/51/26/‟Photographic Evidence‟. 
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The movies we took of some "Reichsbank Loot" at Frankfurt, [...] cannot be used 
because Captain Harris finally advised me yesterday that they have no proof that 
the materials photographed really were loot from Concentration Camp victims 
[...]. You realize that unlike our other films, that one does not speak for itself and 
cannot be used in the absence of such evidence. Needless to say, after having 
the [movie made ...] I was rather shocked to learn of the absence of supporting 
evidence. In any event, I have talked to Mr. Dodd about it and we both are 
agreed that if they have not the evidence the motion picture cannot be used.30 
This film, Reichsbank Loot, was different to other American motion-picture exhibits in a 
number of significant respects: most obviously, no perpetrators or victims were present 
on the screen. With no significant editing and no sound – such as the overdubbed 
narration, or display (and narration) of affidavits on-screen (as adopted in Nazi 
Concentration Camps, for example) – this film could not „speak for itself‟ as the 
prosecutors deemed other films could. As merely a sequence of mostly stationary 
shots of valuables being inspected, little that appeared seemed capable of 
provoking reactions in any defendant in the way that screening Nazi Concentration 
Camps or the 8mm „Persecution of the Jews‟ had. Thus in December 1945, whilst the 
American Prosecution case was still being presented to the Tribunal, the decision not 
to use the Warsaw Ghetto or Reichsbank films appeared to signal the end in the 
matter of the American use of motion-pictures before the Nuremberg IMT.31 By the 
time the American Prosecution case was completed, on 16th January 1946, no further 
motion-picture films were presented.32 
 
 
6.2. Walther Funk’s Tears and Incrimination 
This may have remained the situation in regard to the American use of film were it not 
for the emergence of fresh evidence in relation to „The Persecution of the Jews‟. With 
new documents and a new witness, the American Prosecution would prepare to 
revive a particular aspect of a case against an individual defendant and would use 
the Reichsbank film against him during cross-examination. Defendant Walther Funk 
had, even before the trial had begun, already admitted some part in pre-war 
„economic discrimination‟ against Jews. During an interrogation on 22nd October 1945 
he had spoken about his role in excluding Jews from the German economy as well as 
                                                     
30 Ibid. 
31 David Irving is one of the few non-contemporaries to write about the Reichsbank film (briefly). He states 
that it was „totally suppressed‟ because there was, he concludes, „no proof that the loot really had 
come, as claimed, from concentration camp victims‟. This, as we shall see, is entirely wrong. David J. C. 
Irving, Nuremberg: the last battle (Electronic ed.) (London: Focal Point, 1996), pp. 196-197. This book can 
be downloaded for free: http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Nuremberg/index.html (last access: 
13/Dec/2009). 
32 See Appendix I. 
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F I G U R E  2 :  Walther Funk, ex-President of the 
Reichsbank, in his cell at Nuremberg jail. 
the confiscation of Jewish property: 
[Funk:] So far as my participation in this Jewish affair is concerned, that 
was my responsibility, and I regretted later on that I ever partici-
pated. The Party had always brought pressure to bear on me to 
make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish property, and I re-
fused repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and 
the brutality against Jews were being carried out with full force, 
something legal had to be done to prevent the looting and con-
fiscation of the whole of Jewish property. 
[Interrogator:] You knew that the looting and all that was done at the instigation 
of the Party, didn't you? 
[Funk:] Here Defendant Funk wept and answered:  
 That is when I should have resigned, in 1938. I am guilty. I am guilty. 
I admit that I am a guilty party here.33 
Funk and his counsel continually 
maintained that he had been on the 
periphery of the circle of Nazi leaders, a 
little man of little influence, despite joining 
the Nazi Party before it came to power (in 
1931) and becoming State Secretary of 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in 
March 1933. “I arrived at the threshold, so to 
speak, but I was never permitted to cross 
it.”34 That there is some truth in his statement 
can hardly be said to exonerate his active 
involvement with the Nazi regime: it was, in 
part, because Funk was so pliable, so willing 
to accept his role in obeying Hitler‟s (and 
Göring‟s) command, that he was chosen to 
replace Hjalmar Schacht as Reich Minister 
of Economics in 1938 and President of the Reichsbank in 1939.35 His statement only 
betrayed the desire to have been more accepted within the circles of the highest 
Nazi leadership. His admission of guilt on the 22nd October 1945, however, did not 
extend to the part he was accused of playing in the „final solution‟ during the war. Yet 
his tearful breakdown and (qualified) admission of guilt during the interrogation – “I 
admit that I am a guilty party here” (i.e. only due to his activities during 1938) – came 
not only after his interrogator‟s brief accusations relating to confiscation of Jewish 
                                                     
33 PS-3544, IMT, Vol. XXXII, pp. 375-6; IMT, Vol. V, 11/Jan/1946, p. 161 (Emphasis added). 
34 IMT, Vol. XIII, 4/May/1946, p. 101. 
35 For Hans Pohl, the author of a biographical collection of German bankers of the 20 th Century, Funk did 
not warrant inclusion. Schacht did however (along with other Nazi-era bankers such as Karl Rasche). 
Hans Pohl, Deutsche Bankiers des 20 . Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007). 
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property before the war, but also after the much longer attempt to procure a 
confession in relation to something even more sinister:36 
[Interrogator:] Let me ask you something else: Do you remember the gold that 
the SS was collecting from the concentration camps?  
[Funk:]  I have never concerned myself with that gold.37 
This part of the interrogation was not read in court during the American Prosecution 
case because, given Funk‟s denials, there appeared to be little hard evidence from 
other sources (i.e. written documentation) to condemn him in this particular matter. 
But this part of the interrogation had led to twenty more questions and answers on the 
subject of Funk‟s complicity with the SS during the war. Funk would admit no part in 
the arrangements made between the Economic section of the Reich Security Main 
Office (RSHA) and the Reichsbank in accepting deliveries of property taken from Jews 
murdered in concentration camps. Yet the answer he gave suggested knowledge of 
something he wished to ignore at the time and after: “that gold”. It was after only the 
third question on the next – and less sinister – topic of seizing the property of living 
Jews (before the war) that Funk, as we have seen above, broke down. The 
accusations of collaboration with the SS in converting the possessions of murdered 
concentration camp victims into cash or gold bullion, therefore, appears to have 
played some part in provoking an emotional response that ended, not on the only 
occasion, in tears. 
On a previous occasion when Funk had also wept, what might have been 
interpreted as remorse – after what appears to have been an exaggerated 
confession of his own role in genocide – was perceived by his jailer as the self-pity and 
desire for leniency of a broken, „degraded‟, man.38 Colonel Buton C. Andrus would 
recount the showing of concentration camp footage to some of the prisoners (at 
Mondorf prison, before they were transported to Nuremberg) in order, as he told 
them, „not to inform you of what you already know, but to impress on you the fact 
that we know it, too‟.39 After the film had been shown, recalled Andrus, 
                                                     
36 IMT, Vol. V, 11/Jan/1946, p. 161. 
37 PS-3544, IMT, Vol. XXXII, p. 372 (Emphasis added). 
38 Andrus, The Infamous of Nuremberg, p. 56. 
39 Ibid., p. 54. The concentration camp footage shown to Funk and other prisoners at Andrus‟ behest (or 
with his approval) – although likely to have been composed of similar and, in some instances, the same 
footage – was not the same edited film of concentration camps that appeared (with narration) in the 
courtroom on 29/Nov/1945 (see Appendix I and the discussion of Nazi Concentration Camps in Chapter 
5, section 5.3). According to Andrus, what the prisoners saw was composed only of footage of 
Buchenwald camp. The making of Nazi Concentration Camps was not complete until the autumn of 
1945 . 
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Funk said: ' I have something to tell you, sir.' Then he began weeping. [...] He 
twisted his fingers and said: 'I have been a bad man Colonel and I want to tell 
[you] about it.‟ 
Funk then haltingly explained that he had been personally responsible for having 
Jewish prisoners murdered so that gold could be taken from their teeth without 
trouble. He had had it knocked out of their mouths while they were alive, but if 
they were dead there was far less bother.40 
So incredible is Andrus‟ account that it needs to be approached with caution. It 
seems highly improbably that Funk himself arranged for Jews to be murdered or had 
any say in the way that gold was taken from the victims although his part in (and 
knowledge of) the use of their possessions – once they were dead – is a different 
matter. Even if his tears were the product of self-pity or shame, rather than genuine 
feelings of remorse, or even if Andrus‟ account represents some form of embellish-
ment of Funk‟s reaction to the film, Funk was evidently deeply troubled by his part in 
the „persecution‟ of the Jews.  The report of an interrogation of Funk in November 
1945 noted that: 
[The] witness broke down and wept bitterly on several occasions during the 
interrogations as to the Jewish question. Although he admits responsibility for the 
Jewish discriminatory laws, he denies any participation in concentration camp 
activities‟.41 
Others observed him weeping on several other occasions in his cell and again when 
the Prosecution presented Nazi Concentration Camps in the courtroom.42 
Despite the tears, Funk‟s interrogation of 22nd October had not procured an 
admission of guilt as far as the Reichsbank‟s relationship with the SS was concerned. It 
was, however, the Defence‟s application for the testimony of a new witness that 
would provide a pretext to the Prosecution for reviving this part of the case against 
him. On 5th March 1946 Funk‟s Defence counsel, Dr. Fritz Sauter, had submitted a 
successful application to the Tribunal in order to present written answers from Emil 
Puhl, the ex-vice-President of the Reichsbank.43 The questionnaire sent to Puhl was 
designed to elicit answers that would demonstrate the limited influence that Funk had 
on finance policy and to imply that any measures that improved Reichsbank reserves 
                                                     
40 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
41 IWM/FO645/151/‟Funk‟/Interrogation, 8/Nov/1945. 
42 Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, p. 30; 47. Douglas Kelley, an American psychiatrist at Nuremberg, noted that 
Funk „wept frequently in his cell, overwhelmed by maudlin self-pity‟. Kelley, 22 Cells, p. 159. Another 
American psychiatrist, Leon Goldensohn, noted that „When the question of his political activity is 
approached he becomes tearful or defensive or both [...]‟. Leon Goldensohn & Robert Gellately, The 
Nuremberg interviews (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 76. Funk had also wept on being served with 
the indictment: Neave, Nuremberg, p. 124. 
43 There were certain qualifications to the prosecution‟s acceptance of this application: „[...] as I 
understand Dr. Sauter, he wants an affidavit in the form of answers to questions. The Prosecution have 
no objection to that, only [...] they reserve the right to apply for cross-interrogatories, if necessary; if the 
answers take a certain form, they might have to apply to the Court that the witness [Puhl] be brought 
for cross-examination‟. IMT, Vol. VIII, 5/Mar/1946, p. 538. 
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of gold were already in place before he took charge.44 This evidence, therefore, was 
primarily designed to counter the charge of conspiracy to wage aggressive war(s).45 
But by the time Funk took the stand as a witness in his own defence, and the charge 
of conspiracy to wage aggressive war was being confronted, the document 
containing Puhl‟s answers had not yet arrived in Nuremberg to be used by the 
Defence.46 In the meantime, interrogators on behalf of the Prosecution had reached 
Puhl and asked questions of their own. 
It appears that the Prosecution had already interrogated Puhl specifically on the 
subject of SS wartime deliveries to the Reichsbank, but had decided not to use him as 
a witness in court. Instead, he was merely questioned in order to garner information 
that would be useful in confronting Funk (during interrogation before the trial) so that 
the latter might confess his own guilt.47 It is possible that Jackson‟s aversion to the use 
of witnesses precluded the use of Puhl‟s testimony during the preparation and 
presentation of the American Prosecution case (particularly at a time when General 
William B. Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services, was in conflict over 
methods with Jackson who strongly favoured the use of Nazi self-incriminating 
documents rather than witness-testimony).48 However, when it came to using Puhl‟s 
testimony in May 1946, the Prosecution‟s use of such evidence occurred under quite 
different circumstances: by this time Donovan had left and the use of Puhl as a 
witness had first been requested by Defence counsel, a point stressed by the 
Prosecution in court.49 This helped to allay the Prosecution‟s concerns over 
appearances of reliability („objectivity‟) in the witnesses it chose to use. Furthermore, 
testimony from Puhl and another witness that would be called, could be supported by 
                                                     
44 Document Funk-17, IMT, Vol. XL, pp 231– 243. At this time Emil Puhl was being held as a prisoner in 
Altschweier, within the French zone of occupation. 
45 Of the four charges brought against Funk, this was, in fact, the only one with which Funk was declared 
innocent by the Tribunal. 
46 IMT, Vol. XIII, 6/May/1946, p. 108. 
47 When, on 22nd October 1945 at Nuremberg (before the trial began), Funk was confronted with the 
Reichsbank‟s acceptance of SS deliveries, the interrogator referred to „testimony [that] is clear that you 
came back and reported to the Reichsbank directors of  a conference that you had with Himmler 
before the gold was received‟ (PS-3544, IMT, Vol. XXXII, p.373.) The only bank employee in captivity and 
in a position to report this at the time was Emil Puhl. The interrogator also stated „Puhl also told you, 
didn‟t he, that that gold consisted of ... other kinds of gold articles ...?‟ (IMT, Vol. XXXII, p.374). Although 
Puhl was interrogated soon after this at Frankfurt (on 2nd, 7th , and 8th November 1945 – see documents 
EC-436, EC-437, and EC-438 of IMT, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 513-520) there appears to be no record from Puhl 
before 3rd May 1946 on the particular subject of SS war-time deliveries to the bank. After being named 
as a defence witness, interrogators on behalf of both the defence and the prosecution reached Puhl on 
1st May 1946. It was two days later that he gave prosecution interrogators an affidavit on the subject of 
SS deliveries to the Reichsbank (see: PS- 3944, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, p. 570). 
48 Salter, Nazi War Crimes, pp. 398-410. 
49 IMT, Vol. XIII, 6/May/1946, p. 161. 
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newly available documentation created by the bank itself during the war.50 The 
Prosecution was therefore willing not only to use written evidence provided by Puhl, 
but in fact suggested that it might be necessary to bring him to Nuremberg so that he 
might testify in court.51 On the 3rd May 1946, Puhl supplied the American Prosecution 
with written answers that would serve as new and damning evidence against Funk in 
regard to Crimes Against Humanity. 
Funk‟s cross-examination was conducted by Thomas J. Dodd, a prosecutor who 
appeared more capable in the art than his chief, Robert Jackson.52 In questioning 
Funk in the courtroom on 6th May 1946, after dealing with various other issues, Dodd 
asked about the character of Puhl.53 Funk vouched for the reliability of his ex-vice 
president of the bank. Dodd then switched to more general matters, extracting from 
Funk the admission that, during the war, gold required for foreign-exchange was 
plundered from Belgian and Czechoslovakian banks. Perhaps, as the line of 
questioning suggested, there was considerable need for as much gold as possible (to 
this Funk assented).54 Then Dodd switched to a new topic, beginning with the 
question that had not been posed to Funk for more than 6 months. The exchange is 
worth quoting at length: 
                                                     
50 See documents PS-3947, PS-3948, PS-3949, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 577-583. 
51 IMT, Vol. VIII, 5/Mar/1946, p. 538. 
52 I must qualify this statement, however, with the observation that Walther Funk was, from the point of 
view of the prosecution, much easier prey than Göring who had caused problems for Jackson during 
cross-examination – see: Tusa & Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 274-292.). The prosecution case of 
Hjalmar Schacht, with whom Jackson conducted cross-examination, was also more difficult than that of 
Funk‟s (see: Taylor, Anatomy, p. 383.). 
53 IMT, Vol. XIII, 6/May/1946, p. 161. 
54 Ibid., pp. 161-2. 
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MR. DODD: [...] When did you start to do business with the SS, Mr. Funk?  
FUNK: Business with the SS? I have never done that. 
MR. DODD: Yes, sir, business with the SS. Are you sure about that? I want you to 
take this very seriously. It [...] is very important to you. I ask you 
again, when did you start to do business with the SS? 
FUNK:  I never started business with the SS. I can only repeat what I said in 
the preliminary interrogation [of the 22nd October 1945]. Puhl one 
day informed me that a deposit had been received from the SS. 
First I assumed that it was a regular deposit, that is, a deposit which 
remained locked and which was of no further concern to us, but 
then Puhl told me later that these deposits of the SS should be used 
by the Reichsbank. I assumed they consisted of gold coins and for-
eign currency, but principally gold coins, which every German citi-
zen had had to turn in as it was, and which were taken from inmates 
of concentration camps and turned over to the Reichsbank. [All 
other v]aluables which had been taken from the inmates of con-
centration camps did not go to the Reichsbank but [...] to the Reich 
Minister of Finance [...]. 
MR. DODD: Just a minute. Were you in the habit of having gold teeth deposited 
in the Reichsbank?  
FUNK:  No. 
MR. DODD:  But you did have it from the SS, did you not? 
FUNK:  I do not know.55 
 
Dodd then proposed to read Puhl‟s affidavit. But due to (unsuccessful) Defence 
objections, he could not do so until the next day. 
When proceedings continued the following morning, Dodd first resumed with a 
recapitulation of what Funk had said and admitted the previous day. In reply to 
Dodd‟s summary, Funk provided a little more information that was probably 
unintended: after Puhl had informed him that SS deliveries would be made to the 
bank he had also told Funk, „somewhat ironically,‟ that it would be better to remain 
ignorant of their contents.56 At this time, Dodd did not capitalise on the potential 
inference that Funk must have thereby understood – even before they began arriving 
at the bank – that there was at least something suspicious about the contents of 
these deliveries.57 Instead, Dodd soon moved on to the question of whether the 
defendant had ever visited the vaults of the bank himself. Funk admitted that he had 
occasionally taken visitors there to show them the rooms where gold bars were kept 
but denied that he had ever seen any „jewels, cigarette cases, watches, and all that 
business‟ as Dodd had put it.58 After the process of questioning and denial was 
exhausted, Dodd next proposed to show the film of „Reichsbank Loot‟ that had been 
                                                     
55 Ibid., pp. 162-3. (Emphasis added).  
56 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 166. 
57 Dodd did later observe the inference that Funk‟s contemporaneous understanding of „irony‟ must have 
led him to believe that there was something potentially „sinister‟ about the contents of the deliveries. 
IMT, Vol. XXI, 16/Aug/1946, p. 238. 
58 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 168. 
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abandoned by the Prosecution the previous December.59 
 
 
6.3. Reichsbank Loot is shown 
Just before it was projected, the Tribunal agreed to Dodd‟s request that Funk be 
brought down from the dock to a position closer to the screen so that his memory 
would be „properly refreshed‟ (a touch of sarcasm that Dodd repeatedly employed 
in the face of the defendant‟s denials).60 Since Funk‟s front-row position in the dock 
was already quite close to the screen, one result of his repositioning would be to bring 
him significantly closer to the judges on the bench – making their observation of his 
reactions to the film a little easier. It also physically separated him from the other 
defendants enabling a more focused observation of him alone by everyone else in 
the courtroom. 
 
                                                     
59 IWM/Film & Video Archive/FOY 9; USA-845, IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 169. After the IMT trial, the 
American prosecution agreed to supply the British Foreign Office with copies of most of the films that 
had been presented by the American prosecution as evidence in return for the supply of microfilms of 
all British documents used in the trial. For confirmation of the delivery of Reichsbank Loot to the Foreign 
Office in London, see: Anne G. Blau to [E.J.] Passant, 25/Oct/1946, NA(UK)/FO-370/1330/[L 4590].As far 
as I am aware, the only copy of Reichsbank Loot available for viewing in its original form is the very 
same Foreign Office copy that was subsequently transferred (possibly via what was the Public Record 
Office) to the Imperial War Museum (UK). This has only been catalogued and available for viewing since 
the summer of 2008. Very brief excerpts were used in the production of Stuart Schulberg & Pare Lorentz 
(Dirs.), Nuremberg: Lessons for Today, (Berlin: DFU/OMGUS,1948), (from 49:32) and S. Svilov (Dir.), The 
Nuremberg Trials: A Film Document of the Trial of the Principal German War Criminals, (Moscow: Central 
Documentary Film Studios; American release: Artkino Pictures, Inc., 1947), (from 48:33). 
60 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 169. 
 
F I G U R E  3 :   One of the first scenes in Reichsbank Loot panning across 
the hoard of valuables stored in the vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank. 
(See note 59). 
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As the film was played, the court transcribers had little to do so that – just as with 
other films that were screened in court – the official transcripts would merely note (in 
brackets) that „[Moving pictures were then shown]‟.61 Those present in the courtroom, 
however, would first see the establishing shots of „loot‟ that had been filmed in the 
vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank.62 The rest consisted of close-up shots of valuables 
being inspected by Lt. Robert M. Braggins Jr., the only (partially) visible human 
presence in the film.63 Opening boxes and sacks, he revealed their contents: paper 
currency, coins, necklaces, rings, gems, broaches, clocks, cutlery, fob watches, 
eyeglasses and more. 
 
It was only the very last scene – the last fifty seconds in a 10-minute film – that 
suggested very probable signs of the bank‟s criminal association with genocide: 
Braggins opened boxes containing gold teeth, bridgework and dentures. It was only 
images of such items that had the potential to remind at least some people in the 
courtroom of the visual horrors of Nazi Concentration Camps. From where else, 
implied the Prosecution – and the images themselves – could such items in such 
quantity originate but from the murdered victims of concentration camps? Yet this 
film on its own, as the Prosecution had already decided in December, could not 
prove that such items originated from such places. As with other films presented as 
evidence, Reichsbank Loot was merely to serve as an illustrative example of crimes 
                                                     
61 Ibid. (Brackets and emphasis in original). On the general topic of reference to film in transcripts of 
international criminal trials (without space for much consideration of the details of the films presented at 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, or The Hague) see: Lennon, 'A Witness to Atrocity', pp. 65-73. 
62 The two OSS cameramen that made this film for the prosecution (OCC) were: Lt. Robert M. Braggins Jr. 
and Lloyd Louis Goldstein (who later changed his surname to „Garnell‟). PS-3956 (USA-878) & PS-3976 
(USA-879), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 591-594.  
63 PS-3976 (USA-879), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 593. 
 
F I G U R E  4 ,  A / B :   The sequence of close-ups in Reichsbank Loot begins with the clapperboard 
(which has appeared already in establishing scenes). Written in chalk, the names of the two filmmakers, 
„Goldstein‟ and „Braggins‟ appear mid-way down. The words „Reichbank-Frankfurt‟ [sic], along with the 
date, ‟21 Aug 1945‟, can be seen on the lower section of the board. Lt. Robert M. Braggins then removes 
it to inspect the contents of the box beneath. In a shot that follows later, he empties a sack-full of 
glittering gems on the floor and lets handfuls fall from his palm. 
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that could not be fully explained or proven through visual means alone. 
 
After Funk‟s denials that he had ever known about the items in the film, Dodd 
introduced the affidavit signed by Puhl, „the man who you told us yesterday was a 
credible gentleman, and whom you asked the Tribunal to call as a witness on your 
behalf.‟64 Puhl‟s written answers contradicted Funk‟s version of the way in which 
arrangements had been made to accept the SS deliveries. According to Puhl‟s 
statement, during the summer of 1942, Funk had told him of an arrangement agreed 
with Himmler to accept deliveries of unusual valuables sourced from concentration 
camps. Next, Puhl‟s statement asserted, Funk had instructed him to work out the 
specific arrangements for deliveries to the bank with Oswald Pohl, the head of the 
economic & administrative section (WVHA) of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) 
responsible for managing the „economic‟ aspects of the concentration camps.65 
Puhl‟s affidavit suggested not only that the initiative within the bank for arranging to 
receive SS deliveries had come from Funk, but that Funk was also well aware of the 
unusual nature of their contents and from where they had originated: 
                                                     
64 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 170; PS-3944 (USA-846/851), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 570-2. 
65 On Pohl‟s capture, see page 187. During interrogation by Leon Goldensohn, an American psychologist 
at Nuremberg, Pohl twice confirmed (on 4/Jun/1946 and 5/Jun/1946) that he had discussed 
arrangements for SS deliveries to the Reichsbank with Emil Puhl. He also implied that Funk was party to 
the arrangements. Goldensohn & Gellately, The Nuremberg interviews, pp. 395-396; 401-393. 
 
F I G U R E  5 :   The very last scene of Reichsbank Loot shows Lt. Robert M. 
Braggins inspecting boxes of gold teeth, dentures and bridgework. (See 
note 59). 
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I asked Funk what the source was of the gold, jewels, banknotes, and other articles 
to be delivered by the SS. Funk replied that it was confiscated property from the 
Eastern Occupied Territories, and that I should ask no further questions. I protested 
against the Reichsbank handling this material. Funk stated that we were to go 
ahead with the arrangements for handling the material, and that we were to keep 
the matter absolutely secret.66 
Funk appeared to be shocked by his ex-colleague‟s testimony: according to one 
observer, his reaction amounted to „an almost hysterical explosion of anger and 
fear‟.67 Puhl‟s assertions were simply not true, he claimed.68 Puhl, according to Funk, 
was simply trying to shift all the blame on him and should be brought to Nuremberg to 
deliver his testimony in the courtroom – „before God,‟ and Funk himself (the Tribunal 
subsequently agreed to have Puhl appear in court once he too had been shown the 
film).69 Although Funk had stated that his first knowledge of the SS deliveries had 
come from Puhl, he (Funk) could not deny the essential facts of the case: that in 
addition to accepting consignments of „unusual‟ material sourced from concentra-
tion camps, arrangements had been made by the bank itself to convert and sell such 
valuables in order to credit an account of the Reich Ministry of Finance.70 Dodd now 
presented him with documents providing evidence of such transactions, including a 
memo dated September 1942 sent from the Main Accounts Office of the bank. It 
reported the second delivery it had made to the Berlin Municipal Pawn Brokerage of 
an unusual collection of items to be valued and credited to the state. In addition to 
jewellery and other valuables that could be seen in the film, the one entry that had 
been crossed out read „diverse dentures, partly of gold‟.71 Another document 
provided evidence of related credits made to the Reich Ministry of Finance.72 
Although Dodd suggested it was remarkable for such arrangements and transactions 
to take place without the knowledge of the Reichsbank‟s president, Funk still denied 
all knowledge of such details, admitting only that he had presumed that the SS 
deliveries included only gold coins that Germans, just like concentration camp 
inmates, were obliged to surrender to the state.73 Finally, Dodd adopted a very 
different approach which had little to do with „hard‟ evidence at all: 
                                                     
66 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 170-1; PS-3944 (USA-846/851), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 570-2. 
67 Taylor, Anatomy, p. 396. 
68 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 172. 
69 Ibid., pp. 172, 179; IMT, Vol. XIII, 11/May/1946, pp. 434-5. 
70 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, pp. 173-176. 
71 PS-3948, (USA-847), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 579-581 (see note 1). 
72 PS-3949, (USA-848), IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 582-3. 
73 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 176. 
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MR. DODD: All right. You know you did on one occasion at least, and possibly 
two, break down and weep when you were being interrogated [in 
prison], you recall, and you did say you were a guilty man; and you 
gave an explanation of that yesterday. You remember, those tears. I 
am just asking you now; I am sure you do. I am just trying to establish 
the basis here for another question. You remember that happened?  
FUNK: Yes.  
MR.DODD: And you said, "I am a guilty man." You told us yesterday it was be-
cause you were upset a little bit in the general situation. I am suggest-
ing to you [the following:] is it not a fact that this matter [of SS deliver-
ies] has been on your conscience all the time and [is] really what is on 
your mind, and it has been a shadow on you ever since you have 
been in custody? And is it not about time that you told the whole 
story?74 
This attempt to induce more tears, to break down the witness so that he might finally 
admit his guilt in the face of his own conscience (rather than in the face of the 
evidence) did not result in any confession or expressions of remorse.   
But the film itself had a considerable effect on Funk who exclaimed that he was 
deeply shocked and confused by it.75 When Funk‟s Defence counsel asked him to 
comment on it, he declared: 
Photography and especially films are always very dangerous documents because 
they show many things in a light different from what they really are. I personally 
have the impression, and I believe the Prosecution will probably corroborate this, 
that all these deposits of valuables [...] came from the potassium mines where, at 
my instigation, all gold, foreign currency and other valuables of the Reichsbank 
had been stored away when, because of a terrific bombing attack on Berlin, we 
were no longer able to work in the Reichsbank. [...] Gold, foreign currency, and all 
other deposits of valuables were then taken to a potassium mine in Thuringia and 
from there apparently to Frankfurt, I assume.76 
Funk was correct in this assumption and, without expressly accusing the Americans of 
attempting to mislead the Tribunal in its use of the film, highlighted a problem for the 
Prosecution. Implicit in Funk‟s explanation – and in conflict with some of Dodd‟s 
statements – was the proposition that American troops had made the film only after 
they themselves had placed the items that appeared on the screen in the vaults of 
the Frankfurt Reichsbank. After the film had been shown in court the president of the 
Tribunal had reminded Dodd that proof would be required of how and where the film 
had been made.77 But in his reply and subsequent question to Funk, Dodd had 
appeared to be unsure of the exact circumstances surrounding the making of the 
Reichsbank film. The recording of his speech conveys just a little hesitancy that is lost 
                                                     
74 Ibid., pp.178-9. 
75 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 203. 
76 Ibid., pp. 203-4 (Emphasis added). 
77 The official transcript merely reads „...I take it you will offer evidence as to where that film was made‟. 
What the president actually said was „I take it, you will offer evidence of where that eh… how that film 
was made?‟ IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 169; IWM/Sound/3323, 7/May/1946. 
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in the official transcript: 
MR. DODD: [...] There will be an affidavit as to the circumstances under which 
[the film] was made, who was present, and the time it was taken; but, for the 
information of the Tribunal, it was taken in ...eh... Frankfurt when the ...eh... Allied 
Forces ...eh... captured that city and went into the Reichsbank vaults. 
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, Witness, having seen these pictures of materials 
that were found in your Reichsbank vaults a year ago, or a little earlier than a year 
ago, this time [do] you now recall that you did have such material [...?]78 
Dodd‟s answer to the president of the Tribunal suggested that, once Frankfurt had 
been captured, the SS „loot‟ had been found by Allied troops in the vaults of that 
city‟s Reichsbank branch. Furthermore, taken together with the question he then 
posed to the defendant, Dodd suggested that the film had been shot at some time 
between late March and (at the very latest) early May, 1945: at the time, or soon 
after, the SS items were presumed by Dodd to have been discovered by Allied troops 
in Frankfurt.79 
The appearance of Emil Puhl in court would both help and hinder the Prosecution 
case in various respects and would cast more doubt on Dodd‟s version of events in 
relation to the making of the film. The Defence proposed that before he gave 
testimony in court, Puhl should be shown the film; to this the Prosecution consented.80 
When he took the stand, Puhl‟s priority appeared to be to avoid, as much as was 
possible, incriminating himself: a wise approach since he would later be prosecuted in 
the eleventh „subsequent‟ trial at Nuremberg.81 Now, at the IMT, he retracted and 
even contradicted some of the most devastating testimony he had provided to the 
Prosecution in the form of his affidavit on 3rd May, suggesting, for example, that he 
had become aware of the contents of the SS deliveries only after his initial arrest and 
interrogation by the Allies (i.e. not from what Funk – or anyone else – had told him 
during the war).82 Yet he did maintain – contrary to Funk‟s testimony – that Funk had 
first informed him of the proposal to accept and process the deliveries. This would 
lead to Funk‟s admission, some days later, that, indeed, after meeting with Himmler, 
he (Funk) had then informed Puhl that the deliveries would take place.83 Despite this 
little victory for the Prosecution, however, a significant problem materialised with 
Puhl‟s assessment of the context in which the film had been made: ‟[...] I had the 
                                                     
78 IWM/Sound/3323, 7/May/1946; IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 169 (Emphasis added). 
79 Frankfurt was captured by the 90th Division of Patton‟s 3rd Army on 26/Mar/1945. Greg Bradsher, 'Nazi 
Gold: The Merkers Mine Treasure,' Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records 
Administration, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1999), p. 7. 
80 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 434. 
81 Puhl would be found guilty of Crimes Against Humanity and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment – chiefly 
for his part in the dealings between the SS and the bank. 
82 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 569 (Emphasis added). 
83 IMT, Vol. XVII, 4/Jul/1946, p. 495. 
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impression that the things of which we are now talking had been put there [in the 
vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank] expressly for the purpose of taking the film.‟84 
Rebecca West, who observed some sessions of the court and reported for a 
variety of newspapers and magazines during and after the trial, suggested that Dodd 
had made a „single slip‟ in his comments regarding the film: „He either meant to say 
“photographed” instead of “found”, or suffered a confusion which was purely 
momentary‟.85 In other words, West implied that Dodd had already known about the 
move, by American troops, of the treasure into the Frankfurt vaults before the film had 
been made. West also implied that Dodd had intended to convey this information 
but instead had made a slip of the tongue. Yet such a suggestion does not tally with 
what took place in the courtroom: Dodd had asserted on three separate occasions 
that when Allied troops entered Frankfurt for the first time, they had discovered the 
items in the vaults of the Reichsbank and then immediately (or soon after) made a 
film of them.86 
 
 
6.4. The story of the Reichsbank ‘Treasure’ 
Dodd‟s assertions were plainly wrong. Whilst Funk had claimed that he was 
„completely confused‟ by the film, he had, in fact, partly explained what had 
happened: vast quantities of gold bullion, currencies and other items commonly 
expected to be found in a bank, had accumulated and/or been stored, not only in 
the vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank, but (to a much greater degree) also in the 
vaults of the Berlin branch for most of the duration of the war.87 The „unusual‟ items 
delivered by the SS had been brought to the Berlin branch where both Puhl and Funk 
had been based. It was due to the heavy Allied bombing raid on 3rd February 1945, 
that Funk himself had ordered the transfer of the Berlin Reichsbank‟s contents to the 
Kaiseroda potassium mine in Merkers, Thuringia (the Berlin Reichsbank building had 
sustained considerable damage).88 The Merkers mine was the last refuge in the centre 
                                                     
84 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 563. 
85 West, A Train of Powder, pp. 252-253. It appears likely that West was not present during Funk‟s defence 
or at the time the film was shown: when she wrote about Funk and the film, she used the official 
transcripts (see West, op. cit., p. 254) rather than notes from personal observation. Thus clues in the film, 
and in Dodd‟s slight hesitations in his declaration of its provenance, were not available to her. 
86 See the statements Dodd made the day before the film was shown (IMT, Vol. XIII, 6/May/1946, p. 163) 
and just before and after it was projected in the courtroom (IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, pp. 169). 
87 Puhl had confirmed to Funk‟s defence counsel that the items had been delivered by the SS to the Berlin 
branch of the bank. IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 564. 
88 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, pp. 203-4; Bradsher, 'Nazi Gold,' pp. 8-9. According to an early interrogation of 
Funk, Hitler had instructed him to move the contents of the bank to „a mine in central Germany but this 
was captured by American troops‟. PS-2828, NCA, Vol. V, p. 484. 
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of Germany for the vast bulk of the Third Reich‟s wealth, increasingly threatened by 
the last efforts of a successful Allied invasion.89 It did not take long for the Allies to 
discover it. On 8th April American troops of Lt. General George Patton‟s Third Army, 
having already occupied Frankfurt on 28th March, confirmed the existence of a huge 
hoard of wealth buried 21,000 feet beneath the ground at Merkers.90 
After the discovery it quickly became apparent that, at the rear of the huge 
cavern in which the entire horde was located, an unusual collection of items, quite 
different to the rest of the treasure, was relevant to potential war crimes investigators:  
Included in this inventory is a large quantity of material which it is evident be-
longed to the SS or the Gestapo. Evidence indicates that this part of the treasure 
represents loot taken from individuals who have been murdered as it includes 
thousands of gold and silver dental crowns, bridges and plates and some personal 
articles. It may, therefore, constitute items of evidence, and should be considered 
in that light. It is believed that agencies engaged in the determination of evi-
dence for the prosecution of war criminals should be informed, and at the proper 
time should be permitted to inspect and investigate this part of the property.91 
Generals Patton and Eisenhower soon visited the mine which, in addition to the Berlin 
Reichsbank deposits, contained gold bullion from other Reichsbank branches as well 
as a huge collection of some of the most prized pieces of art in Europe.92 The 
discovery of such wealth, and the issue of what to do next, was soon understood by 
Patton to be a „political question‟: it was something other than a matter of security, 
since he was confident that German troops would not be able to recapture the mine 
(he had originally considered keeping the treasure where it was).93  
 
                                                     
89 At this time, gold was also being transferred to Merkers from several other branches of the Reichsbank in 
Germany. The Merkers hoard would account for approximately 91% of the entire gold reserves of the 
Third Reich recovered by the Allies. William Z. Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold 
and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II: Preliminary Study, (Washington: 
Dept. of State, 1997), p. 153. 
90 Bradsher, 'Nazi Gold,' p. 11. 
91 Lt. Gen. W.B. Smith [on behalf of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander] to the 
Secretaries of the Combined Chief of Staff Committee [SHAEF], „Gold bullion, currency and other 
property discovered by Third Army near Merkers‟, 20/Apr/1945, NA(UK)/FO-1046/266/17. 
92 Bradsher, 'Nazi Gold,' p. 15. 
93 Ibid., p. 11. Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Interview with Bernard Bernstein, 23/Jul/1975, Truman Library 
Online/Bernard Bernstein Papers, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bernsten.htm#transcript (last 
access: 7/Jan/2010), p. 116. 
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The answer that Eisenhower quickly reached was to move the hoard westward as 
soon as possible. Col. Bernard D. Bernstein, the man chosen by Eisenhower to take 
charge of the move, had astounded Patton by telling him that the current location of 
the treasure sat in what – at the Big Three conference at Yalta – had been 
designated as the Russian zone of occupation and that it needed to be moved 
further west before the Russians arrived.94 The incentive to move quickly was 
increased by what was soon viewed as a grave mistake to allow reporters to publish 
reports of the discovery. Not only would the major newspapers cover the story: the 
familiar voice of Ed Herlihy would dramatise the find for his American audience of 
Universal Newsreels: „Murder will out‟, he would conclude in his report, „even from the 
depths of the earth‟.
95
 
Although one British official perceived the gravity of the situation in allowing 
Germans to learn of the mine‟s discovery (according to his report, the responsible 
censor was sacked), it seems more likely that the greatest danger apparent to 
American commanders was making the Russians aware of the move of such treasure 
away from the prospective Russian zone.96 The sooner it was moved, the less trouble 
there might be. On the 15th April, therefore, the entire contents of the mine were 
                                                     
94 McKinzie, Bernstein Oral History, pp.117, 122-3. Merkers stood approximately five miles east of the Yalta-
designated American-Russian zonal boundary, an area in which American troops made speedy 
progress and would soon relinquish to Russian troops. (See NA(UK)/FO-1046/266/13A). 
95 Ed Herlihy, „German Loot Discovered‟, Universal Newsreel, 17/May/1945. 
96 G. M. Jennings to Colin Crowe, UK Treasury Delegation, Washington, 3/May/1946, NA(UK)/FO-
1046/266/14A. The following story (in this letter) that had made its way to the British appears to have 
been embellished in order to provide politically acceptable justification for quickly moving the treasure 
away from what would become the Russian zone of occupation: „The censor (afterward sacked) who 
let the story of the discovery of the gold get past did the Third Army a bad turn; as soon as the Germans 
knew the discovery had been made they counter attacked, in an effort to recover their valuables, and 
caused a considerable number of casualties among the Americans. Patton thereupon insisted on the 
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F I G U R E  6 ,  A / B :   Part of the Reichsbank hoard discovered by General George Patton‟s 3rd U.S. 
Army on 8/Apr/1945 at the Kaiseroda Potassium mine, Merkers, Thuringia. On 12/Apr/1945, Generals 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley and Patton examine the treasure including the cache of SS-
looted valuables.(NARA/RG-111/SC-205409;SC-204515). 
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transported by American troops with 32 ten-ton trucks under heavy guard (including 
low-flying P-51 Mustang fighter-planes) to the Reichsbank in Frankfurt, soon to 
become the Foreign Exchange Depository (FED) of U.S. military government.97 It was 
not until much later – on 21st August 1945 – that Lt. Robert M. Braggins and Lloyd Louis 
Goldstein, at the direction of the OCC, reached the Frankfurt Reichsbank in order to 
film what had previously constituted the contents of SS shipments to the Berlin branch 
of the Reichsbank during the war.98 
Funk had alluded to this (correct) version of events: that the treasure had been 
moved at his instigation to „the potassium mines‟ and then, by Americans, into 
Frankfurt before being filmed. But although he had also suggested that the 
Prosecution should confirm this story, Dodd refrained from doing so explicitly in the 
courtroom.99 There are a number of ways in which to interpret Dodd‟s incorrect 
suggestions (that once American troops entered Frankfurt, they had discovered and 
then filmed SS items in the vaults of the city‟s Reichsbank) and his subsequent 
disinclination to clarify explicitly the circumstances under which the film had been 
made. One is to suggest that he, along with the filmmakers, was intentionally involved 
in a deception aimed at unfairly convicting Funk. This was the line taken subsequently 
by Hans Fritzsche, one of the three defendants that the Tribunal would acquit (he later 
served as a Defence witness in the „subsequent‟ Nuremberg trials of Oswald Pohl and 
Emil Puhl).100 In 1953, Fritzsche‟s memoirs of the trial were published and included a 
short chapter entitled „Funk and the bogus film‟.101 Here Fritzsche portrayed the 
banker as an unfortunate, „impressionable‟ and „unpolitical‟ pawn whom the Nazis 
had misled (as though he had not been a Nazi himself) and whom, subsequently, the 
prosecutors at Nuremberg had damned unjustly.102 In addition to a stream of 
inaccuracies relating to facts (as well as interpretation) Fritzsche ended his chapter 
without having mentioned the origins of the treasure and implying that the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the film were very simple: it was an 
American hoax.103 
                                                     
97 Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold, p. xxxi. 
98 Both men were members of the Field Photographic Branch of the OSS which was assisting the OCC. 
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102 Ibid., p. 220. 
103 Ibid., p. 224. Among the numerous inaccuracies Fritzsche made was the confusion of images of 
Reichsbank Loot with newsreel of the Merkers discovery (p. 221); he also stated (incorrectly) that the 
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After the publication of Fritzsche‟s book, Robert Jackson recalled that: 
[Fritzsche] had been amused at everything that happened at the trial and fre-
quently at the end of a day entertained [himself] by telling the other [defendants] 
what he would say if he was running Goebbels‟ propaganda bureau. He later 
wrote about the trials in the same spirit of propaganda.104 
This was echoed by Rebecca West, who went a little further in denouncing Fritzsche‟s 
suggestion of an American hoax as „a lie‟: although he had been justly acquitted 
because he had not participated in gravely criminal activity, Fritzsche was, however, 
„so much of a Nazi that one of his chapters troubles us as if Goebbels was sti ll 
about‟.105 Given Fritzsche‟s highly selective and inaccurate use of facts, this was a fair 
observation but, as we have seen, West was unaware of, or unwilling to admit, 
Dodd‟s repeated (and incorrect) insistence that the Allies had first discovered the 
„loot‟ in the vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank before filming it. Although West was 
under the mistaken impression that the SS had originally delivered the treasure to 
Frankfurt and that American troops had simply returned it to its place of origin, she sti ll 
made a convincing case that the idea of an American hoax was illogical.106 But a 
particularly significant item of evidence remained unavailable to her: the film, 
Reichsbank Loot.107 
Unlike the other American-made films used as evidence (Nazi Concentration 
Camps and The Nazi Plan), the film did not begin with the on-screen reading of 
affidavits attesting to the authenticity of subsequent images or details surrounding its 
making. However, it did provide some information with a close-up and wider shots of 
a clapper-board. Not only the names of the film-makers appeared on the board; the 
location and date was also clear to see: the Frankfurt Reichsbank, on 21 st August, 
1945 (see Figure 4-a, p. 170). If the American Prosecution‟s aim had been to present a 
„bogus‟ film intentionally – in order to trick the judges into believing it had been made 
at the time of the initial Allied occupation of Frankfurt – the appearance of such a 
late date would have been particularly unhelpful. As it stood, the date on the 
clapperboard demonstrated that, at the very least, the filmmakers themselves were 
not involved in any hoax: its very inclusion contradicted Dodd‟s statements when the 
                                                                                                                                                           
witness Emil Puhl had come to Nuremberg as a free man but was, after giving evidence in court, 
imprisoned by the Allies (p. 223-4). This implied – without evidence – that witness testimony unhelpful to 
the prosecution might be punished (leading to the further implication that helpful witness testimony 
might be rewarded). Fritzsche had probably confused Puhl with another witness, Albert Thoms, who had 
come to Nuremberg without being imprisoned. 
104 LoC/RHJP/259/4, p. 1620. 
105 West, A Train of Powder, p. 251. 
106 Ibid., pp. 252-253. 
107 The only copy in the UK at the time West wrote sat in the library of the Foreign Office and was not 
available to the public or journalists for viewing. See note 59. 
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film was shown. This also suggests that Dodd was mistaken rather than engaged in 
deceiving the Tribunal. 
What appears to be most likely is that Dodd was initially unaware of the relocation 
of the Merkers treasure to Frankfurt (or of its relevance to the items shown in the film) 
and unaware of the date on which the film had been made. If he had intended to 
deceive the judges or anyone else it seems highly probable that he would have 
taken more notice of the details written on the clapperboard.108 It would then have 
made more sense to either edit the film (so that the clapperboard would not appear) 
or simply not to have used it at all (since, as has already been noted, the Prosecution 
did not view the film by itself to constitute enough evidence to convict Funk). Since 
Dodd‟s main reason for showing it was to confront Funk with images of gold dentures 
– in the very last scene – Dodd did not take notice of the evidence within the film itself 
of when it had been made. The other main purpose of the film was to provide 
„illustrative‟ images that could be confirmed by witnesses to represent what were 
„typical‟ of the contents of the SS deliveries (as we shall see). Thus the location and 
date of the film appeared unimportant to Dodd. 
However, the matter of why Dodd did not acknowledge his mistake – after the 
relocation of the treasure from „the potassium mines‟ to Frankfurt was mentioned by 
Funk in court – remains to be explained.109 There are at least three good reasons for 
this: the matter of personal prestige; maintaining the appearance of as strong a case 
as possible against Funk; and the desire to avoid controversy with the Russians. 
As Dodd wrote with evident pride in a letter to his wife on 8 th May 1946, much 
praise had been given him by important members of the court for the job he had 
made of Funk‟s cross-examination: 
I finished cross-examining Funk yesterday morning. I feel it was successful and I am 
pleased because the British and American judges complimented me. Sir Norman 
Birkett, the British alternate judge and a great trial lawyer in Britain, told me it was 
“one of the very best of the trial”. He told the others the same. Justice Jackson 
was very kind and generous in his praise, and so was [Judge] Biddle. All in all 
everyone seemed to think it was very successful. I of course was glad of that. I am 
wondering if it was carried in the press at home. If so you know of it now.110 
For every piece of praise laid on Dodd – by such major players in the trial – there 
came an added incentive to avoid any admission of error that might tarnish what was 
                                                     
108 Furthermore, if the use of the film had been „bogus‟ then it seems highly unlikely that the Americans 
would have given copies of it to the British. Even more significantly, the film was also made available to 
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(see note 59.) 
109 See Funk‟s testimony at p. 27. 
110 Thomas J. Dodd to Grace Dodd, 8/May/1946, Christopher J. Dodd & Lary Bloom, Letters from 
Nuremberg: My Father's Narrative of a quest for Justice (New York: Crown, 2007), p. 300. 
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perceived (at least by Judge Birkett) as one of the best Prosecution performances of 
the trial.111 Furthermore, the very process of expressing pride in his work to his wife 
would have served as another incentive towards preserving the appearance of a job 
well done. His letter also demonstrated his concern with the wider, public, reception 
of his case against Funk. All this would be jeopardised by what seemed to be an 
unnecessary admission of what appeared to be a relatively insignificant mistake. 
 Next, an admission that he had been mistaken should not have impacted the 
strength of the case against Funk: the issue of whether or not the items in the film had 
been moved into Frankfurt by American troops should hardly have mattered since 
Funk himself had implied that they had originally been delivered to the very building 
in Berlin at which he had worked as Reichsbank president112. Yet as Fritzsche‟s book 
later demonstrated, any small matter of detail provided by the Prosecution that could 
be questioned in any way would serve to complicate the Prosecution‟s case and 
help Funk‟s defence. Funk had, in fact, used the circumstances of the treasure‟s 
move to attempt to obfuscate the matter of what could be observed in the film: 
I cannot tell from this film which of these items were deliveries by the SS and which 
were genuine deposits. [...]. It is [...] quite possible that certain functionaries of 
concentration camps made genuine deposits in the Reichsbank which contained 
such articles, to safeguard them for future use. [...] However, [...] I had no knowl-
edge whatsoever of these things and of the fact that jewellery, diamonds, pearls, 
and other objects were delivered from concentration camps to the Reichsbank to 
such an extent. [...]113 
Here Funk was making use of the fact that the items in the film were never 
demonstrated beyond doubt by the Prosecution to be the actual items delivered by 
the SS to Berlin. Funk‟s knowledge of the American move of the treasure allowed him 
a significant measure of wishful thinking in his assertion that such items might 
constitute „genuine‟ deposits from „functionaries‟ of concentration camps. Faced 
with Dodd‟s repeated questioning as to whether it was normal for anyone to deposit 
their gold dentures in a bank, Funk‟s suggestion constituted a rather hopeless and 
desperate attempt to confuse „genuine‟ deposits with items taken from murdered 
victims of concentration camps. His speech, cited above, only confirmed his 
acknowledgement of the fact of the original SS deliveries to Berlin, and his last four 
words, „to such an extent‟, implied at least some basic knowledge of the shipments 
during the time that they had been delivered to the Berlin Reichsbank. However, i f 
                                                     
111 Before Dodd‟s cross-examination of Funk had even begun, Justice Jackson had praised him highly in a 
letter to President Harry Truman. Whether or not Jackson informed Dodd of the commendation I cannot 
say. RHJ to The President, 24/Apr/1946, Truman Library Online/Nuremberg. 
112 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, pp. 203-4. 
113 Ibid. (Emphasis added). 
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further discussion over the making of the film had taken place in court, there was at 
least the possibility that, once the judges were publicly made aware of the 
circumstances of its making (i.e. that it was made only after the treasure was moved 
in by American troops), they might have decided to dismiss the film as inadmissible 
evidence on the basis of its being irrelevant. It therefore made little sense for the 
Prosecution to highlight the complex circumstances under which it was made. From 
the perspective of the Prosecution, a good case had already been made against 
Funk. There seemed little point in jeopardising a case which had already been 
praised by the most important individuals that the Prosecution needed to persuade: 
the judges on the bench. 
Finally, there is the political matter of the treasure that, throughout the entire trial, 
cast a deafening silence. The fact that the American army had quickly removed such 
a vast horde of wealth away from the designated Russian zone was a potentially 
contentious issue between the Russians and Americans, within and beyond 
Nuremberg. This story had the makings of a Soviet ideological critique of western 
„capitalist‟ motivation in the fight against „fascism‟: put simply, had not the Americans 
taken the booty of war away from what was rightfully due to the Russians? Not once 
was the word „Merkers‟ – the original location of the treasure discovered by American 
troops – uttered in court during the IMT trial.114 Even within the private correspon-
dence of the American Prosecution, no discussion of the matter appears to have 
been recorded. From the sources available, it seems impossible to determine exactly 
when Dodd learned of the move of the treasure from Merkers to Frankfurt (or of the 
relevance of the move to what could be seen in the film). What is apparent, however, 
is that the decision to use the film and to gain affidavits attesting to its authenticity 
was a hastily arranged matter in May 1946 (the two affidavits relating to the film were 
signed and dated in May 1946 – rather than December 1945, when the prosecutors 
had first considered using it).115 Thus it seems most likely that Dodd only learned of the 
relevance of Merkers on the day the film had been shown in court (when Funk then 
suggested that the items in the film had come from „the potassium mines‟, rather than 
being discovered by American troops in the vaults of the Frankfurt Reichsbank). 
Whatever the timing of Dodd‟s knowledge of the move from Merkers, once aware of 
such a contentious issue, the Prosecution resolved on keeping the issue private: 
before the affidavits were presented to the court, Dodd received a memorandum 
                                                     
114 The only reference to the location of the mine – that could identify it as standing in the prospective 
Russian zone – was Funk‟s unprompted mention of „Thuringia‟ on two occasions. (IMT, Vol. XIII, pp. 137, 
204). However, even Funk did not refer to the name of the mine or the village itself. 
115 PS-3956, PS-3976, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 591-594. 
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implying that he should not dwell on the issues surrounding the origins of the treasure. 
The suggested text to be read in court was as follows: 
A motion picture film was shown during the cross-examination of the defendant 
Funk. The film showed a portion of the loot turned over to the Reichsbank by the 
SS, as discovered after the defeat of Germany. [...] I stated that I would submit 
affidavits as to the source of the film. I would now like to offer these affidavits, and 
ask that they be admitted into evidence without their being read. The first affidavit 
is by Captain Harris, who arranged to have the pictures taken, and the second is 
by Mr. [Goldstein], one of the photographers who made the picture.116 
With this proposed statement, Dodd was supposed to brush over both the location of 
the treasure‟s original discovery by American troops (in the designated Russian zone) 
as well as the date the film had been made (much later than when American troops 
entered Frankfurt) by vaguely stating „as discovered after the defeat of Germany‟. 
Most significantly, with this unusual proposal that Dodd request the documents not be 
read in court, the date of the film‟s making would only become publicly available 
after the trial.117 Even then, the date, together with more details on the making of the 
film, would be buried in volume XXXIII within a total of 18 thick volumes of thousands 
of documents in the official publication of the Tribunal (published three years after the 
trial, in 1949).118 When Dodd came to offer the documents to the Tribunal, he did not 
stick to the script he had been given and did not even allude in any way to the time 
or place of the treasure‟s discovery or filming. The judges did not request that the 
documents be read – only the document numbers were read in court.119 Thus a major 
problem with this film – that it constituted part of the story of the American endeavour 
to remove the vast bulk of the Third Reich‟s wealth away from Russian troops – was 
successfully circumvented by the American Prosecution at Nuremberg. 
What made most sense from an American perspective – in prosecuting Funk and 
avoiding potential public or diplomatic controversy – was to focus on the 
circumstances of the original SS deliveries to the Berlin branch of the Reichsbank 
during the war (and, as we can say now, during the Holocaust). Because both 
Walther Funk and Emil Puhl continued to deny that they had had specific knowledge 
                                                     
116 [Anonymous, possibly Bernard D. Meltzer] to Mr. Thomas J. Dodd, „Notes for presentation of Funk 
Documents to the Tribunal‟, 28/May/1946, TJDC/TJDP/300/7621, p. 3 (Emphasis added). Lloyd Louis 
Goldstein had changed his surname to „Garnell‟ since making the film (see PS-3976, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, p. 
592). 
117 The date was, as already stated, written on the clapperboard shown in the film itself so would have 
been visible to a particularly perceptive observer in court. However, since the prosecution chose to 
focus on the „looted‟ items - and, in particular, the dental gold - it seems unlikely that the date on the 
clapperboard (or the other information written on it) was deemed by anyone to be significant at the 
time the film was shown. 
118 See footnote 115. The 18 volumes were published in addition to transcripts, indexes and guides, making 
a total of 42 volumes (see IMT in bibliography). 
119 IMT, Vol. XIV, 28/May/1946, p. 602. 
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of the contents of the Melmer deliveries (particularly the existence of dental gold), it 
took the use of a new Prosecution witnesses to demonstrate that somebody in the 
bank knew exactly what was being delivered. During Puhl‟s cross-examination by 
Dodd during the morning of 15th May, the former had been confronted with a 
statement made by Albert Thoms, previously a middle-ranking employee at the Berlin 
Reichsbank who had been instructed by Puhl to receive and process the deliveries.120 
Dodd read and summarized passages from this statement in court, including the 
assertion that Puhl had told Thoms that the deliveries would include „unusual 
property‟.121 Also contained in this statement was the assertion that Puhl later 
contacted Thoms for an update on the progress of the deliveries.122 Perhaps most 
significantly, Thoms‟ statement provided comments on the origins of the items: 
One of the first hints of the sources of these items occurred when it was noticed 
that a packet of bills was stamped with a rubber stamp, “Lublin”. This occurred 
some time early in 1943. Another hint came when some items bore the stamp, 
'Auschwitz.' We all knew that these places were the sites of concentration camps. 
It was the tenth delivery, in November 1942, that dental gold appeared. The 
quantity of the dental gold became unusually great.123 
Thoms‟ statement also explained that a certain Bruno Melmer of the SS was the man 
who appeared, out of uniform, with each of the approximately 77 deliveries to the 
bank, beginning with the first on 26th August of 1942.124 Having been shown the film 
outside the courtroom at midday, Thoms took the stand on the afternoon of 15 th May 
at the request of Dr. Sauter, Funk‟s counsel.125 He was, however, first questioned by 
Dodd, who referred to the film, but only as an illustrative example of the items 
contained within the „Melmer‟ deliveries: 
MR. DODD: Alter seeing that film, are you able to say whether or not that repre-
sents a fair representation of the appearance of some of the ship-
ments that were received by the Reichsbank from the SS? 
THOMS: I may say that this film and the pictures which I have seen in it were 
typical of the "Melmer" deliveries [...]126 
Thoms was in a position to say much more than he did about what he had seen in the 
film. Most significantly, he could have stated that there was little doubt that the items 
in the film were not merely „typical‟, but actual elements of the Melmer deliveries. It 
                                                     
120 Albert Thoms was head of the Precious metals department at the bank. On his capture, see: James 
Stewart Martin, All honorable men (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1950), p. 121. 
121 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 580; PS-3951, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, p. 585. 
122 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 581; PS-3951, IMT, Vol. XXXIII, p. 585. 
123 Ibid. (Both sources). 
124 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, pp. 580, 605. There were 78 deliveries in total according to the FED: Slany, 
U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold, p. 165. 
125 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, pp. 593-4. 
126 Ibid., p. 604. 
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had been Thoms himself who had been charged with inventorying all the deliveries as 
they came in to Berlin and was also in charge of moving what remained of them (i.e. 
those items that had not been processed) from Berlin to Merkers (later than the rest of 
the contents of the vaults of the Reichsbank in Berlin).127 He therefore knew the 
distinctive form that the cache took: unlike anything else in the vaults he had dealt 
with, they were contained within tattered suitcases, boxes, chests, and other 
containers that could be seen in the film.128 He had been captured attempting to 
escape from Merkers and brought back by American investigators to the mine in 
order to identify the „Melmer‟ cache.129 As Thoms had known, each container 
brought to the Berlin vaults had been labelled to identify it clearly as being part of the 
SS treasure (these labels could be seen in the film).130 Furthermore, the Melmer items 
were kept separate from the rest of the treasure when moved into the Frankfurt 
Reichsbank by American troops and were kept under especially strict security 
conditions.131 Thoms had been present when the treasure was moved into Frankfurt. 
The tag identifying each item as an SS delivery remained attached in the Frankfurt 
vaults. There had, therefore, been no chance of confusing SS-delivered items with 
those that constituted more regular items from the bank when the film was made. 
Yet although Thoms was aware of all this, to prove it would have required 
evidence from somebody else who could demonstrate with some authority that the 
SS items had reached Frankfurt intact and had remained isolated from the rest of the 
Merkers treasure: that what could be seen in the film were indeed the actual by-
products of „the Final Solution‟. The most appropriate of several Americans who would 
have been able to provide such evidence – in the form of either an affidavit or 
testimony in court – was Bernard D. Bernstein, the man who had been in charge of 
moving the treasure once it was in American custody. (In fact, Bernstein had sent 
reports about the Melmer cache to Justice Jackson, before the trial had begun.)132 
But, as we have seen, there were good reasons for Dodd and the Prosecution to 
                                                     
127 The SS items were not moved from Berlin until 18/Mar/1945. Bradsher, 'Nazi Gold,' p. 9. 
128Most of the items were contained in such containers which signified that they had not been processed 
at the Berlin Reichsbank. The small amount of valuables that had been inventoried, however, were 
contained in sacks bearing the word „Reichsbank‟ (IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p.616). The „Melmer‟ 
cache moved to Merkers, and subsequently, to Frankfurt, constituted only a small portion of the 
approximately 78 original Melmer deliveries to the Berlin Reichsbank: the portion which had not been 
processed and converted into gold bullion or liquid assets by the bank. See Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts 
to Recover and Restore Gold, pp. 160-163. 
129 Bradsher, 'Nazi Gold,' p. 10. 
130 McKinzie, Bernstein oral history, p. 132. 
131 Ibid. pp. 128-9. 
132 McKinzie, Bernstein oral history, p. 132. Furthermore, Bernstein had known Jackson from earlier days in 
the Roosevelt administration when he had worked in an office next door to Jackson‟s. It appears that 
the two men had had good relationship (see McKinzie, pp. 11, 32-5).  
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avoid providing more details of the events that preceded the making of Reichsbank 
Loot. 
When Thoms was cross-examined by Dr. Sauter, he could not say whether Funk had 
any knowledge of the contents of the Melmer deliveries: Thoms never had any 
contact with the President of the bank. Besides, it was Puhl, according to Thoms, „who 
had to decide the way this affair was to be dealt with; and he desired and ordered 
[it]‟.133 Sauter employed a useful tactic for Funk‟s defence: some of the questions 
were clearly aimed to make Thoms wary of incriminating himself. As with the 
unintended results of the Prosecution‟s cross-examination of Puhl, this resulted in 
qualifications and retractions of some of Thoms‟ previously submitted written 
testimony. The witness now asserted that at the time the deliveries began, he was 
unaware of their potentially criminal nature.134 Even more troublesome for the 
Prosecution, he now attempted to suggest that, despite having noticed the words 
„Lublin‟ and „Auschwitz‟ in later deliveries, he did not know until after he was captured 
by the Allies that these were the sites of concentration camps.135 Yet Dodd had a 
chance to contest this with some skill: 
MR. DODD: Now, I suppose you found lots of things among these shipments with 
names written on them. There must have been something that 
made you remember "Auschwitz," isn't that so?  
THOMS: Yes.  
MR. DODD: Well, what was it? 
THOMS: I must assume - I mean that I know from my recollection that there 
was some connection with a concentration camp, but I cannot say. 
I am of the opinion that [my realization of this connection] must 
have happened later. It is really... 
MR. DODD: Well, I don't care to press it. I just wanted to make perfectly clear to 
the Tribunal that you told us that you did remember "Auschwitz" and 
it had such a meaning for you that you remembered it as late as af-
ter the surrender of Germany. That is so, isn't it? 
THOMS: Yes.  
MR. DODD: I have no further questions.136 
 
 
6.5. Funk’s defence breaks down 
Despite the efforts of the Defence, Thoms had provided enough useful testimony to 
compliment the Prosecution‟s written evidence of transactions between the SS and 
the bank (as well as the bank‟s internal correspondence concerning the processing 
                                                     
133 IMT. 15/May/1946, Vol. XIII, p. 606. 
134 Ibid., p. 608. 
135 Ibid. 
136 IMT, Vol. XIII, 15/May/1946, p. 615 (Emphasis added). 
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of the items).137 Puhl had provided convincing evidence of Funk‟s awareness of these 
deliveries. The case against Funk was, therefore, strong enough to provoke the ex-
president of the Reichsbank into devoting most of his final statement to the matter of 
the „Melmer‟ deliveries.138 By then, he had also to contend with an affidavit given by 
Oswald Pohl, the head of the WVHA, a man who was directly responsible to Himmler, 
and who had been in contact with both Puhl and Funk in regard to arranging the 
deliveries. Pohl had only been captured by the British on 27th May 1946 (after Funk‟s 
defence case had been completed) and his testimony read in court (by a 
Prosecution lawyer) in early August as part of the case against the SS as a criminal 
organisation.139 The Defence had objected to the use of this affidavit on the grounds 
that Pohl was a „millionfold murderer‟ who could not be trusted to tell the truth.140 But 
the reply that came from the Prosecution seemed to be accepted by the Tribunal: 
„...even murderers sometimes tell the truth‟.141 
Pohl‟s affidavit was accepted as evidence and confirmed that Himmler had told 
him of his meeting with Funk before the deliveries began.142 The courtroom discussions 
over Pohl‟s affidavit had even provoked Funk into admitting that he, Funk, had asked 
Himmler to appoint someone (Himmler chose Pohl) to discuss the arrangements with 
his bank‟s vice-president.143 It also led to his admission that Funk had discussed the 
matter with his vice-president after (as well as before) the first SS delivery had been 
made.144 Just as incriminating for Funk was Pohls‟ recollection of visiting the vaults with 
the vice-president and seeing some of the items that his SS department had delivered 
(items which Thoms had suggested were similar to those represented by the film).145 
Pohl remembered that after this tour, he had lunched with Funk, vice-president Puhl, 
and others, during which time it was mentioned that the valuables he had just seen in 
the vaults had been delivered by his department (the WVHA) and that they had 
originated from concentration camps.146 The testimony that Pohl had provided did 
little to exonerate his own, more active, role in genocide – other than to imply 
                                                     
137 See notes 71 & 72. 
138 IMT, Vol. XXII, 31/Aug/1946, pp. 387-8. 
139 IMT, Vol. XX, 5/Aug/1946, pp. 315-7; PS-4045, IMT, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 110-13. The prosecutor was Major 
Frederick Elwyn-Jones who was later Attorney General of Great Britain, 1964-70. 
140 IMT, Vol. XXI, 12/Aug/1946, pp. 1-3. 
141 Ibid., p. 3.  
142 As we have seen, Funk, despite having first denied it, admitted meeting Himmler before instructing Puhl 
to arrange for the deliveries (see p.174). IMT, Vol. XX, 5/Aug/1946, p. 316; PS-4045, IMT, Vol. XXXIV, p. 112. 
143 IMT, Vol. XXI, 16/Aug/1946, p. 238. Funk asserted that he had already testified to this, but this was not 
the case. 
144 IMT, Vol. XXI, 16/Aug/1946, p. 245. 
145 IMT, Vol. XX, 5/Aug/1946, p. 317. 
146 Ibid. 
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continually that everything he had done had been first instigated or ordered by 
Himmler.147 When asked by Dodd what motive Puhl might have in falsely incriminating 
Funk, therefore, the ex-president of the bank could not provide a very convincing 
reason: 
FUNK: In my opinion the motive is purely psychological, because people 
who are in the terrible situation that Pohl is in, who are indicted for 
the murder of millions, usually attempt to incriminate others. We 
know that.  
MR. DODD: May I interrupt you ...You mean in the same position that you find 
yourself in? 
FUNK: No, I do not regard myself as a murderer of millions.148 
 
Funk was not a murderer of millions but, during the period of his presidency, he had 
collaborated with such murderers – most significantly, Heinrich Himmler. Furthermore, 
he had facilitated further collaboration between his subordinates – employees at his 
bank – and the head of the WVHA, Oswald Pohl, a man who was responsible for the 
„administration‟ of concentration camps and was indeed a „murderer of millions‟.149 
 
 
6.6.  Injustice Conveyed 
The Tribunal‟s judgement regarding Funk‟s part in this affair suggested that his guilt 
amounted to turning a blind eye to murder: 
In 1942 Funk entered into an agreement with Himmler under which the Reichsbank 
was to receive certain gold and jewels and currency from the SS and instructed his 
subordinates, who were to work out the details, not to ask too many questions. As 
a result of this agreement the SS sent to the Reichsbank the personal belongings 
taken from the victims who had been exterminated in the concentration camps. 
The Reichsbank kept the coins and bank notes and sent the jewels, watches, and 
personal belongings to Berlin municipal pawn shops. The gold from the eyeglasses 
and gold teeth and fillings were stored in the Reichsbank vaults. Funk has pro-
tested that he did not know that the Reichsbank was receiving articles of this kind. 
The Tribunal is of the opinion that he either knew what was being received or was 
deliberately closing his eyes to what was being done.150 
Although, elsewhere in the judgement, the Tribunal had derived an interpretation of 
the London Charter that curtailed the relevance of the doctrine of conspiracy (see 
Chapter 3), this particular section of the judgement – relating to Funk‟s culpability in 
                                                     
147 PS-4045, IMT, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 110-113. 
148 IMT, Vol. XXI, 16/Aug/1946, p. 242. 
149 In January 1947, Oswald Pohl would be indicted for trial before a subsequent Nuremberg tribunal (Case 
No. 4) and found guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and membership of a criminal 
organization (the SS). He would be sentenced to death by hanging – a sentence, unlike many others, 
that was (eventually, after unsuccessful appeals) carried out on 7/Jun/1951. NMT, Vol. V, pp. 195, 1062, 
1254-5. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 1161. 
150 IMT, Vol. XXII, p. 551. 
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regard to the „Melmer‟ deliveries – appears to have reflected the American 
Prosecution‟s aims in proving just such crime: conspiracy to commit Crimes Against 
Humanity.151 Funk had been „of a station and rank which does not soil his own hands 
with blood‟; he had been a defendant who had known „how to use lesser folk as 
tools,‟ as Jackson had put it in his opening speech.152 This part of the judgement 
sounded (inadvertently) so like an endorsement of the validity of the American 
Prosecution‟s emphasis on the doctrine of conspiracy because there was no 
evidence that Funk had actually seen the contents of the deliveries until they were 
shown on the screen in the courtroom. Whilst remaining president of the bank, it was 
quite possible – and probable – that Funk had, indeed, never set eyes on the personal 
effects of the murdered victims of concentration camps, such as alarm clocks, 
cigarette cases, or gold teeth and dentures. To keep them out of sight was, for Funk, 
to keep them from troubling his conscience. 
Without mention of the film in the judgement, Funk was found guilty, among other 
things, of Crimes Against Humanity.153 This was not, however, quite the end of the 
film‟s legal history. It appeared once again in a „subsequent‟ Nuremberg trial, the 
„Ministries‟ trial (case 11). Before an exclusively American tribunal, it was shown on 20 th 
March 1948 as part of the Prosecution case against Reichsbank vice-President Emil 
Puhl.154 For the American judges at this trial, as with those on the bench at the IMT, the 
film was of little „probative‟ value. Yet, without a Soviet contingent of prosecutors and 
judges involved, there was less concern about controversy over the move of treasure 
from the Russian zone. Thus the word „Merkers‟ had appeared very occasionally 
during this under-reported trial, and briefly in the judgement. There was, as a result, a 
more explicit explanation in this Tribunal‟s judgement regarding the limits of the film as 
a piece of evidence: 
While we have little doubt that the articles shown in the film (US-845 IMT, Pros. Ex. 
1919) were delivered by the [United States] Army to the Reich Bank branch in 
Frankfurt and were part of the loot which the Reich Bank had stored in the salt 
mines at Merkers, the chain of proof is not entirely complete. We shall therefore 
disregard the film, but the facts are proved independently by the evidence which 
we have heretofore outlined.155 
Once again, a tribunal had deemed the film worthy as admissible evidence, but due 
                                                     
151 For the differences between the prosecution‟s indictment and the tribunal‟s interpretation of it – most 
particularly in regard to the doctrine of conspiracy – see Chapter 3. 
152 IMT, Vol. II, 21/Nov/1945, pp. 105. 
153 Indicted on all four counts, Funk was found guilty on counts 2, 3, and 4 – as they were interpreted by 
the tribunal (see Chapter 3). 
154 IWM/FO-646/Case XI/Vol. 210, p. 3,758. This case is also referred to as the „Wilhelmstrasse‟ case, from 
the street in Berlin at which several departments of government were located. 
155 NMT, Vol. XIV, p. 617. 
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to a certain reticence on the part of prosecutors in divulging the full story of the 
American move of treasure, viewed it as inadequate as proof without other – written 
and oral – evidence. 
More than reliance on documents and witness testimony, however, the screening 
of Reichsbank Loot had generated sufficient drama and a suitably salient sense of 
injustice for news reporters who might otherwise have omitted mention of the case of 
Funk‟s collaboration with the SS. As one employee of the IMT General Secretariat put 
it, „all the talk at the Palace of Justice was of the gold teeth of concentration camp 
victims stored in the vaults of the Reichsbank while [Funk] was president.‟156 Such 
headlines as „Tribunal to see Film of Hoard‟ or „Funk shaken by Gold Teeth Film‟ did 
something to inform readers of the case.157 It had been, therefore, the showing of the 
film that had brought greater significance as well as public attention to the case of 
Funk‟s collaboration with the SS. As with the other films designed to illustrate a 
systematic programme of atrocity, the process of showing Reichsbank Loot 
constituted more than the submission of evidence within a framework of legal 
procedure: confronting Funk with his conscience – and shaping this confrontation into 
a public event – was an act of justice in the mode of drama. 
Whilst providing little probative value upon which either of the tribunals could rely, 
to have presented such items in visual form was to have evoked the moral 
implications of collaboration with the SS – something which Funk (and Puhl) had, until 
the film was shown, managed to avoid. Projecting the film produced more drama 
than documents or even witnesses could have achieved by themselves. It had been 
the film that had left Funk „confused‟ and „deeply shocked‟.158 The very process of 
projecting it had provided a tangible connection to the victims of concentration 
camps, something that had already been visualized with horror during the IMT trial in 
November 1945 (see Chapter 5). Displaying images of the personal effects and gold 
dentures of those murdered – mostly Jews from Auschwitz, although this was not 
clearly expressed by the Prosecution – and repeatedly mentioning the words 
„concentration camps‟ after the film had been shown (evoking the unforgettable 
images in Nazi Concentration Camps), was enough to conjure a lasting image of 
what Jackson would refer to in his closing speech as „probably the most ghoulish 
collateral in banking history‟.159 The spectacle of moral drama, therefore, was 
                                                     
156 Neave, Nuremberg, p. 125. 
157 ‟Tribunal to see film of hoard‟, Palestine Post, 7/May/1946; Walter Cronkite, „Funk Shaken by Gold Teeth 
Film‟, United Press/Palestine Post, (Jerusalem), 8/May/1946. 
158 IMT, Vol. XIII, 7/May/1946, p. 203. 
159 IMT, Vol. XIX, 26/Jul/1946, p. 416. 
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achieved using film despite the absence of gruesome imagery. The accusatory 
nature of showing a film to a defendant in the courtroom added drama to a case 
that was based upon more „probative‟ documentary evidence and witness-
testimony. To see the film itself was to visualize a case of injustice. To see it being 
showed to the defendant was to see some justice being done. We can conclude, 
therefore, that the American Prosecution‟s case at the Nuremberg IMT succeeded as 
moral drama most especially due to the way in which it utilized the medium of film. 
  
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION  
 
Whilst negotiating plans in the summer of 1945 for a trial of „the Major War Criminals‟ 
that would take place as soon as possible, British representatives appeared relatively 
content to have the Nazi leaders condemned for the violation of treaties. The Soviets 
were primarily interested in punishment so that the enemies of Soviet communism 
would see the price of opposition. The French hoped for justice, not by demonstrating 
the immorality of Nazi „aggression‟, but simply by proving to a court „that the Nazis 
were bandits‟.1 The Americans were, in contrast to all the other negotiators, 
particularly interested in planning a grand showcase of American justice that would 
revisit two decades of European history and, in doing so, impart political and moral 
lessons – for the present and the future. 
Thirty-five years later, Michael Biddiss provided an insightful analysis of some of the 
legacies the trial had bequeathed to the time in which he wrote.2 There were 
problems – such as the creation of a historical record derived from the overriding 
objective to condemn rather than to explain – but there were commendable 
achievements too. The trial, together with the historical narrative it produced, ensured 
that, at least within Western Germany, „fewer fantasies‟ were likely to develop after 
the Second World War than had been the case after the First.3 He concluded by 
claiming that what E. M. Forster had said of democracy was worth saying of the trial 
as well: „that it be given two cheers [, ...] probably no more than two cheers, but also 
very definitely no less‟.4 With this, Biddiss had, in fact, inadvertently alluded to a 
crucial connection between the trial and a particular concern of the American 
Prosecution. That team of well-educated and privileged Americans was – as we have 
seen most clearly through an examination of the film That Justice Be Done in chapter 
2 – insistent about the „democratic‟ nature of the trial when appealing for support 
from the American people. What these lawyers advocated was „democratic justice‟ 
with all its virtues – in dramatic contrast to the horrific vices of „Nazi justice‟. Just as 
significantly, as chapter 2 also demonstrated, American designs on the laws of the 
London Charter were heavily influenced by what their American authors believed to 
be the interests of the American people. 
This has significant implications for the contention that the Nuremberg IMT, due to 
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3 Ibid., p. 613. 
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the fact of being a legal process, distorted the historical record by obscuring the 
specific identity of the primary intended and actual victims of Nazi ideology and 
genocide. The argument is made most forcefully by Donald Bloxham who suggests 
that the historical narratives produced at Nuremberg were subject to the „tyranny of 
a construct‟ – the legal doctrine of „conspiracy‟ which was used most particularly in 
conjunction with the new crime of waging an „aggressive‟ war.5 There is evidence 
within the pages of this dissertation that clearly supports the idea that the specifically 
Jewish identity of victims was, indeed, obscured by the American Prosecution in its 
narration of Nazi criminality at Nuremberg – the case of the film, Nazi Concentration 
Camps, demonstrates this well in chapter 5. There is also much evidence to suggest 
that the American Prosecution‟s first priority of prosecuting the defendants for their 
part in a conspiracy to commit „aggressive war‟ (considered more significant than 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity) meant that the genocide of European 
Jewry was characterised as a mere by-product of Nazi war-making. As we have seen 
in chapter 3, Robert Jackson stated that atrocities committed within the borders of a 
foreign state were of no concern to outsiders unless that state was involved in 
planning illegal wars. 
Yet to imply that the legal framework of Nuremberg was, of itself, primarily 
responsible for a distortion of historical interpretation that lasted for decades, is to 
downplay the significance of the political context surrounding the creation and 
application of the laws of the London Charter. From an American perspective, the 
reality of war had begun with the humiliation of Pearl Harbour and, twenty years after 
the First World War, had embroiled, once again, American soldiers in bloody 
European affairs. This had led to the murder of American soldiers by the SS at 
Malmedy. From this American perspective, such injustices experienced in war would 
not have happened without the „crime‟ of making war itself. If any law had the 
potential to deter aggressors from embroiling peaceful Americans in further wars, 
then, believed Robert Jackson, it was the crime of aggressive war that was most likely 
to succeed. Until the Tribunal delivered its Judgement, it had seemed to him, 
furthermore, that the use of the doctrine of conspiracy would only help in addressing 
the scale of Nazi ambition. A conspiracy to commit aggressive war, therefore, 
appeared to be the best combination of legal invention and the use of American 
domestic legal tradition that would address the sense of injustice experienced by 
millions of Americans. The most dramatic expression of this American sense of injustice 
appeared in That Justice Be Done, a film that also aimed to justify – to the American 
                                                     
5 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, pp. 69-75. 
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people – a legal response. The effort and expense invested in making this film 
constitutes evidence in itself of the importance that Jackson and others held in 
addressing the American public‟s concerns. 
Since American influence in creating the laws of the London Charter was driven by 
a concern with the interests of the American public, it was those interests – as 
perceived by American representatives – that a) prioritised American victims as most 
worthy of justice and b) prioritised the classification of war-making as the supreme 
crime. The adoption of „Conspiracy‟ and „Crimes Against Peace‟ was the result of 
these American concerns – and the efforts of democratic elites to address them. Such 
interests, rather than any laws, were themselves the sources of historical distortion – 
driven, as they were, by a perspective that downplayed the significance of 
genocide. A critical perspective on the practice of law must counter the legalist‟s 
belief in law‟s autonomy with the question „who‟s law?‟6 Although Gary Bass 
convincingly dismisses the old complaint of „Victors‟ Justice‟ as irrelevant, one major 
problem with the laws applied at the Nuremberg IMT is that, in the case of American 
involvement, the prosecutors were also the legislators.7 In both respects, the 
Americans took the leading roles; thus, the IMT was not as „international‟ as it is 
sometimes remembered.8 It was not, therefore, the fact of a legal process, per se, 
that resulted in a distorted historical interpretation of Nazism; rather, it was the result of 
too much opportunity for American Prosecutors to advance their particular interests. 
The same criticism has been made of Israelis in regard to the trial of Adolf Eichmann.9 
But, despite its legal imperfections, the Eichmann trial demonstrated that the primary 
victims of Nazi-perpetrated genocide could be written into history within a legal 
setting.  
The other purported consequence of Bloxham‟s „tyranny‟ of conspiracy is the 
historiographical legacy of intentionalism enforced by the Nuremberg IMT.10 This has 
reinforced the view that Nuremberg was „the birthplace of intentionalism‟.11 It is true 
that the doctrine of conspiracy, as well as the very process of holding Nazi leaders to 
account, did reinforce an intentionalist interpretation of Nazi responsibility. Yet, once 
again, there is a danger of confusing the source of the problem with its effects. As we 
                                                     
6 By „autonomy‟ I mean what Judith Shklar referred to when observing legalists‟ belief that „the rules are 
“there”‟ – i.e. simply “there” to be discovered rather than – in reality – invented. Shklar, Legalism, p. 10. 
7 „The question‟, states Bass, „is not whether we are looking at victors‟ justice. Probably. But which victor? 
And what justice?‟. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, p. 16. 
8 Jeremy Rabkin, 'Nuremberg Misremembered,' SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1999), pp. 86-88. 
9 Arendt, Eichmann, p. 259. 
10 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, pp. 204-208. 
11 Erich Haberer, 'History and Justice: Paradigms of the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes,' Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2005), p. 494. (Emphasis Added). 
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have seen in chapter 2, war-time research and analysis by the OSS – the organisation 
that became an early influence in Washington on the topic of prosecuting Nazi war 
criminals – suggested, as early as June 1943, the idea of prosecuting individuals for 
plotting „world domination‟ and for the „launching of illegal wars‟ and „aggression‟. 
Such prescriptions were based upon a considerable amount of historical work 
authored by individuals considered to be the most talented and authoritative 
historians of the Third Reich.12 The histories they wrote, being products of their time, 
were mostly concerned – as most history had been since the days of Ranke - with the 
leaders and structures of government rather than the responsibility or behaviour of 
„ordinary‟ people. Not much significance could be placed in the „little man‟ (or 
woman) given the context of a German historiography in Washington that was 
already weighed down with Totalitarianism, an interpretive stance that precluded 
much consideration of low-level agency in anything – including participation in 
genocide.13 In short, „intentionalism‟ preceded Nuremberg; law merely followed the 
interpretive trends of historical research. As a result, the implication that a legal 
process is inherently incompatible with historical pedagogy remains unproven. 
 
Many historians have utilised the documentation produced as evidence at the IMT, 
but it is Nuremberg‟s legal achievements that are most widely considered to have 
provided a valuable institutional legacy. Since the end of the Cold War, Nuremberg 
has served as a guide in identifying successes to be imitated and pitfalls to be 
avoided. As one jurist summarizing the spirit of the laws in the first decade of the 21 st 
century has stated, „History has proven kind to Nuremberg, in so far as it remembers 
the trials that were held there as a watershed. Over time, these trials have in fact 
become lionised – mostly because of the events of the past decade‟.14 The 
international criminal courts that have been in operation over the last decade were 
built upon some of the same foundations as Nuremberg. They inherit some of the 
same political imperfections but, apart from a few notable exceptions (including the 
USA), the laws of the ICC have garnered a much wider, and thus more legitimate, 
international consensus than was achieved for the Nuremberg IMT (where one nation 
took a leading role, only three others were directly involved, and approximately a 
score could only opt to register their approval). The ICC is also more devoted to 
                                                     
12 Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp. 62-96. 
13 Ibid., p. 67. 
14 Mark Drumbl, 'International Criminal Law: Taking Stock of a Busy Decade,' Melbourne Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2009), p. 38. 
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foregrounding the victims of genocide and crimes against humanity.15  
Nevertheless, there are critics of the ICC. But most do not make a priority of 
complaining about the lack of drama in the courtroom (the most aggressive critics 
are usually motivated by the fear of finding themselves or their fellow-nationals held 
to account).16 However, advocates of the ICC might take something valuable from 
Nuremberg by identifying an important element that has not been much replicated in 
international criminal courts today: the process of dramatizing procedure in striving to 
ensure that justice is seen to be done. There are, it appears, irresolvable problems. The 
glass screen that Nuremberg prosecutors decided to do without (as we saw in 
chapter 4) provides a relevant example of a concrete and metaphorical difference 
between the Nuremberg IMT and its more recent successors. The courtroom at 
Nuremberg was a theatre in which defendants, prosecutors, judges and observers sat 
in the same room together. Such circumstances enhanced the potential for staging 
the spectacle that I have dubbed „the celluloid mousetrap‟ – staging a play within 
the play of Nuremberg in order to test for signs (or the absence) of remorse. But for an 
observer at the ICTY or ICC, the entire courtroom is hermetically sealed with bullet-
proof glass. There are, of course, very good and obvious reasons for this. Nevertheless, 
the observer beyond the glass screen, who hears the proceedings only through 
headphones, cannot but feel one step removed from the heart of the matter – as 
though s/he is watching the entire affair on a very large screen. Furthermore, whilst it is 
commendable that proceedings of the ICC can be viewed on any computer with an 
internet connection, such a mode of viewing removes the observer one step further – 
to the point of creating a purely private experience.17 The difference suggests a 
parallel to the comparison of watching a film in a cinema (i.e. communally) with 
watching it privately at home. This is a very relevant comparison since Nuremberg was 
not only recorded as a very public piece of theatre; news of its development was also 
experienced communally – in the cinema-theatres across the United States and 
elsewhere. In this sense, news in the 1940s was a communal experience that allowed 
its audience to engage in the spectacle of justice at Nuremberg. 
Such circumstances (particularly those beyond the courtroom) cannot be 
reconstructed now. Yet, being confronted with genocide and crimes against 
                                                     
15 Susana SàCouto & Katherine Cleary, 'Victims' Participation in the Investigations of the International 
Criminal Court,' Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2008). 
16 A good example comes in the person of John Bolton who stated: „[Our] approach is likely to maximize 
the chances that the ICC will wither and collapse, which should be our objective‟. See: Shahram Dana, 
'Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International Criminal Court,' John Marshall Law Review, Vol. 
43, No. 3 (2010), p. xxiii. 
17 The ICC website currently has video-streaming facilities available from the main page: http://www.icc-
cpi.int (last access: 19/Sep/2011).  
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humanity, the existence of the International Criminal Court is evidence of a moral, as 
well as political, consensus. In the 1940s, there was considerable consensus among 
the Allies – before, during and after the Nuremberg IMT – that Nazism was not only a 
terrible form of politics, but that it was also terribly (morally) wrong. Crimes committed 
against humanity, proclaimed François de Menthon, the French Chief Prosecutor, 
were not only directed against specific innocent victims; they were crimes committed 
against la condition humaine.18 The British Attorney General, Hartley Shawcross, 
echoed Jackson‟s moral assertions when, in his final speech, he declared: „That these 
defendants participated in and are morally guilty of crimes so frightful that the 
imagination staggers and reels back at their very contemplation is not in doubt.‟19 
Given this consensus amongst the Allies (or, at least, amongst the liberal ones) the 
American effort to impart moral lessons to Germans was bound to receive Allied 
support. But as we have seen, the moral spectacle that was staged by the American 
Prosecution was also designed with American reception in mind. Not only would 
Germans see that what their leaders had done was wrong; Americans would see, in 
dramatic fashion, that their own cause was just. Whilst using film proved to be the 
most effective method of producing moral drama from within the courtroom, the 
examination of the American Prosecution in this dissertation demonstrates that, 
whatever form of evidence might have been available, Americans were determined 
to do justice in the form of moral drama. Today, however, the moral drama of 
international criminal justice is not articulated or communicated to the same degree.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 IMT, 16/Jan/1946, Vol. V, p. 406. 
19 IMT, 26/Jul/1946, Vol. XIX, p. 433. 
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APPENDIX 1 
M O T I O N - P I C T U R E  F I L M S  
P R E S E N T E D  A S  E V I D E N C E  A T  T H E  N U R E M B E R G  I M T  T R I A L  
 
 Film Title Date Screened 
Docu-
ment(s) 
Number 
 
Exhibit 
Number 
IMT 
documentation, 
Vol. & pages 
1 Nazi Concentration Camps 29/Nov/1945 PS-2430 USA-79 XXX, pp. 357-471 
2 The Nazi Plan 11/Dec/1945 PS-3054 USA-167 XXXI, pp. 524-636  
3 Original 8mm film of Atrocities against Jews 13/Dec/1945 PS-3052 USA-280 XXXI, pp. 520-524 
4 Hidden Forces 05/Feb/1946 RF-1152 RF-1152 - 
5 
The Atrocities by the German Fascist Invaders in the 
USSR 
19/Feb/1946 USSR-81 USSR-81 - 
6 
Destruction of Art and Museums of National Culture 
perpetrated by the Germans on the territory of the 
USSR 
21/Feb/1946 USSR-98 USSR-98 - 
7 On the Destruction of Lidice 22/Feb/1946 USSR-370 USSR-370 - 
8 
On the Destruction perpetrated by the Germans on the 
territories of the Soviet Union 
22/Feb/1946 USSR-401 USSR-401 - 
9 German newsreel of Hitler’s arrival from France 03/May/1946 USA-835 USA-835 XXXIX, p. 236 
10 Reichsbank Loot 07/May/1946 USA-845 USA-845 XXXIX, p. 240 
 
This table lists all the moving-picture films presented as evidence at the Nuremberg IMT trial in 
chronological order (of their courtroom screening). The quickest way to identify which nation 
presented any given film is to note the alpha-prefix to the Exhibit Number in the penultimate 
column (e.g. USA for America, RF for the Republic of France, etc). Of the ten films, the 
American Prosecution submitted five: items 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10. The French Prosecution submitted 
one (item 4); the Soviets presented four (items 5, 6, 7 and 8); the British presented none. Items 3, 
4, 7 and 9 were („captured‟) original German-made films (or extracts) that remained unedited 
by the Prosecution teams.1 Item 2, The Nazi Plan, was a two-hour and forty-minute collection of 
original German newsreel edited by the American Prosecution. Each one of items 1, 5, 6, 8 and 
10 was shot either mostly or entirely by Allied cameramen and edited by the Allied nation 
concerned with its screening in court. The last column in the table provides references to the 
documentation volumes (rather than the transcripts which can be easily found with the 
relevant dates shown above) of the official publication of the Tribunal. Only the American 
Prosecution ensured that documentation relating to each of their film exhibits would appear in 
the official publication of the IMT. 
                                                     
1 The American prosecution showed films 3 & 9 twice in succession in the courtroom due to the difficulty in 
identification of scenes and/or individuals.  
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APPENDIX 2 
A R T I C L E  6  O F  T H E  L O N D O N  C H A R T E R ,  8 T H  A U G U S T ,  1 9 4 5 
 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES1 
Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for 
the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries 
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the 
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, 
committed any of the following crimes. 
[ i ]2 The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:  
 
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international trea-
ties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or con-
spiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;  
 
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or de-
portation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of 
or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or per-
sons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified 
by military necessity;  
 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war,3 or persecutions on political, racial 
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.  
[ x ]2 Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
                                                     
1 IMT, Vol. I, p. 11. 
2 I have labelled in brackets paragraphs i and x for the purposes of discussion in Chapter 3. 
3 After the discovery of inconsistencies between various translations of the Charter, a comma was 
substituted in place of a semi-colon after the word „war‟ through the Protocol of 6/Oct/1945. This 
correction was evident in the official publication of the Tribunal: International Military Tribunal, Trial of the 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg: 14 November 1945 - 1 
October 1946, 42 Vols. (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1947-9). This correction was not made, 
however, in the American prosecution‟s separate publication: Office of United States Chief of Counsel 
for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 11 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Depts. of State & War, 1946-8). The erroneous semi-colon was also reproduced subsequently in an article 
authored by one of the judges: Justice Birkett, 'International Legal Theories Evolved at Nuremberg,' 
International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1947). For the legal significance of this punctuation, see: Egon 
Schwelb, 'Crimes Against Humanity,' British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 23 (1946). 
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